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Abstract 
Depending on their nature and severity, disasters can create large volumes of debris and waste.  
Waste volumes from a single event can be the equivalent of many times the annual waste 
generation rate of the affected community.  These volumes can overwhelm existing solid waste 
management facilities and personnel.  Mismanagement of disaster waste can affect both the 
response and long term recovery of a disaster affected area.   
 
Previous research into disaster waste management has been either context specific or event 
specific, making it difficult to transfer lessons from one disaster event to another.  The aim of 
this research is to develop a systems understanding of disaster waste management and in turn 
develop context- and disaster-transferrable decision-making guidance for emergency and waste 
managers. 
 
To research this complex and multi-disciplinary problem, a multi-hazard, multi-context, multi-
case study approach was adopted.  The research focussed on five major disaster events: 2011 
Christchurch earthquake, 2009 Victorian Bushfires, 2009 Samoan tsunami, 2009 L’Aquila 
earthquake and 2005 Hurricane Katrina.  The first stage of the analysis involved the 
development of a set of ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators.  The indicators demonstrate 
a method by which disaster managers, planners and researchers can simplify the very large 
spectra of possible disaster impacts, into some key decision-drivers which will likely influence 
post-disaster management requirements.  The second stage of the research was to develop a set 
of criteria to represent the desirable environmental, economic, social and recovery effects of a 
successful disaster waste management system.  These criteria were used to assess the 
effectiveness of the disaster waste management approaches for the case studies.  The third stage 
of the research was the cross-case analysis.  Six main elements of disaster waste management 
systems were identified and analysed.  These were: strategic management, funding mechanisms, 
operational management, environmental and human health risk management, and legislation and 
regulation.  Within each of these system elements, key decision-making guidance (linked to the 
‘disaster & disaster waste’ indicators) and management principles were developed.   
 
The ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators, the effects assessment criteria and management 
principles have all been developed so that they can be practically applied to disaster waste 
management planning and response in the future.   
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Executive summary 
Depending on their nature and severity, disasters can create large volumes of debris and waste.  
Debris volumes can be the equivalent of many times the annual waste generation rate of the 
affected community.  These volumes can overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities 
and personnel.  
 
The presence of disaster waste affects almost every aspect of an emergency response, including: 
inhibiting search and rescue activities and emergency and welfare access to affected populations 
and potentially posing a public health hazard.  In the longer term, poor management of a clean-
up can result in a slow and costly recovery.  Limited rebuilding / repair can be carried out before 
the waste is removed, prolonged exposure to the waste is also potentially risky to public and 
environmental health, and psychosocial recovery may be inhibited by the presence of waste.  If 
managed effectively, debris can become a valuable resource in the recovery and rebuilding 
process and can have a positive effect on social and economic recovery. 
 
Previous research into disaster waste management has been either context specific or event 
specific making it difficult to transfer lessons from one disaster event to another.  Therefore, the 
specific objectives of this research were: 
 
1. To develop a robust analysis framework to research disaster waste management. 
2. To understand the high level system dynamics of disaster waste management 
systems. 
3. To investigate potential decision-making tools for disaster waste managers. 
4. To identify future research needs. 
 
A multi-hazard, multi-context, embedded, multi-case study analysis methodology was adopted.  
Five case studies were analysed: 2009 Victorian Bushfires, Australia; 2009 Samoan Tsunami; 
2009 L’Aquila earthquake;; 2005 Hurricane Katrina;; and 2011 Christchurch earthquake.  A cross-
case analysis was carried out using the model presented in the figure on the following page.  
Each system element (denoted by the circles in the model) was analysed and key principles were 
developed.   
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Cross-case study analysis model 
 
Disaster impacts 
For the purposes of this thesis five disaster impact indicators have been proposed to describe the 
disaster impact (relevant to disaster waste management): disaster scale, number of displaced 
persons, geographical extent, hazard duration and disruption of road network.  In addition, five 
key disaster waste characteristics have been developed: volume of waste, human health hazard, 
environmental health hazard, movement of waste and waste handling difficulty.  The indicators 
are used qualitatively during the thesis analysis; however, a semi-quantitative assessment 
approach is proposed such that the indicators can be used in pre and post-event planning and 
analysis.  
 
Effects 
To enable the effectiveness of a disaster waste management system to be qualitatively assessed 
for cross case analysis, 12 criteria were established (refer to table below).  As for the disaster 
impacts, a semi-quantitative assessment approach has been suggested for future application in 
pre and post-disaster situations. 
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Criteria for an effective disaster waste management system 
 Criteria 
Environmental  
Adverse environmental effects are minimised. 
Environmentally beneficial strategies encouraged (e.g. recycling). 
Economic 
Direct costs1 
 
Indirect costs 
 
Operational (waste handling and disposal) costs are minimised. 
Regulatory and strategic management costs are minimised. 
Local economy stimulated. 
Potential future costs from environmental remediation and adverse health effects 
are minimised. 
Social 
Psychosocial 
 
 
Human health 
 
Improves community spirit. 
Affected persons are empowered to participate in their own recovery. 
Public understands and accepts disaster waste management strategy. 
Human health (both general public and workers, acute and chronic) risks are 
effectively managed. 
Recovery  
The recovery is timely. 
The recovery facilitates a community wide recovery. 
 
Strategic management 
A strategic management structure, separate from peace-time (or business as usual) roles and 
organisational structures, is necessary for large scale events.  Generally, as the size of the disaster 
increases, disaster waste should be strategically managed at higher government levels.  Strategic 
management should also be led by the recovery authority with strong collaboration from peace-
time waste / environmental authorities. 
 
Funding mechanisms 
There are currently a wide range of approaches to funding for disaster waste management.  
However, in response to the catastrophic events assessed in this thesis, public funding was 
predominantly utilised, even in contexts where disaster recovery is typically privately funded.  In 
the case studies there was also a trend toward directly facilitated works rather than payment by 
lump sum or reimbursement.  Given the high potential for negative effects from poor disaster 
                                                 
1 Direct economic costs include those for waste collection, demolition, treatment, and disposal and all the 
management / overhead costs which relate directly to management of disaster waste.   
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waste management, the author suggests that disaster waste management (in particular detritus 
removal and demolition) should be publicly funded and directly facilitated. 
 
Operational management 
Between the case studies there were diverse operational management strategies.  Generally, it was 
found that detritus removal activities and debris management of major repair work should be 
individually facilitated.  Debris collection, demolition and disposal, on the other hand, are best 
carried out collectively in order to manage the collective risks of a poorly implemented clean-up.  
Ideally centralised management processes should include ‘cradle to grave’ waste management 
processes: that is, waste handling facilities should be linked to demolition and waste collection 
activities.  In the absence of an integrated procurement structure, time and cost contracts remove 
the majority of risk from the contractors and places it with the authority / organisation managing 
the waste.   
 
Recycling 
Several barriers to post-disaster recycling have been identified:   
 Time constraints 
 Limited resource availability 
 The mixed nature of the waste 
 Hazards in the waste matrix. 
 Displaced population 
 Post-disaster market challenges (capacity, availability, disruption, storage space 
limitations) 
 Contractual arrangements 
 Availability and feasibility of alternative waste management options 
 
Generally, if recycling is desired and there is an urgency to clear the affected area (and there are 
suitable waste handling facilities), recycling should be carried out offsite.  The likely additional 
costs for this should be recognised as an indirect cost saving.   
 
Environmental and public-health risk management 
Post-disaster, due to the speed and volume of works being carried out, potential environmental 
and public health risks are undoubtedly going to increase.  The increased uncertainty and 
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regulatory and operational resource capacity limitations must be considered when designing 
appropriate risk management strategies.  The author found that stream-lined site-specific 
approval processes that acknowledge and mitigate against the increased risks are generally a more 
favourable approach than providing permit exemptions. 
 
Legislation and regulation 
From a legislative and regulatory perspective, disaster waste management laws need to: allow for 
flexibility for adaptation to any situation; be bounded enough to provide support and confidence 
in outcomes for decision-makers; allow for timely decision-making and action; be collaborative; 
and focus on responsibility, not accountability.  
 
Future planning 
It is envisaged that the concepts in this thesis, in particular, the development of a disaster waste 
management planning approach and principles, will empower decision-makers to successfully 
manage disaster waste in the future.    
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Foreword 
I started this PhD research with such objectivity.  Academic detachment: to allow for a robust, 
impartial and (as far as possible in disaster research) repeatable study.  I would visit countries and 
talk to people about waste.  I would sympathise with the loss of lives, the damaged structures 
and the loss and hardship, but not empathise.  That is the role of the researcher. 
 
That objectivity and detachment was challenged when my hometown (and place of study) was 
affected by a series of significant and destructive earthquakes.  Canterbury, New Zealand, was 
struck by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake at 4:35am on the 4th of September 2010.  Thankfully, due 
to the location of the fault rupture, and the time of day, no lives were lost.  There was, however, 
significant liquefaction in residential areas and damage to unreinforced masonry structures.  That 
earthquake triggered a series of even more destructive aftershocks: in particular a magnitude 6.3 
earthquake at 12:51pm on the 22nd of February 2011 centred close to the city of Christchurch.  
This aftershock killed 185 people, and will lead to the demolition of at least 7,500 homes and 
1,400 commercial properties.  The historic buildings in Christchurch, in particular, were severely 
affected.  The fate of even our most iconic building, The Christchurch Cathedral, was still in 
question at the time of writing.  Along with the destruction, the earthquakes unearthed a 
powerful sense of community: from neighbours assisting each other to the self-coordinated 
efforts of the Student Volunteer and Farmy Armies shovelling hundreds of thousands of tonnes 
of liquefaction silt in the eastern suburbs.  Christchurch and New Zealand banded together like 
never before. 
 
My robust and impartial PhD research now seemed irrelevant.  I just wanted to use the 
knowledge I had gained to help my city regain its feet.  Fortunately I was given that opportunity.  
Helping to manage the waste from a disaster affecting my hometown was bittersweet.  From a 
research and learning point of view the opportunity was invaluable.  Once the observer, now I 
was the observed.  What from the outside I thought was important was now insignificant or 
even impractical.  From an emotional point of view, however, as the rubble was being removed, 
I saw the city I love get swept away along with the lives that were lost.   
 
Beyond the loss and sadness, I see an opportunity for Christchurch and those who live here: an 
opportunity to ‘build back better’, do things smarter and build on the sense of community that 
the earthquakes uncovered.  I am looking forward to the journey that we are all embarking on.
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Note that the acronym list and glossary below, relates to the main thesis document only.  
Additional acronym lists and glossaries are provided for the appendices as required.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Depending on their nature and severity, disasters can create large volumes of debris and 
waste.  In a review of past disasters in the United States (US), Reinhart and McCreanor 
(1999) calculated that in some cases debris volumes from a single event were the equivalent 
of five to fifteen times the annual waste generation rates of the affected community.  Similar 
ratios were found by Basnayake (2006) following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.  These 
volumes overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities and personnel.  Figure 1-1 
shows the enormous volumes of waste on Phi Phi Island one month after the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Phi Phi Island, Thailand, one month after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (photo 
source Erica Seville). 
 
The presence of disaster waste affects almost every aspect of an emergency response and 
recovery effort.  In the immediate response, disaster debris can cause road blockages.  
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Following the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan, road blockages prevented 
building access which in turn impeded rescuers, emergency services and lifeline support 
reaching survivors (Kobayashi, 1995).  Waste presence in a community also poses a potential 
public health risk.  Organic wastes and standing pools of water (potentially caused by debris 
blocking flow paths) can become vector breeding grounds.  Vector-borne diseases are a 
common form of communicable disease experienced post-disaster, particularly when there 
are large numbers of people displaced.  However, the risk of outbreak is relatively low 
(Watson et al., 2007).   
 
In the longer term, poor management of a clean-up can result in a slow and costly recovery.  
First, waste management is on the critical path to recovery.  Limited rebuilding and repair 
can be carried out before the waste is removed.  In Haiti an estimated half of the 10 million 
cubic metres of rubble remained to be cleared some two years after the earthquake 
(Moloney, 2011).  The prolonged exposure to the waste is also potentially risky to public and 
environmental health, as identified by Srinivas and Nakagawa (2008) in Sri Lanka following 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.  If managed effectively, debris can become a valuable 
resource in the recovery and rebuilding process and can have a positive effect on social and 
economic recovery. 
 
Historically disaster waste management has been managed as a logistical exercise.  The main 
focus was removing the material from the affected area with little thought to the longer term 
environmental impacts.  In L’Aquila, in 1703, a large earthquake severely damaged the town.  
The debris was deposited in an area behind the Basilica, which now forms the Botanic 
Gardens.  This site has required on-going remediation to stabilise the poorly compacted fill 
(Stagnini, pers. comm. 2010).  In Stuttgart, Germany, following World War II, 15 million 
cubic metres of rubble from ruined buildings was piled on top of an existing hill.  This hill is 
now a war memorial called Birkenkopf.  In Napier, New Zealand, following the 1931 
earthquake, the waste management solution was to dump the unsorted debris firstly into a 
lagoon (Figure 1-2) and secondly onto the beach adjacent to town.  The latter disposal site 
was eventually formed into a 40-50m wide domain that now runs the length of the 
commercial part of Napier (Johnston et al., 2009).  With increasing awareness and concern 
over potential environmental, social and economic impacts of waste management strategies, 
as well as the growing size and complexities of disasters, modern disaster waste managers 
have to take a far more integrated and considered approach.  
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Figure 1-2 Following the 1931 Napier earthquake, rubble from collapsed buildings was first 
dumped into a lagoon just west of the Napier CBD (pictured) and later along the 
Napier waterfront (photo source Alexander Turnbull Library) 
 
Improved standards for built infrastructure are decreasing the probable impact of disasters in 
many communities.  However, increased urbanisation and dependence on complex 
infrastructure networks increases a community’s vulnerability to a disaster.   
 
The majority of literature available on disaster waste and debris management comprises one-
off case studies and debris management planning guidelines.  It is a feature of disaster 
research that studies are often isolated and event-specific (Chang, 2010).  Issues of variability 
between disasters, time limitations and data access difficulties all make it challenging to 
conduct quantitative, cross-disaster studies.  Table 1.1 lists disaster waste management 
references specific to individual disasters.  The table is ordered first by hazard type and 
second in chronological order.  Debris management planning guidelines (Solis et al., 1995; 
USEPA, 1995b; FEMA, 2007; USEPA, 2008; Wellington Region Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Group, 2008; Johnston et al., 2009; UNOCHA, 2011) generally give a range of 
technical and management options for disaster waste.  Technical aspects include: waste 
collection and transportation; temporary debris storage; recycling; waste disposal; hazardous 
waste management.  Management aspects include: communication strategies; contract 
management; organisational roles and responsibilities; and record keeping.  The guidelines 
are based on existing institutional frameworks (legislative, organisational and financial) 
applicable to the given context. 
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Table 1.1 Disaster waste management references 
Hazard type Year References 
Conflict   
Beirut, Lebanon Post-1990 (Jones, 1996; Lauritzen, 1996/1997; Baycan and Petersen, 
2002; Bjerregaard, 2009) 
Mostar, Bosnia  Post-1995 (Lauritzen, 1995; Baycan and Petersen, 2002; DANIDA, 
2004) 
Kosovo Conflict Post-1999 (Baycan and Petersen, 2002; DANIDA, 2004; Bjerregaard, 
2009) 
Earthquakes   
Loma Prieta earthquake, US 1989 (Lauritzen, 1996/1997) 
Luzon earthquake, Philippines 1990 (Lauritzen, 1996/1997) 
Humboldt County Earthquake, US 1992 (State of California, 1997) 
Erzincan Earthquake, Turkey 1992 (Lauritzen, 1996/1997) 
Northridge earthquake, US 1995 (USEPA, 1995b; Jones, 1996; State of California, 1997; 
USEPA, 2008) 
Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, 
Kobe, Japan 
1995 (Kuramoto, 1995; Lauritzen, 1995; Lauritzen, 1998; 
Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999; Baycan and Petersen, 2002; 
Inoue et al., 2007; Hirayama et al., 2009; Hirayama et al., 
2010) 
Marmara earthquake, Turkey 1999 (Baycan and Petersen, 2002; Baycan, 2004) 
Fires   
City of Oakland Firestorm 1991 (State of California, 1997) 
Coastal Fires, US 1993 (USEPA, 1995b) 
Cerro Grande wildfire, US 2000 (USEPA, 2008) 
Cedar and Pines fires, US 2003 (County of San Diego, 2005; USEPA, 2008) 
Floods   
Midwest floods, US 1993 (USEPA, 1995b) 
Alstead Floods, US 2005 (USEPA, 2008) 
Hurricanes   
Hurricane Hugo, US 1989 (USEPA, 1995b) 
Hurricane Charley, US 1992 (MSW, 2006) 
Hurricane Andrew, US 1992 (Tansel et al., 1994; Meganck, 1995; USEPA, 1995b; Jones, 
1996; Luther, 2008) 
Hurricane Iniki, Hawaii, US 1992 (USEPA, 1995b) 
Hurricane Opal, US 1995 (Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999) 
Hurricane Fran, US 1996 (Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999) 
Hurricane Georges, US 1998 (Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999) 
Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne, 2004 (Solid Waste Authority, 2004) 
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Hazard type Year References 
US 
Seminole Florida Hurricane 
season, US 
2004 (USEPA, 2008) 
Hurricane Ivan, US 2004 (USEPA, 2008) 
Hurricane Katrina, US 2005 (Harbourt, 2005; LDEQ, 2005a; Pardue et al., 2005; 
Presley et al., 2005; SWANA, 2005; USEPA, 2005a; b; 
Brunker, 2006; Diaz, 2006; Esworthy et al., 2006; LDEQ, 
2006a; McCarthy and Copeland, 2006; Allen, 2007; Dubey 
et al., 2007; GAO, 2008; Jackson, 2008; Luther, 2008; 
Roper, 2008; USEPA, 2008; Cook, 2009; Denhart, 2009; 
Foxx & Company, 2009; Denhart, 2010; Moe, 2010; 
HHS.gov, accessed 2010) 
Hurricane Rita, US 2005 (LDEQ, 2006a; USEPA, 2008) 
Tornadoes   
Central Florida Tornadoes, US 1998 (Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999) 
Oklahoma Tornadoes, US 1999 (Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999) 
Tsunami   
Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 (Basnayake et al., 2005; Petersen, 2005; Selvendran and 
Mulvey, 2005; UNEP, 2005a; WMinE, 2005; Basnayake et 
al., 2006; Petersen, 2006; Pilapitiya et al., 2006; UNDP, 
2006; Srinivas and Nakagawa, 2008; Bjerregaard, 2009) 
Typhoon   
Toraji typhoon, Taiwan 2001 (Chen et al., 2007) 
Nari typhoon, Taiwan 2001 (Chen et al., 2007) 
Mindulle typhoon, Taiwan 2004 (Chen et al., 2007) 
Aere typhoon, Taiwan 2004 (Chen et al., 2007) 
Tokage Typhoon, Japan 2004 (UNEP, 2005c) 
Volcanic eruptions   
Mount St Helens eruption, US 1980 (Markesino, 1981; Dillman and M.L., 1982)  
Winter storm   
Lincoln Winter Storm, US 1997 (USEPA, 2008) 
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In addition there are a limited number of cross case study analyses (Lauritzen, 1995; 
1996/1997; Lauritzen, 1998; Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999; Baycan and Petersen, 2002; 
Petersen, 2004), and technical academic studies (Dubey et al., 2007; Inoue et al., 2007; Rafee 
et al., 2008; Hirayama et al., 2009; 2010).  The US Army Corps of Engineers (Channell et al., 
2009) and Ekici et al (2009) give broad reviews, but are still limited to the US context and to 
technical aspects of debris management.  Karunasena (2009) proposes to review disaster 
waste management in developing countries with an emphasis on the Sri Lankan context.  
However, the majority of the literature cited is US based and there is no analysis of the 
contextual relevance of US derived practices in other countries.   
 
The following literature review is divided into nine sections, corresponding to the key aspects 
of disaster waste management: 
 Planning 
 Waste characteristics – including waste composition and quantities 
 Disaster waste management phases 
 Waste handling, treatment and disposal 
 Environment 
 Economics 
 Social considerations 
 Organisational aspects 
 Funding 
 Legal frameworks 
 
In each section, the literature is critically analysed and a summary, in italics, of the missing 
links and deficiencies in the existing literature is presented.  These italicised summaries are 
later developed into the major lines of enquiry of this research.  Last, Section 1.12 outlines 
the thesis objectives and scope. 
 
This literature review is adapted from a paper written by the author (included in Appendix 
A): 
Brown, C., Milke, M. & Seville, E. (2011) "Disaster waste management: a review 
article". Waste Management, 31, 1085-1098. 
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1.2 Planning 
1.2.1 Developed countries 
With the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, efficient, effective and low 
impact recovery is becoming increasingly important.  One of the first comprehensive plans 
for disaster debris and waste was prepared by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (USEPA’s) in 1995.  The plan was titled “Planning for Disaster Debris” (USEPA, 
1995b) and was updated in 2008 (USEPA, 2008).   
 
The USEPA planning guidelines are built from the experience of previous events in the US 
and are framed around existing legislation, organisational structures and funding mechanisms 
(referred to here, collectively, as institutional frameworks).  In particular, they align with the 
Federal and Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) debris management guidelines 
(FEMA, 2007).  Both guidelines give a range of technical and management options for 
disaster waste.  Specific disaster waste management plans are the responsibility of individual 
municipalities and states, for example plans prepared by the State of California (1997) and 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ, 2006a).  Recently, FEMA 
introduced an incentives programme, by way of increased cost share of any future disaster 
debris management responses, to encourage localities to prepare debris management plans 
(USEPA, 2008).   
 
In addition to plans, in 2003 the USEPA launched a web-based information tool called 
USEPA’s Suite of Disaster Debris Management and Disposal Decision Support Tools 
(Thorneloe et al., 2007).  The tools are essentially a database for US users with GIS 
capacities, where the database includes technical information on safe waste handling, disposal 
options, facilities (including facility waste acceptance criteria, operator contact details), 
environmental and operational regulations and sample contract documents.   
 
Many authors and government authorities outside the US have also recognised the 
importance of preparing disaster waste management plans (Skinner, 1995; Solis et al., 1995; 
Jackson, 2008; Wellington Region Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2008; 
Johnston et al., 2009) but few country or location specific guidelines exist.  Many of the 
recommendations of these documents are based on the USEPA’s guidelines and/or take a 
similar form.  While the USEPA’s documents are comprehensive from a technical and 
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general management perspective, they are prepared alongside US specific institutional 
frameworks.  When transferring the USEPA guidelines to other contexts, authors do not 
seem to recognise the influence of these institutional frameworks and the need to assess and 
potentially develop context specific institutional frameworks for disaster waste management.   
 
These tools and guides also tend to be quite prescriptive.  They give little guidance on 
decision-making and option consideration in different disaster situations.   
 
1.2.2 Developing countries 
In 2005, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (ISDR, 2005) was developed to reduce 
disaster risk, particularly in vulnerable developing economies.  Planning for disaster recovery, 
including management of disaster waste, is part of the disaster risk reduction strategy.   
 
Disaster waste management plans in developing countries seldom exist.  In many cases 
peace-time2 solid waste management programmes do not even exist – indicating that solid 
waste management is a low priority.  Financial, technical and expert resources in developing 
countries are generally a limiting, if not prohibitive, factor in achieving disaster risk reduction 
goals.  The Joint United Nations Environment Programme / Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs Environment Unit have recently prepared disaster waste management 
guidelines specifically for developing countries (UNOCHA, 2011).  The guidelines cover 
many of the technical issues addressed in the USEPA guidelines, and management and 
implementation strategies are designed for countries with little or no existing infrastructure 
and/or waste management expertise.  Opportunities for livelihood promotion and 
maximising value from the resources are also emphasised in the draft document.   
 
Two isolated research studies identified a range of technical, managerial and institutional 
factors that may be limiting factors in the future management of disaster waste.  Karunasena 
et al. (2009) carried out an analysis of Sri Lanka’s preparedness to manage disaster waste.  
Rafee et al. (2008) made an assessment of the likely capability of the city of Tehran to 
manage earthquake waste.    
                                                 
2 Peace-time refers to the times when a community is not affected by a disaster.  Also referred to as ‘business as 
usual’. 
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Apart from the UNOCHA document, there are several documents available to guide first 
responders in dealing with disaster waste.  These include: World Health Organisation “Solid 
Waste Management in Emergencies” (WHO, 2005); Guidelines for Safe Disposal of 
Unwanted Pharmaceuticals in and after Emergencies (WHO, 1999); and the UNEP/OCHA 
Joint Environmental Unit “Initial clearing and debris removal” (JEU, 2006).  In addition 
there are several emergency management handbooks that cover all aspects of emergency 
recovery including brief sections on waste management.  Resources include Engineering in 
Emergencies (Davis and Lambert, 2002) and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees Handbook (2000).  All these documents cover solid waste disposal very generally 
and tend to focus on immediate management of waste generated in an emergency and 
municipal wastes in displaced populations or where solid waste infrastructure is not 
functioning.  They do not generally cover management of disaster-generated waste. 
 
There are currently numerous guides and tools available for handling hazardous wastes in 
developing countries that could be applied (in emergencies), including “A Brief Guide to 
Asbestos in Emergencies: Safer Handling & Breaking the Cycle” (Shelter Centre, 2009), and 
the Hazard Identification Tool (OCHA, 2009a).  Environmental assessment tools and guides  
are also available such as the Flash Environmental Assessment Tool (OCHA, 2008) and the 
Environmental Needs Assessment in Post-Disaster Situations (UNEP, 2008).  These tools 
are not currently integrated into the disaster waste management plans / guides discussed 
above. 
 
As for the planning guidelines in developed countries, these guides are generally limited to 
technical interventions.  They fail to address the managerial and institutional components 
that influence the effectiveness of a disaster waste management system such as funding, 
legislative considerations and organisational planning. 
 
Currently disaster waste management guidelines do not consider the impact of existing 
institutional frameworks on disaster waste management activities.  Guidance documents which 
include not only technical planning advice but also policy development recommendations would 
be a useful addition to the literature.  Research into the effectiveness of prescriptive versus 
decision-making type guidance would also be valuable.   
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1.3 Waste characteristics 
1.3.1 Waste composition 
It is well recognised that different types of waste are generated depending on both the type 
of built environment affected (e.g. coastal/inland, urban/rural), and the hazard type 
(Kobayashi, 1995; Solis et al., 1995; Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999; USEPA, 2008).  The 
variation occurs both in composition and manageability (ability to recycle, likely hazardous 
substances, handling procedures required, etc.).  For example, the nature of disaster waste 
generated from masonry houses will vary greatly from an environment with predominantly 
wooden houses.  Following Hurricane Katrina, waste managers were challenged by the 
mixture of hurricane and flood-generated debris (Luther, 2008) because each required 
different management approaches.  To date the studies cited only report context specific 
experiences.  The studies also report waste composition in a variety of ways so that it is 
difficult to make comparisons between cases.   
 
The waste streams generated by disasters generally identified in the literature are: 
 vegetative debris or green-waste 
 sediment / soil and rock 
 house-hold hazardous waste (refrigerant, oils, pesticides, etc.) 
 construction and demolition debris from damaged buildings and infrastructure (such 
as roads, pipes and other services) 
 industrial and toxic chemicals (including fuel products) 
 putrescible wastes (such as rotting food) 
 vehicles and vessels 
 recyclables (plastics, metals etc.) 
 electronic and white goods 
 waste from disaster-disturbed pre-disaster disposal sites 
 human and animal corpses 
 
The largest component of urban disaster waste would meet the peace-time classification of 
construction and demolition (C&D) waste.  Some components of this waste stream pose a 
potential health risk.  These include: asbestos, arsenic treated woods (Dubey et al., 2007), 
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gypsum (leaching in disposal sites) (Jang and Townsend, 2001a; USEPA, 2008) and organic 
pollutants (Jang and Townsend, 2001b). 
 
In addition to disaster generated waste, authors have identified other waste streams that can 
be indirectly generated post-event, including: excessive unwanted donations such as food, 
pharmaceuticals and clothing (Ekici et al., 2009), large amounts of health care wastes 
(Petersen, 2004), rotten food from power outages (Luther, 2008) and emergency relief food 
packaging (Solis et al., 1995).   
 
Municipal waste must also be managed if the disaster affected community is still living in the 
affected area.  If not collected, municipal waste may be mixed with disaster debris (Jackson, 
2008), which: poses a potential public health risk; makes it more difficult to separate the 
wastes (Baycan and Petersen, 2002); and, in the US, makes the disaster waste ineligible for 
collection under FEMA regulations (FEMA, 2007). 
 
The terms waste and debris are used differently by different authors.  However, in general, 
debris refers specifically to largely inert building and vegetative materials generated by the 
disaster, and waste refers to the entire waste matrix, including post-disaster municipal waste. 
 
Some authors use a simple matrix to identify expected waste categories from different hazard 
types (see Table 1.2 for disasters in the US).  Other authors describe not only the types of 
waste expected but the location and nature of waste expected and how that may affect debris 
management options.  As examples:  
 Hurricane storm surges can move private property (including potentially industrial) 
wastes away from their source site thereby affecting the wider community (Esworthy 
et al., 2006; USEPA, 2008). 
 Hurricane waste is generally more lightweight and with large amounts of vegetative 
debris (USEPA, 2008). 
 Combined flood and hurricane damage means that wastes are mixed beyond the 
point where separation is practical (Esworthy et al., 2006) (observed following 
Hurricane Katrina).  Similarly, tornado debris in the US is often so twisted it is 
difficult to separate and, therefore, recycle (Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999).  
 Flood events can generate mould problems (Cook, 2009). 
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 Earthquake debris typically comprises construction material, personal property and 
sediment (USEPA, 1995b). 
 Earthquake debris generally needs to be managed using specialist equipment and 
personnel (as observed in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, due to the weight of 
the collapsed structures) (Booth, 2010). 
 Fires typically generate less debris than other hazards (USEPA, 1995b) and the debris 
is likely to be more difficult to separate and to ensure waste components are 
contaminant (hazardous or non-hazardous) free (County of San Diego, 2005). 
 
Table 1.2 Typical debris streams for different types of disasters (FEMA, 2007) 
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Hurricanes / 
Typhoons 
X X X X X X X X X 
Tsunamis X X X X X X X X X 
Tornadoes X X X X X X  X X 
Floods X X X X X X X X X 
Earthquakes  X X  X X X   
Wildfires X  X  X X X   
Ice storms X    X     
 
1.3.2 Waste quantities 
As for waste composition and nature, the quantity of waste will vary based on the type of 
disaster and the built environment affected.  Table 1.3 shows reported waste volumes from 
some large scale disasters in the last 15 years.  As can be seen from the table, waste quantities 
are reported in terms of both mass and volume.  None of the waste quantities reported 
explicitly stated how they were measured (for example, truck loads or landfill volumes), 
calculated or estimated (for example waste volumes or mass per house or per affected area).  
The geographical extents also are generally not reported so it is difficult to give, say, a per 
affected area or per capita waste generation estimate.  Reinhart and McCreanor (1999) have 
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estimated that large scale disasters typically generate in the order of 5-15 years’ worth of 
annual waste generation in a community.  The majority of the disaster waste quantity data 
available is from disasters in the US.  This is likely largely due to the established disaster 
waste management (monitoring and record keeping) processes required for federal 
emergency funding eligibility, as detailed in the FEMA debris management guidelines 
(FEMA, 2007). 
 
Table 1.3 Reported waste quantities from previous disasters 
Year Event Waste Quantities Data Source 
2010 Haiti earthquake estimated 23 - 60 million 
tonnes 
(Booth, 2010) 
2009 L’Aquila earthquake, Italy  estimated 1.5-3 million 
tonnes 
(Di.Coma.C, accessed 
2010) 
2008 Sichuan earthquake, China 20 million tonnes (Taylor, 2008) 
2005 Hurricane Katrina, US 76 million cubic metres (Luther, 2008) 
2004 Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne, 
Florida, US 
3 million cubic metres (Solid Waste Authority, 
2004) 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 10 million cubic metres 
(Indonesia alone) 
(Bjerregaard, 2009) 
2004 Hurricane Charley, US 2 million cubic metres (MSW, 2006) 
1999 Marmara Earthquake, Turkey 13 million tonnes (Baycan, 2004) 
1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 
Kobe, Japan 
15 million tonnes (Hirayama et al., 2009)  
 
There have been a number of studies that have retrospectively quantified disaster debris 
volumes following disaster events.  The studies have been conducted in an attempt to both 
improve disaster waste estimation techniques and to aid debris management planning, 
preparedness and response.  In their guide to disaster debris management planning, USEPA 
(2008) identify that pre-disaster waste estimations are beneficial in both pre-disaster planning 
and post-disaster response and can be carried out using hazard maps.   
 
The majority of the waste estimation studies carried out have been based in Japan.  Studies 
identified by Inoue et al. (2007) investigated specific gravities of the debris generated by the 
1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, and found an average specific gravity of 0.59 T/m³ 
during transportation, which increased to approximately 0.73 T/m³ in stockpile due to 
consolidation processes and water addition for dust suppression.  Hirayama et al. (2009; 
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2010) estimate debris volume on a weight per house or per unit floor area basis.  Hirayama et 
al. use these previous estimates to predicatively estimate likely disaster waste quantities in 
Japan based on hazard maps.  Values of between 30 and 113 T/household are used to 
account for a range of house and building types and levels of damage sustained.     
 
Outside Japan several studies on disaster waste volume quantification have been carried out.  
Chen et al. (2007) correlated debris generated from four flooding events in Taiwan with three 
parameters: population density, total rainfall and flooded area.  Chen et al. found a significant 
non-linear correlation with these variables which could be used to predict future flood waste 
volumes in Taiwan.  A study from the University of Florida quantified arsenic-treated wood 
following Hurricane Katrina (Dubey et al., 2007).  The paper emphasises the potential 
environmental and public health risk of disposing of such large quantities in unlined landfills.  
Tansel et al. (1994) present a method of quantifying disaster waste from Hurricane Andrew, 
US, 1992, based on categorising the size and structural composition of affected houses.   
 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the US has developed loss 
estimation models for disaster events (FEMA, 2009c; d; b).  The HAZUS models include 
debris estimation methodologies.  FEMA has also produced a Debris Estimating Field Guide 
which includes various debris estimation methods (FEMA, 2010). 
 
As for the studies on waste composition discussed in Section 1.3.1, all these studies and 
guides are context and disaster specific.  As noted by Chen at al., the method demonstrated 
in their study could be transferred to other contexts, but disaster waste data from the 
different context would be required to generate the correlations.  It follows that while 
estimation methods may be transferred between contexts, actual waste quantities from these 
studies are less likely to be transferrable.   
 
A cross-context and multi-disaster assessment of waste composition and quantities would be a 
valuable addition to the literature to enable the development of better waste quantity 
estimation methodologies.  The development of a standard method of reporting disaster waste 
composition and quantities would be a worthwhile step toward enabling this.   
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1.4 Disaster management phases 
Typically management of disaster waste (and disaster management in general) is described in 
the literature in three phases (Kuramoto, 1995; Baycan and Petersen, 2002; UNOCHA, 
2011): 
 Emergency response (debris management to facilitate preservation of life, provision 
of emergency services, removing immediate public health and safety hazards such as 
unstable buildings and hazardous materials, lifelines restoration (critical 
infrastructure) etc.) 
 Recovery (building demolition, infrastructure repairs) 
 Rebuilding (debris management of wastes generated from and recycled materials used 
in re-construction). 
 
The phases are not distinct and the duration of each phase varies significantly between 
disasters.  Typically, in terms of waste management, the emergency phase involves the 
removal of immediate threats to public health and safety, (Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999) 
and generally lasts between a few days and two weeks (Haas et al., 1977).  During this phase 
there is little scope for recycling and diversion.   
 
The recovery phase is where the majority of the disaster generated waste will be managed 
and is the focus of this thesis.  In past disasters this phase has lasted up to five years (New 
Orleans, Hurricane Katrina) (Luther, 2008).  The duration of the recovery phase for waste 
managers can be affected by a number of factors outside the control of waste managers 
including police/coroner investigations which can limit site access for public and waste 
contractors (Ekici et al., 2009) and slow resident return (New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina) 
(Cook, 2009).   
 
The rebuilding phase is a much longer process and it is hard to define the ‘end’ of this phase.  
According to Haas et al. (1977) the rebuilding phase duration could be in the order of 10 
years. 
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1.5 Waste handling, treatment and disposal 
1.5.1 Temporary staging sites  
Temporary staging sites for recycling and waste processing are identified as an important 
element in a disaster waste management system by many authors (FEMA, 2007; Jackson, 
2008; USEPA, 2008; Johnston et al., 2009) as they provide extra time to appropriately sort, 
recycle and dispose of the waste.  However, the expense of double handling of wastes and of 
acquiring land for the staging site can be limiting factors in their use (FEMA, 2007).  Figure 
1-3 is a photo of a temporary staging area established to manage earthquake waste following 
the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, Italy. 
 
Inappropriate location of temporary storage sites can be potentially damaging to the 
environment and affected people’s livelihoods.  Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 
waste was disposed of in areas such as playgrounds, swamps and rice paddies (Basnayake et 
al., 2006; Pilapitiya et al., 2006; UNDP, 2006).  Pre-disaster identification of temporary 
storage sites has been suggested by many authors as a way to avoid these potential adverse 
effects (Kobayashi, 1995; Skinner, 1995; FEMA, 2007; USEPA, 2008; Johnston et al., 2009).  
Most of the disaster waste management guidelines reviewed (FEMA, 2007; Wellington 
Region Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2008) provide guidance on temporary 
staging site selection; however, as identified by Channell et al. (2009), there is potential for 
more research to be carried out on siting and management aspects of temporary staging sites. 
 
More research on the effective use of temporary storage / staging facilities would be beneficial.  
Factors requiring consideration include space requirements, environmental factors, noise and 
dust, pre-disaster site identification, land-use planning issues and costs. 
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Figure 1-3 Temporary staging area for managing waste following the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, 
L’Aquila, Italy.  (Photo date: September 2010.) 
 
1.5.2 Recycling  
Many components of disaster waste can be recycled.  Materials can be used in a number of 
post-disaster applications including soil for landfill cover, aggregate for concrete, and plant 
material for compost (fertilisation and slope stabilisation) (Channell et al., 2009).  The benefit 
of recycling disaster debris is shown in many ways and is evident in the analysis of many past 
disaster clean-ups: Marmara Earthquake (Baycan and Petersen, 2002; Baycan, 2004), Kosovo 
(DANIDA, 2004), Northridge Earthquake, US, 1994 (Gulledge, 1995; USEPA, 2008), 
Lebanon (Jones, 1996), Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kobayashi, 1995), Indian Ocean 
Tsunami, Thailand and Sri Lanka (Basnayake et al., 2005; UNDP, 2006).  The benefits 
include: 
 
 Reduction of landfill space used. 
 Reduction in the quantity of raw material demand (for purposes where recyclable 
materials are suitable). 
 Possible reduction in waste management costs. 
 Reduction in transportation for raw materials and debris. 
 Job creation (for developing countries, in particular). 
 
The major component of disaster waste, in most cases, is construction and demolition 
(C&D) waste.  There are many existing articles which address recycling barriers and 
opportunities to recycling this waste stream in peace-time (Hsiao et al., 2002; Kartam et al., 
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2004; Blengini, 2009; Kofoworola and Gheewala, 2009).  Skinner (1995) and Reinhart and 
McCreanor (1999) presented peace-time C&D recycling practices and data as guidance for 
disaster waste recycling.  However, little critical analysis was presented for recycling following 
a disaster event.  Other authors have identified potential barriers to C&D recycling after a 
disaster, including: the time to collect and process the materials; the unavailability of 
specialised processing equipment (Baycan and Petersen, 2002); the inability to physically 
separate the materials (Lauritzen, 1998; Baycan, 2004); the lack of desire to offset raw 
material use in rebuild (Lauritzen, 1998); unavailability of disposal sites (Lauritzen, 1998); 
cost relative to other disposal methods (Solis et al., 1995); and the unavailability of markets 
to absorb large quantities of material (Solis et al., 1995; Lauritzen, 1998).   
 
While the literature provides an overview of the advantages and barriers to recycling 
following a disaster, there have been no quantitative assessments of post-disaster recycling 
feasibility, and what planning / preparations are possible pre-disaster to make recycling a 
more viable option   
 
A more comprehensive understanding of post-disaster recycling is required.  In particular, 
factors such as: the effect of large quantities of materials on existing recycling markets; the need 
for establishment of post-disaster markets (eg. environmental land remediation, land 
reclamation, waste to energy and housing reconstruction applications); logistical constraints; 
space requirements and associated land-use issues; and the economics of post-disaster recycling, 
all require further analysis. 
 
1.5.3 Waste to energy 
Waste to energy has been proposed by Yepsen (2008) as a potential disaster waste treatment 
option.  Yepsen noted that there are limiting factors in using waste to energy as a treatment 
option in the US.  These include high shipping costs, limited markets in the US, certification 
requirements for international movement of the biomass and FEMA emergency funding 
regulations (which are geared toward lowest cost debris management contracts with no 
incentives for beneficial use). 
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Small scale waste to energy has been used in the US in response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, 
Charley, Frances, and Jeanne (USEPA, 2008), but there is no review of the success of these 
initiatives.   
 
1.5.4 Open burning 
Open burning has been used as a disaster waste management option following the Indian 
Ocean tsunami (Basnayake et al., 2006), and the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake (Irie, 
1995).  While some people accepted open burning as an acceptable management option 
under the circumstances, others condemned it for adverse health effects and environmental 
concerns.  Petersen (2004) and Lauritzen (Naito, 1995) suggest open burning is a necessary 
management option in some cases to remove immediate hazards but give little definitive 
guidance on the situations for which open burning is appropriate.   
 
As for recycling and waste to energy treatment options, no research has been carried out into 
open burning specifically following disasters.   
 
Guidance on the circumstances under which open burning should be used would assist disaster 
waste managers to assess and implement appropriate treatment programmes.   
 
1.5.5 Land reclamation and engineering fill 
Several disaster responses have used land reclamation as a waste management option.  
Following the 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey, some municipalities used the debris as 
levelling fill for new housing developments and as land protection against flooding.  Baycan 
(2004) expressed concern over the potential for hazardous wastes to be inadvertently 
included in the fill but gave no formal assessment of the risk or retrospective analysis on 
actual contamination.  Contamination and/or variability in fill composition could also lead to 
structural instability of the fill in time. 
 
Following the Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake, existing land reclamation programmes were 
requested to take earthquake debris.  Significant amounts of sorting and waste segregation 
was reportedly required to ensure the debris was clean enough for coastal reclamation (Irie, 
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1995; Lauritzen, 1998).  As for the Marmara earthquake, the author is unaware of any post-
reclamation testing or assessment of effects. 
 
1.5.6 Disposal 
In many large scale disasters, waste volumes exceed permanent disposal site capacities 
(Petersen, 2006; USEPA, 2008).  Temporary or low engineered debris and waste disposal 
sites can be employed.  Standards at existing disposal sites have also been reduced after some 
disasters to increase available disposal sites (for example the expansion of waste disposal 
criteria at unlined Construction & Demolition landfills after Hurricane Katrina (Luther, 
2008)).  Authors note the potential for adverse environmental effects at these disposal sites 
but give little evidence on actual effects. 
 
Disposal of hazardous substances has been identified as problematic following several 
disasters – Indian Ocean tsunami (Pilapitiya et al., 2006) and Hurricane Katrina (Dubey et al., 
2007).  Hazardous waste is disposed of in some cases without segregation as part of the 
overall waste matrix.  Apart from the study by Dubey et al (2007) on arsenic quantities in the 
waste post-Hurricane Katrina, there has been little research into actual effects of disposal of 
hazardous substances in disaster situations.  Channell et al. (2009) identified several 
problematic substances present in disaster waste of which disposal issues required further 
research including gypsum and putrescent materials. 
Further research would be beneficial investigating the environmental and human health 
impacts of disaster specific disposal sites and the subsequent development of disaster specific 
guidance on the effective establishment and operation of these sites. 
1.6 Environment 
Disasters and the environment are inextricably linked.  Disasters cause direct physical 
damage to the environment and inappropriate environmental management and land use can 
increase the environment’s vulnerability to the effects of disaster events.  For example, 
experts believe that the impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami would have been reduced by 
proper preservation and management of mangroves and coral reefs as they would have acted 
as a buffer against the waves (UNEP, 2005b).  In Thailand inappropriate peace-time waste 
management has contributed to this form of environmental degradation as many waste 
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dumps were located in coastal areas.  The suitability, or not, of disaster waste management 
options will have an effect on the environmental impact of a disaster and in turn may affect 
the environment’s future resilience against hazards.   Poor management in general can also 
induce negative environmental effects.  For example, in the past slow clean-up programmes 
have led to illegal dumping (Baycan, 2004; Petersen, 2004; Jackson, 2008).   
 
The standard peace-time waste management hierarchy of source reduction, recycling and 
waste combustion / landfilling (USEPA, 1995a) is not always considered possible post-
disaster.  In fact, sometimes peace-time environmental standards are reduced to expedite 
disaster waste management activities.  For example, as discussed in Section 1.5.6, the 
expanded waste disposal criteria following Hurricane Katrina. 
 
Despite many of the disaster waste management plans discussed in Section 1.2 emphasising 
environmentally responsible approaches, there seems to be no critical analysis on what 
environmental standards are appropriate post-disaster.   
 
In developing countries, disasters are often cited as a potential opportunity for development 
of waste management systems and/or improvement of existing environmental practices.  For 
example, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Indian Ocean Tsunami waste 
management programme included a focus on the development of sustainable waste 
management systems through the collection, recovery, recycling and/or safe disposal of 
waste materials (UNDP, 2006). 
 
An improved understanding of the need for, and the risks or effects of changes in 
environmental standards post-disaster is needed.   
 
1.7 Economics 
Little information exists on the economic impact, both direct and indirect, of disaster debris 
management programmes.  Table 1.4 provides an overview of the limited published (direct) 
cost data for debris removal works.  Costs reported are variable and sometimes only include 
one part of the clean-up works, for example: the value of collection contracts; only disposal 
costs; costs for debris management in one affected region; or just publicly funded clean-ups.  
Due to the FEMA reimbursement processes (FEMA, 2007) cost data for debris management 
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should be available in the US, however, the author has only located a limited amount of cost 
data.   
 
Table 1.4 Disaster waste management costs following past disasters 
Disaster Location Debris 
quantity 
Cost (as quoted in original 
reference) 
Reference 
2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami 
Sri Lanka 0.5 mill tonnes 500-600 million rupees  
(US$5-6 million) 
(Basnayake et al., 
2006) 
2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami 
Thailand 0.8 mill tonnes 110 million Baht 
(US$ 2.8 million) 
(Basnayake et al., 
2006) 
2004 Typhoon 
Tokage 
Tokage, 
Japan 
44,780 tonnes Estimated US$ 15-20 million (UNEP, 2005c) 
1999 Kosovo 
Conflict 
Kosovo 100,000 
tonnes 
13.7 millionDKK (building 
waste management system 
programme only) (US $2.35 
million) 
(DANIDA, 2004) 
Hurricane Charley Florida, US 19 mill cubic 
yards 
US$286 million 
FEMA reimbursed money 
only 
(FEMA, 2009a) 
Hurricanes 
Jeannes & Frances 
Palm 
Beach, US 
 US$20 / cubic yard pickup-
disposal 
(Solid Waste 
Authority, 2004) 
1998 Central 
Florida Tornadoes 
Osceola 
County, US 
250,000 cubic 
yards 
US$8 million (debris removal 
contract only) 
(Reinhart and 
McCreanor, 1999) 
 
In the US, FEMA (2007) estimates that for disasters in the US between 2002 and 2007 
(predominantly hurricanes and other storm events) debris removal operations accounted for 
27% of FEMA disaster recovery costs.  Note that FEMA funds include only for the 
‘emergency response’ activities and do not generally include waste resulting from repairs and 
rebuilding activities or demolition. 
 
Indirect costs following disasters are more difficult to assess.  Indirect costs associated with 
slow disaster waste management could include: disruption of critical infrastructure; effects on 
public health (Petersen, 2004); delays to rebuilding processes; affects local industry such as 
tourism (UNEP, 2005c).  Indirect costs also result from a poorly designed disaster waste 
management programme: reduction in future landfill space; impact of waste trucks on roads 
(Reinhart and McCreanor, 1999); environmental impact remediation resulting from 
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inappropriate and/or illegal dumping (UNDP, 2006); and increased resource depletion by 
limited resource recovery.   
 
As for waste quantification (see Section 1.3.2), costs associated with debris management will 
vary significantly depending on the disaster and the context.  Attempts to quantify the direct 
and indirect costs of management of disaster waste have been limited.  The FEMA HAZUS 
loss estimation methodology (discussed in Section 1.3.2) is arguably the most comprehensive 
estimation technique available. 
 
Development of an approach to assess the likely direct costs of various waste management 
options (recycling, waste to energy, landfill disposal, land reclamation, etc.) and indirect costs of 
those options (slower debris removal, long term environmental degradation, etc.) would greatly 
enhance disaster waste managers’ abilities to respond appropriately to disasters in the future. 
 
1.8 Social considerations 
1.8.1 Human health and safety 
Human health and safety protection is identified as a goal in many of the case studies and 
plans (Solis et al., 1995; WMinE, 2004; SWANA, 2005; USEPA, 2008).  There are three main 
aspects of human health and safety relevant to disaster waste management.  First, human 
health hazards presented by the waste matrix itself, such as hazardous substances, vermin 
and vectors and health care wastes (WMinE, 2003; Petersen, 2004) have to be managed.  
Second, health and safety risks from waste management options must be considered.  For 
example, following Hurricane Andrew, US, 1992, the use of air-curtain incinerator units drew 
concern over the potential human health risks from burning commingled wastes (USEPA, 
1995b).  Lastly, health and safety protection for all those who handle the waste has to be 
considered.  In the aftermath of the 2001 World Trade Centre collapses, medical studies of 
emergency responders and clean-up workers identified some health effects from dust 
particles inhaled (Landrigan et al., 2004; Lange, 2004) due to inadequate health and safety 
equipment.  Allen (2007) commented on the inadequate provision of protective equipment 
for private property owners returning to clean up their properties following Hurricane 
Katrina.  Channell et al. (2009) identified management of fine particulate matter during 
demolition and debris management processes, as a necessary research area.   
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Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the likely human health threats will add to the 
literature, and to disaster waste managers’ understanding of waste management options.  The 
assessment should consider the human health hazards from the waste matrix, waste 
management options and from handling the waste. 
 
1.8.2 Community / psychosocial impact 
Many studies state that fast disaster debris removal expedites the community recovery and 
rebuilding process (Solid Waste Authority, 2004; WMinE, 2004; SWANA, 2005; USEPA, 
2008).  Unmanaged and visible disaster debris and waste can serve as a reminder to 
communities of the losses they have endured (DANIDA, 2004; Petersen, 2004).  However, 
most disaster waste management programmes also include environmental and/or health and 
safety objectives which contribute to a slow debris management process, such as strict 
recycling targets and hazardous material handling requirements.  Luther (2008), for example, 
identified the time-consuming procedures required for asbestos management following 
Hurricane Katrina as particularly challenging.  The challenge was to minimise exposure to 
asbestos while not slowing the clean-up.  The conflict between a fast waste management 
process (to facilitate community recovery) and meeting environmental and public health 
objectives has not been explicitly addressed in the literature.   
 
Allen’s (2007) commentary on ‘environmental justice’ issues relating to Hurricane Katrina 
highlighted the negative social impact of locating disaster disposal sites near disaster affected 
communities.  Denhart (2009) studied the positive psychosocial impacts of a housing 
deconstruction (as opposed to demolition) project following Hurricane Katrina.  The project 
allowed property owners to participate fully in the manual deconstruction and resource 
recovery process of their property.  Denhart emphasised the attachment that was felt 
between people and their properties.  Denhart also noted that property owners were able to 
take control of their properties and were able to “give life” to their damaged properties by 
donating, selling or re-using the building materials.   
 
It is interesting to note that rubble is often used to commemorate disaster events.  
Birkenhopf, in Stuttgart (refer Section 1.1) holds a commemorative plaque on its summit.  
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Rubble from the World Trade Centre collapse has also been used widely (including in New 
Zealand) to create memorials for those who lost their lives. 
 
It would be beneficial for disaster waste managers to better understand the psychosocial 
implications of the speed and nature of the debris removal process.  For example, effects from 
personal property salvage and the emotional attachment owners have with their properties.  
Understanding these factors will enable better planning of disaster waste systems. 
 
1.8.3 Communication 
Public perception, understanding and involvement has long been recognised as a factor in 
successful solid waste management programmes (USEPA, 1995a).  However, achieving 
adequate community understanding in a disaster situation is a huge challenge for waste 
managers.  Authorities after Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne identified pre- and post-disaster 
communication, through an on-going and consistent education programme, as a key to their 
successful and efficient debris removal programme (Solid Waste Authority, 2004; USEPA, 
2008). 
 
In past events, negative community reaction to disaster waste management options has led 
waste managers to alter their approaches: consuming time and valuable resources post-
disaster as well as generating mistrust in the community.  As discussed in Section 1.8.1, 
community reaction to air curtain incinerators following Hurricane Andrew, led to the 
abandonment of incineration (USEPA, 1995b).  Following Hurricane Katrina, public 
opposition to the expanded waste acceptance criteria at C&D landfills led to a lawsuit being 
filed and the eventual closing of one of the landfills.  Waste managers were forced to find 
alternative disposal sites (Luther, 2008).  Public consultation during the disaster waste 
management process may have increased public understanding of the necessary actions for 
efficient management of the waste, or would have identified publicly unacceptable waste 
management options before attempts were made to implement them. 
 
Comprehensive guidance on the most effective ways to include communities in post-disaster 
waste management decision-making is missing from the current literature.  Waste managers 
26  Disaster waste management: a systems approach 
  Charlotte Brown 
 
 
need to recognise that communities can be changed by a disaster: their expectations, risk 
tolerance and needs will likely change significantly.  Further research is needed. 
 
1.8.4 Employment and capacity building 
Past disaster waste responses in developing countries and post-conflict situations have 
included opportunities for post-disaster employment, and for expertise and governance 
capacity building.  Capacity building of local governments, in particular, is identified as a 
priority by several authors (DANIDA, 2004; Petersen, 2004; UNDP, 2006; Bjerregaard, 
2007) and includes development of management systems, budgeting, and technical skills.   
 
1.9 Organisational aspects 
1.9.1 Strategic management 
Disaster recovery, in general, can be governed by a number of different organisational 
configurations.  Olshansky et al. (2006) comment that generally the establishment of a 
separate recovery coordination organization is helpful.  The management of disaster waste in 
relation to the overall disaster recovery also varies between contexts and events.   
 
Disaster waste organisational structures are best defined in the US where disaster waste 
management roles are clearly established by FEMA (2007).  Elsewhere, roles and 
responsibility for disaster waste management are not well established.  In Turkey following 
the 1999 Marmara earthquake, no department was assigned coordinative responsibility for 
debris which led to a report of haphazard waste management (Baycan, 2004).   
 
In developing countries, in particular, the presence of numerous international aid 
organisations adds to the complexity of coordination and strategic management.  Often, 
despite coordination efforts by the United Nations or government, inappropriate handling 
and disposal of debris still occurs (Petersen, 2006; UNDP, 2006).  Avoidable administrative 
delays can also affect disaster waste management activities.  For example, there were customs 
delays at ports in Haiti which delayed the arrival of rubble clearing equipment (Moloney, 
2011). Petersen (2004), in a review of several disaster events, emphasised the need for 
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inclusion of waste management activities in international humanitarian responses, and of 
central coordination for waste management activities. 
 
Organisational structures for the coordination of disaster waste management programmes are 
likely to be context specific and will need to fit within existing governance structures.  
However, there would be value in further investigations into how organisational (intra-
organisation) structures influence the effectiveness of waste management programmes (for 
example human and equipment resourcing, work scheduling); and how best to integrate waste 
management into the overall disaster recovery operation (inter-organisation) (such as 
coordination with rebuilding activities, allocation of shared resources, works prioritisation).   
 
1.9.2 Operational management 
It appears that the physical works associated with disaster waste management operations 
(demolition, private property clearance, kerbside collection, transportation, temporary staging 
areas, recycling, disposal) have been implemented in a variety of ways with varying degrees of 
public and contractor participation and contractual arrangements.  For example, the FEMA 
regulations (2007) generally (unless there is a significant public health and safety risk) require 
private property clearance to be paid for and facilitated by property owners.  Kerbside 
collection is carried out by contractors or the US Army Corps of Engineers.  The 
organisation of the physical works has implications on the speed of recovery, resource 
availability and management of environmental and human health hazards. 
 
It appears that certain peculiarities of the disaster and resultant waste may indicate what 
operational systems are most appropriate.  Waste characteristics (as discussed in Section 
1.3.1), for example, can influence how the debris is managed and what level of public 
participation is desirable.  For example, heavy earthquake debris (Lauritzen, 1998; Booth, 
2010) or hazardous substances such as asbestos after Hurricane Katrina (Luther, 2008), may 
be too cumbersome or dangerous for private property owners to manage themselves.  No 
author has looked critically at what factors should be considered in the organisational design 
of the physical works associated with disaster waste programmes. 
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In the US, disaster waste contracting is a growing industry.  Contracting companies are 
specifically positioning themselves to respond to disaster events including procuring 
specialised equipment, personnel and pre-arranged contracts (Fickes, 2010).  Pre-arranged 
contracts and rates with contractors has been identified as an important feature in facilitating 
effective clean-ups (Jackson, 2008) and avoiding price gouging (Jordan, accessed 2010).  
Mismanagement of disaster waste by contractors, such as illegal dumping observed following 
Hurricane Katrina, (Allen, 2007; GAO, 2008) may also be avoided by having pre-arranged 
contracts. 
 
Research is needed into the most effective operational organisational strategies for different 
disasters.   
 
1.10 Funding 
The financial responsibility for disaster waste management varies between and within 
contexts and disasters.  In the US, for example, FEMA funds a kerbside collection service 
for collection of private property detritus; whereas, private property demolitions are generally 
the responsibility of the property owner (and/or their insurer) (FEMA, 2007).   
 
The literature includes reference to funding mechanisms used in specific responses; however, 
it lacks analysis of the most effective mechanism (private, public, insurance etc.) for funding 
disaster waste management in different contexts. 
 
Disaster response and recovery funding policies commonly stipulate lowest cost options 
must be used.  For example, the FEMA regulations in the US (FEMA, 2008) appear to 
consider only direct costs and do not consider the longer term, indirect costs and/or 
benefits, of certain waste management options (refer Section 1.7).  That is, the feasibility 
assessments required by FEMA are cost rather than cost-benefit focussed.  In some cases a 
cost-only analysis does not allow disaster waste managers to meet the goals of long-term (or 
even current) waste management strategies (Lauritzen, 1995); on the other hand, it could be 
argued that environmentally preferable management options are too costly in a disaster 
response situation.  
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For example, in Los Angeles (LA), following the 1994 Northridge earthquake, FEMA 
originally denied funding for LA officials to establish a recycling system to supplement its 
insufficient landfill space, because it was more expensive than landfilling.  The city of LA was 
forced to prove that recycling was part of their long-term waste management strategy and 
that the additional cost to start up recycling facilities was justified (State of California, 1997).  
Currently there is no literature on how non-direct costs can be included in feasibility 
assessments of disaster waste management programmes. 
 
Further analysis of the success or failure of various funding mechanisms relative to the context 
and the disaster impacts would be beneficial. 
 
1.11 Legal frameworks 
Solid waste management, particularly in developed countries, is governed by diverse 
legislation and regulation to minimise the potentially harmful effects of waste on the humans 
and the environment.  However, in the wake of a disaster these peace-time laws can cause 
significant delays in the clean-up process.  For example, health and safety procedures for 
demolition of structures containing asbestos meant average structure demolition times of 
four days in the clean-up following Hurricane Katrina.  Authorities elected to relax handling 
standards to reduce demolition times to one day (GAO, 2008).   
 
As noted by Kobayashi (1995), the greater progress we make toward recycling and advanced 
waste treatment methods, the more our ability to cope with disaster decreases.  Complex 
treatment and disposal processes with strict environmental standards are not designed for 
large acute influxes of materials.   
 
Many disaster waste management plans or guides (Solis et al., 1995; Wellington Region Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Group, 2008) highlight the availability of emergency legal 
waivers on solid waste regulations such as the Hurricane Katrina asbestos example.  
However, it is often unclear to what degree and in what circumstances legal or regulatory 
relaxations are acceptable.  In the previous example the relaxation of demolition procedures 
had the potential to cause long term health effects for waste handlers and the public. 
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A 2006 report for the US Congress, on Hurricane Katrina, assessed the use of environmental 
waivers.  The report described their effectiveness in the short term for expediently managing 
debris but raised questions over the implications of their use in the long-term (for example 
land or water contamination effects) (McCarthy and Copeland, 2006).  Overall the report was 
inconclusive and gave no guidance on future use of legal waivers in the US. 
 
Legislation and regulation has the potential to significantly affect the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a disaster waste management programme.  The impact of legislative 
provisions on the management of disaster waste will be very context specific.  Brown et al. 
(2010a) present a discussion of the potential legal issues for managing disaster waste in New 
Zealand.  The review found that while there was legal flexibility to facilitate a timely clean-up 
the complexity of the legislation and organisations involved may make post-disaster decision-
making and the assessment of applicability of legal waivers cumbersome.  A similar review 
was carried out by Gerrard (2006) in the US context.  Gerrard found that the majority of 
environmental regulations in the US include emergency exemptions and, despite the 
propensity following the 2001 World Trade Centre collapse and Hurricane Katrina to expand 
the existing emergency exemptions post-disaster, further exemptions are not considered 
necessary. 
 
Waste ownership (salvage rights) was identified as a potential legal issue in a cross case study 
analysis by Baycan and Petersen (2002).  Waste ownership issues are of concern when private 
property owners are not able to participate in the clearing of their own property, particularly 
where revenue is then generated from recycling of the debris.   
 
A general investigation and guidance into necessary legislative and regulatory requirements for 
disaster waste management would be useful. 
1.12 Thesis scope 
As demonstrated in the above literature review, there are still significant gaps in our 
understanding of disaster waste management.  In particular, existing literature focuses heavily 
on technical management aspects of disaster waste management and neglects institutional 
(organisational, legal and financial) frameworks.  In addition the literature is generally either 
based on a single disaster event, single hazard types or has a focus on a single cultural 
context.  As a result it is difficult to apply the recommendations and lessons learnt 
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confidently to other disaster events and in other contexts.  This makes planning for disaster 
waste management challenging. 
 
Therefore, the research aim was to improve our understanding of disaster waste management 
systems as an element of wider disaster recovery.  The focus of the research was on the 
institutional frameworks that influence disaster waste management system as a function of 
overall disaster recovery.  The analysis included operational aspects of disaster waste 
management systems from cradle to grave (from demolition / collection to end use / final 
disposal). 
 
With limited structured research currently in disaster waste management, the author first 
aimed to develop a robust analysis framework to: 1) enable this research and 2) to provide a 
clear and repeatable framework for future research.  Second, the author aimed to develop a 
high level, holistic understanding of the disaster waste management system including: the key 
system elements, the key relationships, the constraints, the behaviour drivers, and the overall 
system behaviour.  Ultimately the analysis framework and the systems understanding were 
combined to develop a decision-making guidance tool for disaster waste managers which can 
be transferable between hazards and contexts. 
 
The specific research objectives were: 
1. To develop a robust analysis framework to research disaster waste management. 
2. To understand the high level system dynamics of disaster waste management systems. 
3. To investigate potential decision-making tools for disaster waste managers. 
4. To identify future research needs. 
 
The following chapter presents the methodology used for the research and also provides a 
road map for the remainder of the thesis. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Section 1.1, previous research has been either context specific or event 
specific making it difficult to transfer lessons from one disaster event to another.  A 
methodology was necessary to enable data to be: 1) gathered from a wide range of contexts 
and hazard types, and 2) to be analysed such that the analysis results could be transferred 
between contexts and hazard types. 
 
Therefore, a multi-hazard, multi-context, embedded multi-case study approach was adopted.  
According to Yin (2009), case study research methodology is appropriate when a researcher 
is aiming to understand “how” or “why” a certain (social) phenomenon works.  In particular 
case studies are useful where the researcher has no control of behavioural events; the 
research focuses on contemporary events; and where decisions are the focus of the study: all 
of which apply to this research topic.  As well as increasing transferability of results, a multi-
hazard approach ensures that the research is also in line with the majority of emergency 
research and planning.  A multi-cultural approach allows for a wider range of organisational 
arrangements and institutional frameworks to be analysed.  This inclusive approach also 
increases the number of potential case studies: after all, disasters are, by definition, rare.  
 
The author’s aim was to develop a case study analysis framework which could be consistently 
applied across different and varied disaster events such that common lessons could be drawn 
and transferred to other contexts.  In addition it was desired that the framework could be 
manipulated so that it could be used as a disaster waste planning tool.   
 
This chapter outlines: why the case studies were selected (Section 2.2.1); how the data were 
collected (Section 2.2.2); how each case study was analysed (Section 2.2.3); and how the cross 
case analysis was carried out (Section 2.2.4).  A discussion section (Section 2.3) is also 
included to review the strengths and limitations of the methodology. 
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This chapter is adapted from the following conference paper presented by the author (refer 
Appendix B): 
Brown, C., 2011. Disaster waste management: a systems methodology. International 
Conference on Building Resilience, July 2011, Kandalama, Sri Lanka. 
 
2.2 Case study analyses 
2.2.1 Case study selection 
According to Yin (2009), five or more cases should be investigated if the theory is subtle.  
Due to time constraints five case studies were analysed.  The studies selected were (in the 
order they were investigated)(study location in brackets): 
 
1. Victorian Bushfires (Victoria, Australia), 2009 
2. Samoan Tsunami (South eastern coast of Upolu Island, Samoa), 2009 
3. L’Aquila Earthquake (L’Aquila, Abruzzo, Italy), 2009 
4. Hurricane Katrina (New Orleans, Louisiana, US), 2005 
5. Christchurch Earthquake (Christchurch, New Zealand), 20113 
The case studies were chosen for a number of different reasons: 
 Access to data:  Where possible, cases were selected where contacts and/or 
relationships already existed, a site reconnaissance was feasible, and/or there was 
good access to published data (preferably in the author’s native language: English).  
 Timing of the event:  Reconnaissance and interviews were ideally carried out 6 – 12 
months after the disaster event to minimise disruption to response activities and to 
gain benefit from participant reflection.   
 Scale of disaster:  Cases were selected where waste volumes overwhelmed existing 
capacities and extraordinary measures, above existing emergency plans and capacities, 
were taken.  
 Multi hazard:  A range of (four) hazard types were represented. 
 Multi-contextual:  A diverse range of contexts with varying institutional frameworks 
and organisational structures and approaches were included.   
                                                 
3 Data have been collected since the first Canterbury earthquake on 4 September 2010.  While some reference is 
made to the September earthquake response, the analysis focuses on the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
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2.2.2 Data collection 
For each case study, qualitative data have been gathered from both pre- and post-disaster 
literature (government reports, documents and legislation; newspaper; practitioner reports 
etc.) and semi-structured interviews with professionals involved in disaster waste 
management.  The semi-structured interviews focussed on:  
 disaster impacts (number of deaths, number of damaged properties, lifeline 
disruption etc.);  
 disaster waste properties (volume, characteristics, hazards etc.);  
 impact and waste assessment processes;  
 pre-disaster waste management systems (normal waste volumes, spare capacity in 
system, future waste strategy);  
 pre-existing disaster waste management plans;  
 disaster management systems (overall and waste specific);  
 property owner participation / responsibilities in clean-up);  
 waste collection and transportation process;  
 recycling;  
 waste disposal;  
 waste management timeline and priorities;  
 demolition processes;  
 reconstruction waste;  
 costs;  
 economic impact;  
 relevant legislation;  
 overall effectiveness of waste management approach; and  
 any other areas identified by the interviewee. 
 
For all but Hurricane Katrina, face to face meetings were possible with personnel involved 
directly in the waste management process including solid waste managers, local authorities 
and emergency managers.  Due to funding limitations, a reconnaissance to Louisiana was not 
possible.  Instead data were gathered through three phone interviews with recovery 
personnel and the review of a considerable amount of published material on the event 
response.  In Christchurch, the author had the opportunity to participate in the first four 
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months of the 2011 February earthquake response and recovery effort, working in the waste 
management team under Civil Defence and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority.  
Therefore, data for the Christchurch case study were primarily collected using an active 
participatory approach.   
 
A community based survey was also carried out in Victoria to gauge attitudes towards, and 
impacts of the management of disaster waste.  The survey included questions on: community 
attitude towards debris after a disaster; community perception of insurance and public 
funding; and the effect of the waste management programme on their overall recovery 
including timeliness and completeness.  Due to language barriers and time constraints, this 
community survey was not able to be carried out for the other case studies. 
 
The data sources for each case study are summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Case study data sources 
 Victorian 
Bushfires 
Samoan 
Tsunami 
L’Aquila 
Earthquake 
Hurricane 
Katrina 
Christchurch 
earthquakes 
Date of main 
data collection 
August 2009 
(professionals) 
/ March 2010 
(community) 
April 2010 September 2010 February 2011 September 2010 
– date of 
publication 
Time after 
disaster 
6 months /  
13 months 
7 months 17 months 5.5 years In parallel with 
recovery 
Number of data sources 
Face to face 
interviews 
8 20 10 - - 
Phone 
interviews 
0 - - 3 - 
Community 
members 
surveyed 
14 - - - - 
Legal 
documents 
2 3 5 10 2 
Government 
document 
13 7 8 23 14 
Practitioner 
reports 
0 14 0 1 1 
Academic 
articles 
1 0 4 12 2 
Private 
enterprise 
generated 
documents  
    2 
Newspaper 
articles 
1 11 6 1 24 
Websites 2 3 3 4 4 
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Last, an informal survey of disaster waste management perceptions was carried out amongst 
largely academics and disaster management professionals.  The survey was part of a seminar 
series by the author and the author’s primary supervisor, Associate Professor Mark Milke.  
As this data collection is supplementary to the main research methodology and data 
collection, the survey description, results and data limitations are included in Appendix C. 
 
2.2.3 Single case study analyses 
For each case study, first a description of the disaster and disaster waste management system 
was developed.  This generally included: 
 
1. Disaster impacts 
2. Waste properties (volume, nature, hazards) 
3. Organisational structures (strategy and operations) 
4. Legislative frameworks and post-disaster legislative or regulatory decisions 
5. Funding frameworks (pre and post-disaster) 
6. Waste management operations (emergency response; waste collection, transportation, 
handling and disposal; hazardous waste; health and safety; monitoring and record 
keeping; public information; and other.) 
 
The general description above provided the background context for which the case study 
could be analysed and the disaster impacts which may influence the management of the 
waste. 
 
Next, each case study disaster waste management system was qualitatively broken down into 
five system elements (note that the system elements have been refined during the course of 
the research and the full Bushfire and Samoan tsunami case studies used slightly different 
elements.  These were manipulated to the final five elements during the cross-case analysis.):  
 Strategic management  
 Funding mechanism  
 Operational management strategy (including a subsystem of recycling) 
 Environmental risk management 
 Human health risk management 
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The effectiveness of each system element was then assessed using a cause and effect model.  
That is, an analysis as to why the waste management approach was taken and how effective 
the approach was.  The cause or external influences on the disaster waste management 
system was discussed in a decision-making process section: 
 Approach and rationale 
 
The effects were qualitatively assessed by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the 
approach, broken down into the following sections:   
 Related delays 
 Organisational implications 
 Legal constraints  
 Environmental effects 
 Economic effects 
 Social effects  
 
The single case studies are summarised in Chapter 3, and the full case studies are included in 
Appendix D, Appendix F, Appendix H, Appendix J, and Appendix K. 
 
2.2.4 Cross case study analysis 
Using the case study analyses described above, a cross case analysis model was developed to 
enable a consistent and thorough template for cross case analysis.  The model is shown in 
Figure 2-1.  The large dotted circle represents the context that is affected by the disaster 
event.  Depending on the context and the hazard generating the disaster, certain disaster 
impacts are generated.  The context and the disaster impacts are the externalities which will 
determine the nature of a disaster waste management system.  These are, in effect, the cause 
or decision-drivers as to why a disaster waste management system is designed a certain way.  
The five circles in the middle of the diagram depict the five key elements of a disaster waste 
management system (as determined above in the single case study analyses).  The links 
between the elements and the touching sides represent the links between the system 
elements.  The elements are in no particular order.  The large circle around the system 
elements represents the legislation and regulation which constrains how the waste 
management system can be designed.  Last, the model includes ‘effects’.  This system 
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component is important as it represents the effects or effectiveness of a particular disaster 
waste management approach.   
 
A more detailed discussion of each of the model elements and how the model was used in 
the analysis is included below (with relevant thesis chapter numbers given in brackets).   
 
Figure 2-1  Case study analysis model 
 
Disaster impacts (Chapter 4) 
To enable cross case analysis, qualitative disaster impact and disaster waste impact indicators 
were developed using the case study data.  The indicators were based on the key motivators 
and driving factors for post-disaster decision-making.  In development of the indicators 
several definitions and categorisations of disaster waste and disaster waste management 
activities were developed.   
 
Effects (Chapter 5) 
Based on the assessment of effects (environmental, economic and social) for the single case 
studies, 12 qualitative criteria for assessing the effectiveness of various disaster waste 
management system approaches were developed.  Two criteria specifically reflect typical 
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recovery objectives.  A semi-quantitative application for the indicators (as a planning and 
response tool) is also developed but is not used in the analysis presented in this thesis. 
 
System elements (Chapters 6 to 10) 
For each system element (strategic management, funding mechanisms, operational 
management strategy, recycling, environmental risk management and human health risk 
management) the data from each case study were combined using a combination of pattern 
matching, explanation building and logic models (Yin, 2009).  All the case study approaches 
were compared to see which had the most positive impact; the disaster and disaster waste 
indicators were reviewed to determine why certain approaches were taken or were more 
successful; and the links to the other systems elements were identified and analysed. 
 
In the thesis discussion (in the interest of brevity), the common links between two system 
elements have only been fully discussed in one of the respective elements chapters, with a 
brief reference in the other.  The author has elected to only discuss linkages where the linked 
element has already been presented in a previous chapter.  For example links between 
Strategic management (Chapter 6) and Funding mechanisms (Chapter 7) will only be 
discussed in the Funding chapter, and so on. 
 
To ensure a fair analysis, wherever possible, the observations were taken relative to the 
contextual baseline rather than as an absolute.  For example, the analysis of the 
environmental and human health risk management decisions and legislative frameworks 
(Chapter 10) generally only looked at circumstances where standards had been altered from 
peace-time standards.  It was not the aim of this research to determine the suitability of 
peace-time standards.  This approach was deemed necessary to enable cross case analysis 
without contextual bias. 
 
Each element analysis (including recycling) is presented in a separate chapter except for 
environmental and human health risk management which are combined.  
 
Legislative and regulatory framework (Chapter 11) 
An analysis on the legislative and regulatory frameworks necessary to successfully manage 
disaster waste was carried out.  As above, this analysis combined all the single case study data 
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to determine some general requirements and principles for disaster waste management 
legislation and regulation. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
2.3.1 Case study selection 
The case studies represented a wide range of disasters and contexts.  There was a range of 
funding mechanisms (full private insurance reliance to full government sponsorship), 
organisational structures, waste management approaches etc.  It was fortunate that the timing 
of the research and funding availability coincided with such a diverse range of disaster 
events.   
 
The case studies did not, however, represent a wide range of disaster scales.  All events 
investigated (apart from the 2010 Canterbury Earthquake investigated briefly as part of the 
2011 Christchurch earthquake analysis) were catastrophic events involving loss of life and 
property.  Further research including a range of disaster scales would be beneficial. 
 
While variability of disaster events and contexts was desired during case study selection, it 
was found that the study in Samoa was significantly different to the other studies.  The 
developing country context of Samoa meant that some of the institutional frameworks 
(legislative structures, environmental standards, public health and safety etc.) that the 
research focuses on, were not as critical to the management of disaster waste as in developed 
countries.  The case study was still useful, particularly during the analysis of organizational 
structures and public participation; however, in general, limited comparisons were able to be 
made between Samoa and the other case studies. 
 
In carrying out the data collection 6-12 months after the event, it was hoped that participants 
would still have a clear memory of the processes followed, the decision-making rationale, and 
the outcomes.  But also be able to reflect on the approach taken and assess the systems 
effectiveness.  In general, the author believes this aim was met.  The major drawback to the 
timing of the data collection was that, because of the relative proximity to the event, 
potential environmental, economic and social effects (positive or negative) had not been fully 
realised.  For example, the environmental effects due to mixed waste disposal at a closed 
landfill site after Hurricane Betsy in 1965, in New Orleans, were not fully realised until 1990 
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when the landfill site was designated a Superfund4 site.  The site had even already been built 
on (Allen, 2007).  Human health effects on those involved in the clean-up after the 2001 
World Trade Centre collapse will need to be monitored for many years with increased risk of 
respiratory and other illnesses, such as Mesothelioma etc. (Landrigan et al., 2004).  Therefore, 
in some cases the author has had to project, based on the interviewee’s responses and her 
own professional judgment, the possible or likely future effects of certain disaster waste 
management approaches.  It has been noted wherever projections have been made.  A 
longitudinal study of one or more of the case studies presented here would be an excellent 
way of verifying the robustness of the analysis and the system effectiveness measures. 
 
2.3.2 Data collection 
Access to robust, accurate and complete data is one of the major challenges of disaster 
research.  The data in this research relied primarily on individual accounts 6-12 months after 
the event, supplemented by written documents where available.  The quality of the 
information is limited by: the memory, understanding and interpretation of the situation by 
the interviewees; language translation (Samoa and L’Aquila);; cultural interpretation by the 
interviewer; the interviewer – interviewee relationship; and the availability of written 
documents.   
 
The semi-structured interviews allowed for complete, personal accounts of the waste 
management decision-making and implementation process post-disaster where often 
published data are not available.  However, interviews have a number of limitations.  De 
Vaus (2002) notes that in face-to-face interviews interviewees may be more likely to give 
acceptable rather than true answers (also known as social desirability).  The interviewees 
here, for instance, as participants and decision-makers in the waste management process 
have a vested interest in having a positive report on their work.   
 
There may also have been an effect from the cultural difference between the interview and 
interviewees, or as De Vaus describes it – the effect of observable characteristics.  This is 
where an interpretation of a situation is influenced by one or other’s cultural background.  
                                                 
4 Superfund is the United States’ federal government's program to clean up the nation’s uncontrolled hazardous 
waste sites (www.epa.gov/superfund/). 
42  Disaster waste management: a systems approach 
  Charlotte Brown 
 
 
This may include language nuances, voice tone and body language.  The use of a translator in 
L’Aquila also increased the potential for cultural misunderstanding as it is likely the translator 
paraphrased and inadvertently added their own interpretation. 
 
There were a number of limitations resulting from forming the Hurricane Katrina case study 
purely from published documents.  These included: presentation of final decisions rather 
than decision-making processes; data coming from predominantly government documents; 
inability to clarify unclear statements; and presence of information gaps.  In addition the 
documents were largely written more than 12 months after the event.  This allowed authors 
more time for analysis and synthesis of the data than the other case studies.  This may mean 
fuller and more considered information was available, however this may have meant that 
motivational bias may have played a part: that is, there was opportunity for unbalanced 
information to be presented.  The data also differed from the other case studies in that the 
published accounts were generally from an organisational perspective rather than individual 
(according to the interviews).  In general, the author believes that given the range, quantity 
and quality of documents reviewed for Hurricane Katrina, that a full and fair understanding 
of the disaster waste management system was achieved. 
 
The active participatory approach following Christchurch presents both more opportunities 
and challenges than all the other case studies.  Participation in the recovery efforts has 
allowed the author to understand better the decision-making processes in the management of 
demolition and disaster waste.  The author could observe real and perceived decision-drivers 
and constraints which are often absent in written or first-hand moderated accounts of a 
situation.  The researcher also observed in real time, allowing a greater level of detail to be 
observed, rather than the snap shot of data gathered during interviews. This ‘fly-on-the-wall’ 
aspect of the methodology is a particular strength. 
 
However, the objectivity of the research could be challenged.  Because of the author’s direct 
involvement in the design of the waste management process, the author may not be able to 
critically analyse the actions taken and outcomes achieved.  Bias, for example, towards the 
organisation the author was working for would be a natural tendency.  In the interest of 
future learning, the author has attempted to dissociate herself from the process to allow for a 
critical analysis.   
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In all the case studies, except the Victorian Bushfires, no community based data collection 
was carried out.  This presents a significant limitation when attempting to analyse the social 
effects of the demolition and debris management programmes.  In lieu of this information, 
social impacts have largely been based on observations and the media’s portrayal of 
community response.  References are given where possible.  It is noted that the media does 
not always present information that is representative of the whole community and this has 
been taken into account during the analysis. 
 
Accepting and accounting for these data limitations is an important part of disaster research.  
Every effort was made here to ensure the data collection and interpretation was consistent 
across case studies and triangulation of information was carried out.  Given the high level 
information sought during this research it was felt that generally these limitations had 
minimal impact on the data collected. 
 
2.3.3 Case study analyses 
As discussed, the adopted analysis model was an important tool in ensuring consistent 
analysis both within and between case studies.  However, in a complex and dynamic system, 
such as disaster waste management system, there is a risk of losing the complexities and 
interdependencies by over-simplifying the system.  This is a weakness of the model but a 
decision that has been consciously made to enable analysis to be carried out in a systematic 
way.   
 
For the effects analysis, qualitative assessments only were used.  Qualitative assessments are 
subjective; however given all the assessments were made by the author, it is believed that the 
assessment is valid within the context of this research.  In many cases, it is difficult to assess 
the effect directly related to a specific system element as there are many interdependencies.  
It is envisaged that the systems approach will provide a conduit to look beyond proximate 
causes to underlying causes. 
 
2.4 Summary 
This methodology allows for a multi-disciplinary and holistic analysis of a complex problem 
across many different contexts and will enable a greater understanding of disaster waste 
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management systems.  The analysis shows how a simple static model can be used to generate 
more complex, dynamic models.  It is envisaged that the methodology will not only assist in 
the analysis for this thesis but will also be able to be applied to future research in this area 
and be able to be adapted for future planning of disaster waste management systems.  These 
opportunities are explored throughout this thesis. 
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3. Case study summaries 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the five case studies included in this research: 2009 
Victorian Bushfires, 2009 Samoan Tsunami, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, 2005 Hurricane 
Katrina and 2010 Canterbury and 2001 Canterbury earthquakes.  The cases are presented in 
the order in which they were researched.  They have been included in this order as the 
method of analysis and nature of the data collected changed during the data gathering 
process.  This is most apparent in the full case studies presented in the Appendices. 
3.2 2009 Victorian Bushfires 
The 7 February 2009 “Black Saturday” bushfires in Victoria, Australia, were the most 
devastating bushfires in Australian history.  173 people were killed in 78 communities.  Over 
430,000 hectares of land and 2000 properties were destroyed (VBRRA, 2009a).   
 
Due to the intense heat of the fires (up to 1200°C) (Teague et al., 2009), many of the affected 
buildings were reduced to small piles of debris.  The waste matrix included mixed ash, 
concrete rubble and bricks, partially burnt dimensional timber and fence posts (treated), 
metal, vegetation and trees, household hazardous wastes (including asbestos), vehicles and 
corpses (removed by the Coroner).   
 
Due to the scale of the disaster, the Commonwealth and Victorian Governments elected to 
establish the Victorian Bushfire Recovery and Reconstruction Authority (VBRRA) to “guide 
the recovery and rebuild process” (VBRRA, 2009b).  VBRRA took overall responsibility for 
the waste management programme.  
 
Two weeks after Black Saturday, the Commonwealth and Victorian Governments also 
elected to pay for and facilitate demolition and removal of all building related debris in the 
affected areas.  This responsibility would ordinarily rest with private property owners and 
municipalities.  The rationale behind providing this service was to clear debris and hazardous 
materials from bushfire affected properties and to help start people rebuilding (The Premier 
of Victoria, 2009) and in turn benefit the economic recovery of the community. 
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One week later, the State government let a single “managing contract” to facilitate the 
demolition and debris removal works.  The contract included all public and private buildings 
destroyed in the bushfires.  Individual property owners were not required to participate in 
the works, other than salvaging of personal belongings if desired. 
 
The contract was awarded to an Australian building contractor called Grocon.  
Approximately 70% of subcontracts (and 50% of the labour) were sourced from the local 
community.   
 
To expedite debris removal and minimise hazards to people and the environment, the 
Victorian Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Human Services, based 
on limited site testing, elected to classify all bushfire waste as a single waste type: 
‘Construction & Demolition waste plus other contaminants, including Class B (non-friable) 
asbestos’.  Provisions under Section 30A of the Victorian Environmental Protection Act, 
1970 and Section 55 of the Dangerous Goods Act, 1985 (Victorian Government Gazette, 
2009) were activated to formalise the classification.  These ‘emergency’ regulations stipulated 
stream-lined handling, transportation and disposal methods for management of the bushfire 
waste. 
 
The majority of the bushfire waste went to existing municipal waste landfills a significant 
distance from the affected area.  However, due to several health and safety incidents 
involving waste-laden trucks travelling on a dangerous stretch of road, an alternate disposal 
site was commissioned.  An area at an existing landfill site, close to the affected area, was 
identified and a low-engineered landfill cell was designed, consented and constructed in just 
10 days.   
 
Overall the demolition and debris removal programme appeared to be successful.  The six 
month demolition programme met the government’s objectives of facilitating the rebuilding 
process.  In addition, the community valued the financial and physical contribution towards 
their recovery.  Public health and environmental health risks were generally well managed.  
 
Figure 3-1 shows a typical house demolition site following the Bushfires.  Figure 3-2 shows 
human health protection measures in place to enable private property recovery. 
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The full length case study report is included in Appendix D.  A journal length version of the 
case study is available in the following publication (see Appendix E): 
 
Brown, C., Milke, M. & Seville, E. (2011) "Disaster waste management following the 
2009 Victorian Bushfires". The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 26:2, 17-22. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 The remnants of a house in Marysville, following the 2009 Victorian Bushfires. (Photo 
date: August 2009.)  
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Figure 3-2 Resident sifting through potentially contaminated rubble following the 2009 Victorian 
Bushfires. (Photo source: Dr Lachlan Fraser) 
3.3 2009 Samoan Tsunami 
On 29 September 2009, two tsunami waves, triggered by a M8.3 earthquake centred 200 
miles south east of Samoa, hit the south eastern and southern coasts of Upolu Island, Samoa.  
143 lives were lost (Samoa Logistics Cluster, 2009) and 4,389 people (2.4% of the total 
population of Samoa) were affected (Ministry of Health, 2009).  Terrestrial, marine, beach, 
lagoon, coral, mangrove, riverine, marsh and swamp habitats were all heavily affected by the 
tsunami (Samoan Government, 2009).  The majority of affected communities spontaneously 
relocated inland; leading to a reconstruction task that not only involved personal property 
rebuilding and infrastructure repair, but also the establishment of completely new 
infrastructure (water, power, sanitation, schools, shops, etc.) for the relocated settlements. 
 
The waste generated from the Samoan Tsunami mainly comprised green-waste and 
lightweight building materials (timber and corrugated iron) from the traditional fale style 
housing (JICA, accessed 2010).  There were small amounts of household hazardous materials 
(pesticides, refrigerants, oils, fuels etc.) and some disturbed oil drums.  Excessive and 
inappropriate relief donations (for example, expired pharmaceuticals and food) were 
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received, and contributed to the waste.  Waste from humanitarian aid, such as cans, water 
bottles and food wrappers, also contributed to the waste volume. 
 
The tsunami emergency response was initially guided by the Government of Samoa National 
Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) 2006-2009 (Government of Samoa, 2006).  However, 
the extent of the 2009 tsunami overwhelmed the Samoan Government emergency response 
capacities.  Within three days the United Nations (UN) Cluster system was established to 
help in the response (OCHA, 2009b).  Neither the Samoan NDMP nor the UN Cluster 
system explicitly includes disaster waste management.  By default the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and the Environment (MNRE) assumed responsibility for waste, in line with its 
peace-time function and the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster took the role 
under the UN system.  The UN cluster system was disestablished and disaster administration 
was handed back to government sector by sector.  The WASH cluster was de-activated 
approximately three weeks after establishment (OCHA, 2009c). 
 
At the time of the tsunami there was no designated disaster fund available for disaster 
recovery in Samoa.  Recovery was heavily dependent on external funds from donors.  
Following the tsunami, significant amounts of international assistance was pledged to a 
Samoan Government recovery fund (Government of Samoa, 2006).  Funds from the 
government fund were allocated to recovery activities based on government department 
recommendations.  In addition some funds were pledged to individual organisations 
(typically non-governmental organisations). 
 
Immediately after the tsunami, many people lit fires to dispose of some of the unpleasant 
smelling debris (JICA, accessed 2010) likely due to damaged septic tanks and odorous marine 
sediments.  Many villagers salvaged materials from the debris to construct temporary 
housing, see Figure 3-3, while allegedly others were too traumatised to do anything.   
 
Clean-up activities were initiated and managed by a number of organisations.  These are 
summarised in Table 3.1.  Generally the clean-up operations involved community members 
(paid and unpaid) collecting debris and placing it in piles for contractors to collect and take 
to the country’s only landfill, Tafaigata landfill, near Apia.  Some waste segregation (for 
recycling) was carried out prior to collection (by volunteers and community members) and 
recyclables were scavenged from the waste at the landfill.  Efforts to separate waste at source 
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varied between clean-up operations.  There were isolated incidents of debris being disposed 
of illegally near the affected area.  An alternative disposal facility on the south coast was 
suggested by the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme during the 
rapid needs assessment process but no action was taken. 
 
Generally terrestrial wastes were prioritised ahead of coastal, marine and wetland wastes.  As 
of April 2010, the majority of the debris had been collected and disposed of.  Some targeted 
clean-ups in wetland areas were still being carried out.  The author has no figures on the 
quantity of tsunami debris or volume to landfill. 
 
In general, the waste management response to the tsunami was piece-meal.  There was little 
overall coordination and subsequently little quality control (public health, environmental 
standards, programme and completeness). 
 
The full length case study report is included in Appendix F.  This case study was also 
presented at the following conference (see Appendix G): 
 
Brown, C., Milke, M. & Seville, E. (2011) "Disaster Waste Management for the 
Samoan Tsunami". International Conference on Building Resilience, July 2011, Kandalama, 
Sir Lanka. 
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Figure 3-3 A temporary shelter made from tsunami debris, Lalumanu, Samoa.  Photo date: April 
2010.) 
 
  
Table 3.1 2009 Samoan Tsunami clean-up activities  
When Lead agency Funding Scope of Works Reference 
First 2 weeks 
(October 
2009)  
Ministry of Works, 
Transportation and 
Infrastructure 
(MWTI) 
Unknown Clearance of debris blocking access roads  
Mid-Oct / 
Nov 
Japanese International 
Corporation Agency 
(JICA) 
JICA Pilot project: removal of bulky wastes in Ulutogia, Satitoa, Malaela 
and Lalumanu   Including waste salvage, segregation, recycling and 
paid community participation. 
(OCHA, 2009c) 
Start date and 
duration 
unknown 
MNRE Unknown Bulky waste collection.  The exact nature and scope of the contract 
was very unclear.  No demolition, no recycling. 
 
10 November 
2009 
HMAS Tobruk / 
Australian Navy 
Australian 
Navy 
One day reef and lagoon clean-up operation.  Crew and amphibious 
vehicles were provided.  Voluntary community participation. 
(Powell, 2009)  
March 2010 United Nations 
Development 
Programme (UNDP) 
AusAid A one day clean-up for Poutasi village (Falealili District).  Voluntary 
community participation.   
(Samoa Observer, 2010b) 
(Ministry of Health, 2009) 
April 2010 Conservation 
international (CI) 
CI Three day bulky waste removal in the mangroves in Malaela and 
Saleaumua.  Paid community participation. 
(Conservation International, 
2010) 
March 2010 
onwards 
UNDP Various Waste management problems identified by community through 
Community Centred Sustainable Development Programmes 
(CCSDP) process. 
(Samoa Observer, 2010a) 
General Ministry of Health 
(MOH) 
MOH Advice on vector control - burning / burying waste and avoiding 
stagnant pools of water. Some heavy machinery provided to remove 
waste causing water stagnation. 
(Ministry of Health, 2009) 
General Independent church 
and other groups 
Various Various uncoordinated community level clean-ups by church and 
other independent volunteer groups. 
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3.4 2009	  L’Aquila	  Earthquake 
On 6 April 2009, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit the Abruzzo region in central Italy.  314 
people perished and approximately 70,000 residents were displaced (Dolce, 2009).  The 
largely historic town of L’Aquila, with predominantly multi-storey unreinforced buildings, 
suffered severe damage.  In total approximately 25% of the 72,000 damaged buildings 
required full demolition (Dolce, 2010).  The historic centre of the town was cordoned off 
and was known as the ‘red zone’.  The historic centre was still largely closed at the time of 
writing: three years after the event. 
 
It has been estimated that approximately four million tonnes of waste will be generated from 
the demolition and repair works.  70-80% of the waste is thought to be aggregate and the 
intent is to recycle as much as possible.  Disaster waste management activities are still 
continuing at the time of writing and only a small proportion of the waste has been managed. 
 
The Dipartimento della Protezione Civile (DPC) (Civil Protection Department) is 
responsible for disaster coordination (including recovery) (Dolce, 2010).  Under the National 
Protection Act, DPC has the authority to make special laws to fulfil its emergency response 
and recovery functions (within EU laws and regulations).  All natural disaster damage losses 
are financially covered by the National Government / DPC.  The value of all individual 
compensation is determined after a given disaster event.   
 
The environmental protection function of DPC Directorate of Command and Control 
(Di.Coma.C) initially managed the earthquake waste.  The unit established and oversaw the 
waste management strategy and operations until responsibility for demolition and waste 
management activities was handed back to the respective municipalities (Comunes) in 
December 2009 (Di.Coma.C, accessed 2010), eight months after the event.  
 
The demolition and waste management works are essentially organised into three categories: 
1. Full demolition works.  Initially full demolition works were coordinated by the 
Dipartimento della Protezione Civile and were carried out by the National Fire Corps 
and Army, as shown in Figure 3-4.  Temporary staging areas were established to sort 
mixed wastes brought from the demolition sites.  After demolition works were 
handed to the local municipalities, L’Aquila Comune elected to sort wastes at the 
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demolition site and take the sorted wastes to temporary staging areas for interim 
storage.  It has been estimated that sorting materials on site has increased the 
demolition time up to five-fold. 
 
2. Major repair debris.  Major repair debris is handled by contractors, engaged by property 
owners, carrying out repair work and who were approved as National Environmental 
Managers.  Contractors are responsible for separating wastes and taking materials to 
recycling operators or disposal sites as per their peace-time operations. 
 
3. Minor detritus.  Detritus is dealt with by individual property owners.  Central collection 
facilities have been provided by the municipality. The municipality is then responsible 
for separating the wastes and taking it to recycling facilities or disposal sites. 
 
The waste management systems under DPC and the Comune are shown in Figure 3-5 and 
Figure 3-6, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3-4 Fire Service and Army personnel carry out demolition of houses in Onna, one of the 
towns most affected by the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake;; September 2010. 
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Figure 3-5 2009 L’Aquila earthquake demolition and waste management flow diagram: as 
managed by Dipartimento della Protezione Civile (Civil Protection Department) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6 2009 L’Aquila earthquake demolition and waste management flow diagram: as 
managed by the Comune or municipality 
 
Existing solid waste disposal and resource recovery facilities were overwhelmed by the waste 
volumes and new recovery facilities have been sought (Di.Coma.C, accessed 2010).  
Recycling was identified early as a key component in debris management to reduce 
environmental impact and save landfill space.  Recycled aggregate has been ear-marked for 
building construction, road reconstruction and environmental remediation works [for 
example, quarry restoration] (Di.Coma.C, accessed 2010). 
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Waste management guidelines were established by Provincia dell’Aquila to outline the 
technical and logistical operation of temporary staging sites.  The environmental regulatory 
bodies (Institute for Environmental Protection and Research, Regional and Local Agencies 
for Environmental Protection) are responsible for approving recovery and disposal sites.  
The municipalities are responsible for identifying, establishing and operating temporary 
storage sites. 
 
There are very strict environmental laws in Italy and the European Union.  These have 
affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the waste management programme.  Neither 
considers environmental procedures and standards for waste or environmental management 
in response to an emergency.  As a result of this, Protezione Civile had to prepare new 
emergency legislation for waste management (Di.Coma.C, accessed 2010).  Legislative and 
regulatory changes included defining a classification for earthquake waste under the 
European Waste Code system and expedited procedures for authorising waste management 
facilities.  Despite this, eleven months after the earthquake only some of the many of the 
temporary and permanent sites needed to process the large volumes of waste had only just 
been approved (Nardecchia, 2010). 
 
Emergency and recovery managers in L’Aquila have cited debris as a significant hurdle on 
their road to recovery.  As one interview respondent remarked in terms of the recovery: “this 
[waste management], is not a problem – it is the problem”.  The delays in the recovery 
process have led to some public protests and general community dissatisfaction.  Some of 
the delays in the waste management process have been due to arguably unavoidable 
circumstances such as management of historic wastes.  However, the majority of the delays 
were, in the author’s opinion, as a result of poor organisational management and strict 
environmental standards. 
 
 
The full length case study report is included in Appendix H.  This case study was also 
presented at the following conference (see Appendix I): 
 
Brown, C., Milke, M., Seville, E. & Giovinazzi, S. (2010) "Disaster Waste 
Management on the Road to Recovery: L'Aquila Earthquake Case Study". 14 
European Conference on Earthquake Engineering Ohrid, Macedonia. 
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3.5 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina hit the States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, US., on 29 August 
2005.  In addition to hurricane damage, heavy rain led to levee breaches and flooding in 
some areas.  80% of New Orleans was inundated by 3-12 feet of floodwaters (Cook, 2009).  
Over 1800 people died (HHS.gov, accessed 2010) and over 600,000 residential structures 
were affected – 77% were totally destroyed (Roper, 2008).  The disaster resulted in mass 
voluntary and involuntary evacuations.  Four years after Hurricane Katrina some Parishes 
have still not returned to pre-Katrina population levels (51% for St Bernard and 76% for 
Orleans) (Brookings Institute, 2009).   
 
Hurricane Katrina generated the most disaster-related debris in the history of the US: more 
than twice the previous record generated by Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  It is estimated that 
when the demolition of affected properties is complete, approximately 100 million cubic 
yards [76 million cubic metres] of debris would have been generated and disposed of in the 
three affected states, with 64 million cubic yards [49 million cubic metres] in the State of 
Louisiana alone (Luther, 2008).  The waste was predominantly construction and demolition 
(C&D) waste, green-waste and floodwater sediment.  There were some significant hazards in 
the waste matrix, including: flood water sediment contaminated with heavy metals and poly-
aromatic hydrocarbons (Esworthy et al., 2006); rotting food or putrescible wastes; household 
hazardous substances and asbestos (Luther, 2008).    
 
Due to the scale of the disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
elected to pay for all debris removal operations.  Ordinarily FEMA would pay 75% of the 
cost for debris removal from public places, and individuals (and their insurance companies) 
would be responsible for private property waste management.  FEMA generally relies on 
property owners to clean detritus from private properties for kerbside collection (FEMA, 
2007);; however, the high health risk and level of resident displacement led to FEMA’s 
decision to remove debris and demolish structures declared a public health risk (LDEQ, 
2006c). 
 
Many of the local authorities in Louisiana opted for the US Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) to facilitate the FEMA funded clean-up works directly.  USACE let four debris 
removal contacts in the state of Louisiana.  The contracts were generally lump sum contracts 
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for the clean-up of a specified area.  For legal reasons, demolition of abandoned (later 
condemned) houses had to be managed by the respective municipalities, not FEMA. 
 
Temporary storage areas were established to sort material collected during kerbside 
collections.  Some recycling was carried out, in particular metals were segregated and sold, 
and vegetative waste was chipped and used as mulch or for landfill cover.  Limited recycling 
of Construction & Demolition (C&D) waste was carried out, particularly of waste resulting 
from the FEMA-funded private property demolitions.  A regulation change was made to 
exclude the requirement to remove non-friable asbestos prior to demolition.  Many C&D 
landfills were also permitted to expand their waste acceptance criteria to include wood, 
carpet and (arguably) most significantly asbestos.  Some new landfills were opened (Gentilly 
and Chef Menteur) and there was considerable public opposition to (including some legal 
action against) this in areas close to the affected area. 
 
The (simplified) waste management system is shown in Figure 3-7. 
 
The scale of Hurricane Katrina was unprecedented in US history.  The extensive planning 
and funding regulations for disaster debris management in the US had to be adapted to 
match the scale and complexity of the event.  Significant changes to organisation and funding 
structures were necessary, as well as changes to environmental and public health regulations 
to facilitate the clean-up.  Despite the pre-planning and the extraordinary measures taken, 
there are still condemned houses waiting demolition five years after the Hurricane 
(Trethewey, 2010).   
 
The full length case study report is included in Appendix J.   
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Figure 3-7 2005 Hurricane Katrina demolition and debris management system 
 
3.6 2010 Canterbury and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes 
On 4 September 2010, the Canterbury region of New Zealand was struck by a magnitude 7.1 
earthquake.  The event caused significant damage but no loss of lives.  The earthquake, 
however, triggered a sequence of more deadly and damaging aftershocks that were 
continuing at the time of writing.  In particular, on 22 February 2011, Christchurch was 
struck by a magnitude 6.3 earthquake, centred within 10km of the central city.  185 people 
died and 164 were seriously injured (GeoNet, 2011).  The central city was significantly 
damaged and there was widespread liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of the city.  At the 
time of writing an estimated 1400 commercial properties and at least 7,500 homes are facing 
demolition.  As in the L’Aquila earthquake, the central city was cordoned off immediately 
after the earthquake and was also named the ‘red zone’.  It is estimated that approximately 
four million tonnes of building debris will be generated from the demolition and building 
repair work and up to four million tonnes from the horizontal infrastructure (i.e. roads, 
water, sewer and stormwater pipes) repair. 
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The majority of the waste will be construction and demolition (C&D) wastes.  Unsafe or 
already collapsed building debris (i.e. where removal of building contents was not possible) 
also included building contents such as furnishings, household hazardous substances, food, 
and whiteware.  Asbestos was also present in some buildings.  Where possible asbestos was 
removed prior to demolition, but this was not always possible due to building instability.  
Some building material had to be stored separately so that it could be used as evidence in 
various earthquake inquiries. 
 
In addition to the large amounts of construction and demolition, in excess of 500,000 tonnes 
of liquefaction silt was generated by the earthquakes.  This material was largely collected 
from private properties by an army of volunteers and placed on the kerbside for collection.  
Local authority roading contractors collected the silt and deposited at one of two designated 
disposal sites.   
 
The initial emergency response (up to the end of April 2011) was managed by New Zealand’s 
emergency management authority, Civil Defence.  The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
(CER) Act was passed in April 2011 to facilitate the recovery.  The Act established the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) to oversee the earthquake recovery.   
 
Emergency works such as silt clearance and demolition for urban search and rescue, were 
paid for through the Civil Defence.  Demolition and debris management activities in the 
recovery phase are generally paid for by insurance companies.  Commercial properties are 
insured privately and residential property owners have joint cover between the national 
insurer, the Earthquake Commission (EQC), and private insurers5.   
 
Due to the desire to protect public health and safety and to open the city centre as quickly as 
possible, Civil Defence and subsequently CERA elected to operationally manage commercial 
property demolitions and later seek financial compensation from insurers and building 
owners.  Building owners had the opportunity to carry out their own demolition as long as 
they did so within an allocated time.  At the time of writing approximately one third of 
                                                 
5 EQC covers the first $100,000 of any insurance claim on a residential property and the first $20,000 for 
contents.  Private insurers cover the balance, up to the maximum policy value. 
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commercial properties (classified as dangerous under the CER Act) had been managed by 
CERA.   
 
Initially CERA-managed demolitions were carried out with urgency under a cost 
reimbursement procurement model, allowing for limited material salvage onsite.  A large 
(privately operated) resource recovery site was established to recycle the predicted large 
volumes of mixed wastes.  Metal waste could be taken directly to a metal recycling facility.  
Inert waste could be taken to Lyttelton Port where a land reclamation (accepting concrete, 
asphalt, brick, natural fill at no cost etc.) was approved under special CER Act powers two 
months after the earthquake.  As the process continued, lump sum contracts became the 
preferred procurement approach and as a result contractors began to establish their own, 
legal and illegal, waste handling facilities to separate and process wastes.  Due to the high 
cost of disposal at the regional landfill6, a new, low-engineered disposal site is currently being 
approved to dispose of all, pre-sorted, and unrecyclable demolition wastes.  The site is 
located at the former Christchurch City landfill, Burwood. 
 
Due to the extensive liquefaction in suburban areas, large residential areas are going to be 
abandoned:  that is, the government is buying properties off the residents because of the 
unsuitable land conditions.  These areas are now known as the ‘residential red zones’.  
Demolitions in the residential red zones are being managed by CERA and private insurance 
companies, depending on whether the property owner has accepted a government or 
insurance settlement for the property, respectively.  All demolitions and major repair works 
in non-red zoned areas are being carried out by insurance companies or their appointed 
management company.   
 
The demolition and debris management system is shown in Figure 3-8.  Figure 3-9 shows the 
demolition of the iconic University of Canterbury, School of Engineering, “Mushroom”, 
which was damaged by the earthquakes. 
 
At the time of writing the demolition and debris management programme is continuing.  The 
demolition works continue in parallel with a number of other recovery issues, including 
establishing new planning and building regulations and securing insurance cover within New 
                                                 
6 The regional landfill in Christchurch is a regulated monopoly. 
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Zealand.  At this stage the demolition and waste management works have neither facilitated 
nor hindered the overall recovery.  It has proceeded at a pace which is largely considered 
acceptable by the public, under the circumstances (Hartevelt, 2011).  
 
The full length case study report is included in Appendix K.   
 
Figure 3-8 2011 Christchurch earthquake demolition and debris management system 
(simplified) 
 
 
Figure 3-9 Demolition of the University of Canterbury, Engineering School “Mushroom”.  (Photo 
date: December 2011.) 
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4. Disaster impacts 
4.1 Introduction 
In order for decision-makers to determine the best approach for managing disaster waste, it 
is important to understand the disaster impacts that drive decision-making post-disaster.  A 
number of authors have made observations on the nature of disaster waste, see Section 1.3, 
but generally these observations are event-specific and are limited to a hazard type.  This 
limited analysis makes it difficult to transfer lessons learned from one event, and therefore 
plan for future events. 
 
The author believes that a generic ‘disaster & disaster waste impact’ classification system 
would be useful to enable both post-event analysis and pre-event planning.  In this thesis, a 
disaster & disaster waste impact classification system will enable cross case analysis to be 
made such that observations are more readily transferable between disaster scenarios.  Pre-
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event, a classification system would assist in planning by allowing predicted hazard scenarios 
to be translated into disaster & disaster waste impacts which in turn could be used to enable 
management and operational systems to be planned.  Post-event a classification system could 
be used during rapid assessments and in the initial design of the waste management system. 
 
In this Chapter, disaster & disaster waste impact indicators, developed from the literature 
review and the five case study analyses, are presented.  The indicators will in turn be used 
during the cross case analyses in Chapters 6 to 10 to determine whether the nature of the 
disaster impact affects the suitability of various disaster waste management strategies.  Last, 
in Section 12.2, there will be a discussion on how the indicators could be used and/or 
adapted to aid disaster planning and response.   
 
4.2 Disaster impact indicators 
The general impacts of a disaster event will influence the disaster waste management 
approach taken.  The impact of a disaster could be measured in many different ways, using 
many different measures, including:  
 Number or proportion of deaths 
 Number or proportion population affected 
 Number of persons displaced 
 Geographical extent of impact 
 Geographical isolation 
 Number of buildings destroyed 
 Projected recovery time 
 Economic impact (direct and indirect) 
 Resources required 
 Lifeline (critical infrastructure) disruption 
 Hazard duration (short, medium, long term) – e.g. continuing aftershocks 
 
During the case study research, several of the above measures, in particular, had a noticeable 
impact on the management of disaster waste (as will become apparent in Chapters 6 to 10 of 
this thesis).  Therefore for the purposes of this thesis, the above has been synthesised to five 
indicators which describe a disaster’s impact (relevant to disaster waste management): 
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disaster scale, number of displaced persons, geographical extent, hazard duration and 
disruption to road network.  To measure each indicator the author suggests a semi-
quantitative (also referred to as an ordinal scale) rating scale (low, medium, high) could be 
used. 
 
Semi-quantitative disaster impact indicators are proposed for a number of different reasons.  
First, in the context of this thesis, semi-quantitative indicators allow for assessments to be 
made relative to the contextual situation.  For example, the 185 lives lost in Christchurch was 
the second largest loss of life in New Zealand due to a natural disaster (after the 1931 
Hawke’s Bay earthquake).  So relatively speaking, the earthquake was significant in New 
Zealand terms.  That death toll, however, is small in comparison to the 1117 lives lost in the 
2009 Padang earthquake, in Indonesia (Vos et al., 2010), which in turn pales in comparison 
with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake death toll in Indonesia of approximately 
160,000.  Thus, based on the number of deaths, the Christchurch earthquake, while 
considered catastrophic in New Zealand, may have been considered relatively minor in 
Indonesia. 
 
Second, when planning for disaster events there is great uncertainty over the likely impact or 
impacts.  Using semi-quantitative indicators allows for a range of impacts to be accounted 
for under a single scenario.   
 
Third, in a post-disaster situation, particularly in the response phase, semi-quantitative 
indicators allow for rapid assessments to be made so that a picture of the impacts can be 
developed in the absence of full and accurate data.  The gathering and synthesis of data post-
event appears to be either 1) infeasible, due to time, resourcing or information access 
limitations; or 2) impossible, due to the lack of expertise or understanding of how to 
synthesise and assess risk information for this unique situation.  Streamlined post-disaster 
impact assessment approaches have been suggested by a number of authors: Charles Kelly 
suggests the balance needed in post-disaster impact assessments is between Speed, Accuracy 
and Utility (Kelly, 2011); The Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies Good 
Enough Guide (Emergency Capacity Building Project, 2007) states that “quick and simple” 
solutions for impact assessment may be the “only practical possibility [given time and 
resource constraints]”.  Both Kelly and the Good Enough Guide acknowledge that as the 
situation changes your assessment approaches may also need to change. 
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Semi-quantitative ratings are, however, subjective and therefore may be influenced by the 
assessor’s knowledge, experiences and interpretation of the situation.  In this thesis, the 
assessments were all carried out by the author to ensure consistent relative assessments. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, and as an example, assessment scales have been established.  
Note, if this assessment approach was to be adopted by a community, context specific 
assessment scales ideally be established by planning and/or emergency response authorities.   
 
The four disaster indicators and scales are: 
 
1. The general disaster scale (e.g. the number of persons deceased, the proportion of 
the population affected, the proportion of buildings destroyed, the projected 
recovery time, the economic impact, the resources required to manage the response, 
lifeline disruption). 
 
Low Medium High 
Minor level of damage and 
disruption.  Local resources only 
required to manage the event.  
Project recovery time: 1-2 years. 
Moderate level of damage, 
possible loss of lives.  Regional 
resources required.  Projected 
recovery time: 2-5 years. 
Significant loss of lives and 
damage to buildings and 
infrastructure.  National and/or 
international resources required 
to manage the response.  
Projected recovery time: over 5 
years. 
 
Pre-event, it would be useful for authorities to determine what may constitute a low medium 
or high scale disaster.  Many countries may have a qualitative or quantitative method of 
doing this already.  In New Zealand the scale of an event is largely determined by the 
resources needed to respond to the event, that is, whether the resources can be found locally, 
regionally or nationally. 
 
2. The number of displaced persons (and desiring to return) 
Low Medium High 
Less than 1% of population 
displaced.   
1-20% population displacement 
in affected area, with some or all 
intending on returning to the 
area. 
Over 20% of population in 
affected area is displaced, with 
some or all population intending 
on returning to the area. 
 
Note that, this indicator is specific to displaced persons wanting to return.  The reason for 
this is explained in Section 5.3.  
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3. The geographical extent of the impact (including effects of geographical isolation) 
Low Medium High 
Area of impact is confined to one 
or two localities, with easy access 
to unaffected areas. 
Regional area of impact.  Some or 
limited access to and from 
affected areas. 
Extensive area of impact, across 
multiple regions.  Difficult access 
to and from affected area. 
 
4. The hazard duration 
Low Medium High 
One off event with short term 
effects (e.g. presence of 
floodwaters): up to 1 week. 
Multiple, on-going effects of 
hazard (e.g. on-going severe 
aftershocks): for up to 1 month. 
Multiple, on-going effects of 
hazard (e.g. on-going severe 
aftershocks, nuclear incident): in 
excess of 1 month. 
 
Note that, related to this, is whether or not a hazard is a slow or rapid onset.  In a slow onset 
event (such as an oil spill or potentially a flood) authorities have time to plan, pre-position 
supplies and people have time to put mitigation measures in place (such as move furniture 
above group in a flood situation). 
 
5. The disruption to the road network 
Low Medium High 
Minimal damage to road 
network.   
Roading networks are moderately 
to severely disrupted for up to 
one month.  Authorities require 
minimal traffic movement. 
Roading networks are disrupted 
for more than a month.  
Authorities require minimal 
traffic movement. 
 
The author has used the above scales to determine the relative impacts of the five case 
studies.  These are presented in Table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1 Disaster impacts for thesis case studies. 
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* There was a high displacement of persons following the Samoan Tsunami but generally residents elected to 
move away permanently. 
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4.3 Disaster waste impact indicators 
4.3.1 General 
Typically, as the research literature demonstrated (see Section 1.3), authors have limited their 
description of disaster waste to debris streams linked to hazard types.  As shown in Table 4.2 
(a revised version of Table 1.2, based on observations during the course of this research), 
most hazard types, apart from pandemics, generate most debris streams.  This simplistic 
categorisation, therefore, does not help in understanding why there is such a varied number 
of disaster waste management approaches both within and across hazard types.  A more 
detailed description of disaster waste is required in order to understand the impact of disaster 
waste on planning a disaster waste management system and/or measure its effectiveness.   
 
Therefore, it is proposed that disaster waste be further categorised by 1) the waste source 
and 2) the waste characteristics.   
 
Table 4.2 Typical waste streams for different hazard types: author’s adaptation (in bold) of the 
2007 FEMA classification 
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Wildfires X X X X X X X X  
Ice storms X    X     
Volcanic 
eruption 
X X X X X X X X X 
Pandemic    X X     
Industrial 
disaster 
X X X X X X X X  
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4.3.2 Waste source 
The first categorisation is ‘waste source’.  That is, delineating the wastes depending on where 
or how the waste originated. A waste source categorisation is useful because the waste 
characteristics may be different between sources and therefore are likely to be managed 
differently (as will be discussed later in the thesis, predominantly Chapters 7 and 8).  The 
following categorisations are proposed (waste sources most likely in small scale disaster 
events are marked with a *): 
Waste sources: 
Response phase (prioritised) 
 1.= Removal of acutely hazardous substances (and other waste posing a 
secondary hazard e.g. waste blocking flowpaths). 
 1.= Demolition to enable urban search and rescue. 
* 3. Waste clearance for emergency / essential service operation (e.g. 
access way clearance, removal of damaged stock at food stores). 
 4. Partial demolition / making safe building for public. 
 
Recovery phase (not prioritised) 
* 1. Private (residential, commercial and industrial) property detritus (non-
structural material) 
* 2. Public property detritus (e.g. liquefaction silt, floodwater sediment, 
wind blown material, rock fall) 
 3. Full demolition debris 
 4. Major repair waste 
 5. Reconstruction waste 
 6. Horizontal infrastructure repair (e.g. roads, water, sewer, stormwater) 
 
Within each waste source category there may be sub-categories.  For example, in 
Christchurch following the earthquakes, private property detritus included two waste 
streams: 1) liquefaction silt and 2) household items such as broken plates, crockery, 
televisions and carpets.  Because of the very different nature and quantity of the materials, 
they were managed differently (liquefaction was collected by local authority contractors and 
private residents were responsible for disposal of household items).  As will be discussed in 
the operational management strategies chapter (Chapter 8), each waste stream (and sub-
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stream) is likely to have a different (but ideally complimentary) management technique and 
owner / manager.   
 
For the purpose of this thesis cross case-analysis, the waste source classification has only 
been used in the qualitative descriptions of the disaster waste management approaches.  
However, it is useful to demonstrate how the waste source classification can be used for 1) 
post-event assessments (i.e. for research) and 2) pre-event planning (to estimate likely waste 
sources, relative quantities and composition). 
 
As for the general disaster impact analysis, a semi-quantitative assessment can be used for 
both pre and post-event applications.  Semi-quantitative ratings for the disaster waste 
sources, and relative quantities, for the thesis case studies are shown in Table 4.3.  The scale 
used is: 
Low = 0-10% of the total waste 
Medium = 10-50% of the total waste 
High = more than 50% of the total waste 
 
Table 4.3 Disaster waste sources for case studies: contribution to overall waste quantity 
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For pre-event planning purposes, a slightly different assessment scale is needed.  First, the 
likelihood of the waste being generating from each particular source needs to be scored.  The 
rating scale could be low, medium and high probability.  Second, it is useful to indicate the 
likely relative quantity of the waste stream.  The rating scale could be the same as for the 
post-event analysis (Low =0-10%, Medium = 10-50%, High = above 50%).  Thus, a two 
letter rating system is proposed.  The author’s ratings for different hazard types are shown in 
Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 Typical disaster waste sources: the likelihood of them occurring and the likely 
relative quantity for different hazard types 
 Typical disaster waste sources 
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Hurricanes / 
Typhoons 
M L L L H L L L H H H M M L H M M L L L 
Tsunamis M L M L H L L L H M H M M M H M M L H H 
Tornadoes M L L L M L L L H M M M M M H L M L M L 
Floods M L L L H M L L H M H H M M M L M L M L 
Earthquakes M L H L  M L H L H L M L H H H M H M H H 
Wildfires M L L L L L L L - - H H - H M M L 
Ice storms L L - H M - - - - - - - 
Volcanic 
eruption 
L L L L H M L L H H H H L L L L L L M M 
Pandemic H L - - - H L* - - - - - 
Industrial 
disaster 
H M M L L L M L H L L L M L M L L L L L 
The first letter indicates the likelihood of the waste stream occurring (L=low, M= medium, H= high probability 
of occurrence) 
The second letter indicates the likely quantity contribution to the overall waste matrix (L=0-10%, M=10-50%, 
H=50-100%). 
* Infected waste products possible at household level.  Likely most waste will be at medical facilities. 
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As well as noting what waste sources occur in each hazard, it is useful to consider which 
waste streams (Table 4.2) are likely for each waste source (Table 4.4).  Based on the case 
studies and literature reviewed, Table 4.5 has been compiled by the author using the same 
rating system as above.  This analysis could be extended to consider the likely debris streams 
and waste sources for each hazard type7.  
 
Table 4.5 Typical waste streams for each waste source: the likelihood of them occurring and 
the likely relative quantity 
 Typical disaster waste sources 
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Vegetative L L L L M L L L H L H M L L L L - M L 
Construction and 
Demolition (C&D) 
M L H L M L H L L L M L H H H M H M H M 
Personal Property / 
Household Items 
L L L L L L M L H L M L H M M L - L L 
Hazardous Waste H L L L L L M L M L L L M L L L L L M L 
Household Hazardous 
Waste (HHW) 
H L L L L L L L M L M L H L L L - - 
White Goods L L L L L L - L L L L M L L L - - 
Soil, Mud and Sand L L M L H L M L M L H M L L L L M L H H 
Vehicles and Vessels M L L L M L - L L M L - - - - 
Putrescent L L L L - - M L M L M L - - L L 
The first letter indicates the likelihood of the waste stream occurring (L=low, M= medium, H= high probability 
of occurrence) 
The second letter indicates the likely quantity contribution to the overall waste matrix (L=0-10%, M=10-50%, 
H=50-100%). 
 
                                                 
7 This level of analysis has not been included here as it is not considered essential to the overall thesis 
objectives. 
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4.3.3 Disaster waste characteristics 
As well as the relative composition of the waste from each waste source it is useful to know 
some other physical characteristics of the waste.  Based on the literature review and the case 
studies, five key disaster waste characteristics are proposed: volume of waste, human health 
hazard, environmental health hazard, movement of waste and waste handling difficulty.  The 
reason for the selection of these characteristics will become evident in Chapters 6 to 10.  As 
for the disaster impacts in Section 4.2, these characteristics have only been used in this thesis 
to allow qualitative assessment of the disaster waste management system.  However, a brief 
discussion has been included to demonstrate how these indicators may be applied to pre- 
and post-event planning. 
 
As above, a semi-quantitative rating system is proposed to determine relative impacts for 
each waste characteristic.  Note again that semi-quantitative rating scales specific to different 
context may need to be defined; those given here are indicative only. 
 
In addition, below each characteristic, a list of possible information sources is noted to 
enable an impact assessment to be made.  The list is divided into data which could be (and 
should be) known pre-disaster, and which would need to be assessed. 
 
1. The volume of waste 
Low Medium High 
Waste generated is equivalent to 
1-2 years’ worth of annual waste 
generation. 
Waste generated is equivalent to 
5 years’ worth of annual waste 
generation. 
Waste generated is equivalent to 
more than 5 years’ worth of 
annual waste generation. 
 
Information sources (pre-event): local authority building information (building dimensions, 
material type); land-use data; hazard models. 
Information sources (post-event): damage maps, building damage assessments; LIDAR data. 
 
2. Human health hazard (physical (e.g. fall hazard) or chemical or biological) 
Low Medium High 
Hazard poses a weak, chronic 
threat. 
Hazard poses a minor acute or 
serious chronic threat. 
Hazard poses a serious acute 
and/or serious chronic threat.  
 
Human health hazards can be acute or chronic.  As discussed in the literature review (Section 
1.8.1), chronic health hazards following the World Trade Centre collapses are being 
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documented on an on-going basis and doctors fear that some effects may be seen for up to 
30 years.   
 
Information sources (pre-event): local authority hazardous material databases; hazard models. 
Information sources (post-event): air monitoring; water monitoring; expert assessments; 
building damage assessments. 
 
3. Environmental health hazard 
Low Medium High 
Hazard poses a weak, chronic 
threat. 
Hazard poses a minor acute or 
serious chronic threat. 
Hazard poses a serious acute 
and/or serious chronic threat.  
 
Information sources (pre-event): local authority hazardous material databases; hazard models. 
Information sources (post-event): air monitoring; water monitoring; expert assessments; 
building damage assessments. 
 
4. Movement of waste by disaster forces (particularly cross-property or locality boundary) 
Low Medium High 
The majority of the waste 
remains within the property 
boundaries. 
Some waste is likely to travel 
across property boundaries. 
Significant waste transported 
across property boundaries. 
 
Information sources (pre-event): hazard models 
Information sources (post event): observations 
 
5. Waste handling difficulty (e.g. specialist equipment required for demolition, waste 
separation or heavy material removal)  
Low Medium High 
Persons with little or no skill can 
manage waste stream.  Standard 
household and garden tools only 
necessary. 
Some basic equipment is required 
to manage waste.  Unskilled 
workers could be quickly trained. 
Waste is difficult and dangerous 
to manage.  Specialist skill and 
equipment is required. 
 
Information sources (pre-event): local authority building data. 
Information sources (post-event): observations; field trials. 
 
These indicators have been applied to the five thesis case studies to demonstrate how the 
indicators may be used in a post-disaster assessment situation, see Table 4.6.  Note that a 
range of impacts (denoted by a dash or ‘–‘ ) has been given in some cases as the disaster 
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characteristics may vary between waste sources.  For example, the difficulty in handling the 
waste in Christchurch varied from low difficulty for the liquefactions silts (which could be 
cleared simply by community volunteers) to high difficulty demolishing tall buildings. 
 
Table 4.6 Disaster waste characteristics for thesis case studies. 
 Typical disaster waste impacts 
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2009 Victorian Bushfires - 
demolition 
M L-M L-M L M 
2009 Samoan Tsunami – general 
clean-up 
M L L-M H L 
2009 L’Aquila Earthquake - 
demolition 
H L-H L L M-H 
2005 Hurricane Katrina – 
demolition 
H M-H L-M H M-H 
2011 Christchurch Earthquake – 
demolition 
H M-H L L L-H 
L = low, M = medium, H = high  
 
For planning purposes, a general rating per hazard may also be useful.  While there are 
definitely waste characteristics that are specific to hazard type (for example trans-boundary 
movement of waste in tsunami events), there are equally common characteristics (such as 
human health hazards) which span across hazard types.  Generic disaster waste impact 
characteristics will facilitate cross case analyses across a wide variety of events and therefore, 
the ability to transfer lessons learnt between different events.  Based on the literature review 
and the case studies in this thesis, a general rating of disaster waste impacts based on hazard 
type is presented in Table 4.7.  As for the analysis in Table 4.6, ranges of impacts have been 
given due to the likely variation between waste sources as well as disaster impacts for each 
hazard.  Generally this analysis shows that disasters have a wide range of impacts (in terms of 
waste generation).  The most interesting distinction between the disaster events is the hazard 
types which move privately owned materials or waste across property boundaries (i.e. 
hurricanes, tsunamis, tornadoes, floods) and those where waste largely stays at its point of 
origin (i.e. earthquakes, fires, ice storms, volcanic eruptions, pandemics and industrial 
disasters).  This has funding and legal implications which will be discussed in later chapters.   
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Table 4.7 Typical range of disaster waste impacts for different hazard types 
 Typical disaster waste impacts 
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Hurricanes / 
Typhoons 
L - M L - M L - M M L - H 
Tsunamis L - H L - H L - H M - H L – H 
Tornadoes L L - M L - M M L - H 
Floods L - H L - H L - H M - H L - M 
Earthquakes L - H L - H L - H L L - H 
Wildfires L - M L - M L - M L M - H 
Ice storms L L - H L - H L L - H 
Volcanic eruption L-H M M L L-H 
Pandemic L H L L H 
Industrial disaster L-M L-H L-H L L-H 
L = low, M = medium, H = high  
 
This assessment could be expanded further by evaluating the waste impacts expected for 
each waste source for each hazard type; and potentially for different disaster impacts within 
each hazard type.  However, that level of detail is not included in this thesis.  The aim is to 
present an approach suitable for further analysis and planning purposes. 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter presented three key classifications and semi-quantitative assessment techniques 
which can be used to aid in pre-event and post-event planning and analysis: 
 Disaster impact indicators; 
 Disaster waste source categorisations; and 
 Disaster waste impact indicators. 
 
These classifications will be used qualitatively for the remainder of the thesis to enable cross 
case analysis. 
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5. Effects 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the literature review (Sections 1.6 to 1.8), disaster waste management systems 
can have wide and varying environmental, economic and social effects.  These potential 
effects need to be better understood to enable disaster waste managers to establish 
appropriate goals for disaster waste management systems which also meet the objectives of 
the overall recovery. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to develop qualitative criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a 
disaster waste management system.  These criteria could also be interpreted as objectives for 
disaster waste management.  The chapter discusses the challenge of balancing these 
objectives post-disaster, and the impact of the different disaster & disaster waste impacts 
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presented in Chapter 4.  There is also a discussion on how these criteria may also be 
developed for use in future disaster waste management planning.  A possible assessment 
approach and scale is proposed. 
 
The criteria will form the basis for the cross-case study analyses presented in (Chapter 6 to 
10).   
5.2 The criteria 
5.2.1 Environmental  
There are a number of widely acknowledged adverse environmental risks associated with 
managing waste.  Environmental risks can include contaminant discharge to air, water or 
land and can occur at any stage of the waste management process.  Generally risks associated 
with managing waste in peace-time are well recognised and understood.  Post-disaster many 
of these risks can increase intentionally and unintentionally often due to the desired speed of 
physical works (refer Chapter 10).  Disaster waste management systems should ideally aim to 
mitigate environmental risks. 
 
Examples of negative environmental effects observed in the case studies include: illegal 
dumping (Hurricane Katrina, Christchurch earthquake, Samoan tsunami) and air pollution 
from open burning following Hurricane Katrina. 
 
Criterion: Adverse environmental effects are minimised. 
 
In peace-time, waste management systems in developed countries generally successfully 
manage environmental risks and there is a growing focus on environmentally beneficial 
strategies for waste management, such as, at times, reuse, recycling and reduction.  There is 
opportunity post-disaster to implement environmentally beneficial waste management 
strategies and where feasible this should be encouraged.   
 
Criterion: Environmentally beneficial strategies encouraged (e.g. recycling). 
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5.2.2 Economic  
Direct 
Waste management is an expensive service.  Costs are incurred from management, labour, 
transportation, plant and equipment, treatment and disposal of waste.  Cost control and 
savings can be achieved through a number of initiatives, including reducing double handling, 
using in-kind assistance where appropriate, maximising economies of scale, recycling and 
controlling post-disaster price escalation (see Section 7.3.3).  
 
Criterion: Operational (waste handling and disposal) costs are minimised. 
 
Management costs are incurred both at a strategic and operational level.  Costs include 
administration, monitoring and coordination.  These costs can be reduced by selecting 
efficient contract types, organisational structures and risk management techniques (as 
discussed later in this thesis).  For example, following the Victorian Bushfires, the managing 
contractor, in agreement with the Victorian Environmental Protection Agency, established a 
streamlined truck certification and management programme which reduced monitoring 
requirements. 
 
Criterion: Regulatory and strategic management costs are minimised. 
  
Indirect 
As noted by Horwich (2000) in his assessment of the economic impacts of the Kobe 
earthquake, disaster recovery efforts can have a positive effect on the local economy.  In 
terms of waste management, indirect benefits can be stimulated by use of local labour and 
services. 
 
Criterion: Local economy stimulated 
 
Indirect costs could be incurred from poor environmental and human health risk 
management if environmental remediation or medical intervention is needed.  Authorities 
also may face the costs of litigation.  This cost is positively linked to minimising adverse 
environmental effects, above, and human health effects, below.  When risks are minimised, 
potential future remediation costs are also minimised.  
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Criterion: Potential future costs from environmental remediation and adverse health effects are 
minimised. 
5.2.3 Social  
Psychosocial 
Many authors, as discussed in Section 1.8, note that the removal of debris aids in the 
psychosocial recovery of a community.  The limited social impact data collected in this 
research contributed to that assertion.  One community member interviewed in Victoria, 
Australia, described the transformation following the bushfire debris removal in Marysville as 
having “gone from rubbish heaps to a new housing development”;; another described it as “a 
new beginning”.  The psychosocial benefits are not just from reducing visual impacts and 
enabling rebuilding.  There are also benefits from facilitating access to and the recovery of 
social infrastructure such as schools, churches and community facilities.  More generally, 
disaster waste removal is the first physical step towards recovery.  
 
Criterion: Improves community spirit 
 
The author proposes that physically participating in disaster recovery works can contribute 
positively in psychological terms.  Community participation in disaster recovery planning is a 
well-recognised ideal with many benefits including empowering communities and mitigating 
potential mental health issues (Sullivan, 2003; Gordon, 2009; Phillips, 2009; Collins et al., 
2011; Mooney et al., 2011); the benefits of physically participating has been less well 
researched.  Parallels can perhaps be drawn to the psychological benefits of general 
volunteerism, under the assumption that similar benefits apply to disaster affected persons.  
Major benefits of volunteering in a disaster recovery situation cited by Phillips (2009) include 
decreasing psychological distress and depression, improving mental health and drawing 
people away from inappropriate means of coping with the disaster.  Respondents to a study 
on community recovery after the 2003 Canberra bushfires in Australia noted that ‘having a 
sense of control and acceptance and engaging in meaningful activities’ aided them in their 
recovery (Camilleri et al., 2010).   
 
Empowering communities during recovery also potentially aids in their future ability to help 
themselves following a disaster event (The World Bank and The United Nations, 2010).  
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There was general concern noted, following the Samoan tsunami, that the low level of 
community involvement in the recovery effort was contributing to aid dependence.   
 
Criterion: Affected persons are empowered to participate in their own recovery. 
 
Public communication and consultation around post-disaster issues, including waste 
management, is arguably the most important aspect of disaster response and recovery.  
Communication helps to ensure that the authorities and the community are working toward 
a common and shared goal.  Disconnects between the community and authorities (for 
example in terms of prioritisation of works, timeliness, fairness, environmental and human 
health risk management) can lead to erosion of public trust and public opposition which may 
affect the expedience and quality of the recovery.  Following Hurricane Katrina, L’Aquila 
earthquake and the Christchurch earthquakes, protest and/or legal action has been taken 
against authorities for various aspects of the waste management system: each time diverting 
resources from the recovery efforts.  It is important to design the disaster waste management 
programme to maximise public acceptance. 
 
The sensitive management and/or return of personal property should also be considered 
here.  In all the case studies investigated the rightful return and/or sensitive handling of 
personal property has been an important consideration for community members.  
Community members all appreciated the opportunity to salvage personal property prior to 
demolition.  In Christchurch there was much disaffection regarding the handling of business 
effects in the central city – some belongings which were supposed to be unrecoverable (some 
containing private information) were salvaged by the demolition contractors.  This is 
discussed further in Section 8.3.4.   
 
Criterion: Public understands and accepts disaster waste management strategy 
 
Human health 
Management of disaster waste involves the management of various human health hazards.  
Hazards can be at the demolition site, during waste collection, transportation or at waste 
handling facilities.  Hazards can be chemical or physical, acute or chronic, as described in 
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Section 4.3.3.  Management systems need to be designed to ensure these hazards are 
effectively controlled. 
 
Criterion: Human health (both general public and workers, acute and chronic) risks are 
effectively managed. 
 
5.2.4 Recovery 
Clear recovery objectives, in the author’s opinion, are critical to effective disaster waste 
management systems and disaster recovery in general.  In many of the case studies reviewed 
in this research, recovery objectives appeared to be either not established, poorly 
implemented or there was a disconnect between waste management activities and the overall 
recovery.  
 
In Victoria, Federal and State Officials publicly acknowledged Bushfire recovery objectives 
and designed the waste management strategy in line with those objectives:  
 
“Ms [Jenny] Macklin [Federal Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs] said clearing debris left in the wake of Victoria’s bushfires 
was the essential first step in rebuilding communities.  ‘We will remove potential 
hazardous material, such as asbestos, and then clear properties for free, so 
communities can start to get back on their feet,’ she said.  ‘When you see the scale 
…[of] the devastation and people sifting through what was their homes, it is clear the 
pressing priority, both at an emotional and safety level, [is] to start clearing away the 
debris.  We want to help people get started as quickly as we can, and we want to give 
them the practical assistance they need to make sure the clean-up is done in a safe 
and sensitive way.’ “  
(The Premier of Victoria, 2009) 
 
In Christchurch, however, the recovery objectives were rather less well defined.  Generally it 
was understood that time was a critical factor.  However, minimising direct cost, social 
disruption and environmental impact were also proffered as recovery goals by various 
agencies and authorities.   
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In a review of disaster recovery programmes, Olshansky et al. (2006) surmised that recovery 
objectives, while different for every context and disaster, generally focus on time and quality.   
 
In terms of timeliness, expedient demolition and clean-up offers many economic and social 
benefits.  Economically, there are indirect financial benefits from a timely clean-up: reduced 
business losses, the return and/or non-flight of people and businesses, reductions in 
government welfare dependence and a faster return to full economic productivity.  There is 
potentially a benefit to faster demolitions from the point of view of a business that has 
limited or no business loss insurance.  For example, the following (fictional) calculation 
demonstrates the effect of time to demolish on total business losses: 
 
Building value    $1,000,000 
Demolition cost (option 1) $50,000 for 4 week programme 
Demolition cost (option 2) $100,000 for a 2 week programme 
 
Therefore, the additional cost for a faster demolition (option 2) is $25,000 per week.  If 
business losses for the building (or neighbouring buildings unable to open because of the 
damaged structure) are more than $25,000/week, then, a faster (and more expensive) 
demolition is justified.  Further analysis and research comparing demolition costs and 
business losses would be advantageous. 
 
Some proffer that a faster demolition reduces the chance of illegal dumping by those 
frustrated by the clean-up service taking too long to reach them (GAO, 2008) and thus, the 
risk of cost for future remediation costs is reduced (Section 5.2.2) and human and 
environmental risks are reduced (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.3).  From a psychosocial point of 
view, as waste is removed, community spirits can be lifted (refer Section 5.2.3). 
 
It should be noted that the desired speed of clean-up and demolition may change over time.  
In fact it could be argued that the urgency to demolish and clean-up, decreases as the 
recovery period progresses.  This is because most of the dangerous buildings are removed, 
health and safety concerns are reduced, public access may be restored and from a 
psychological point of view the damage is less visible.  Urgency to clean-up could also be 
reduced when there are delays in the wider recovery planning, including re-build planning 
and permitting and building code changes observed in Christchurch.  It may be appropriate 
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(unless the waste is causing significant disruptions or posing significant hazards) to align 
demolition / clean-up timing with recovery planning.  For example, demolition in the central 
city of Christchurch (to make safe enough to re-open the area) was scheduled for April 2012 
– the same month as the approval of the central city recovery plan.  
 
Criterion: The recovery is timely. 
 
In terms of the analysis in this thesis, the author has assumed that ‘quality’ is measured by the 
environmental, economic and social criteria discussed in this chapter. 
 
The author would add to Olshansky et al.’s findings in that recovery objectives also tend to, 
and need to, focus on community.  In many developed countries, a free market paradigm 
exists which focuses on individual freedoms.  It has been observed by the author that this 
paradigm is not necessarily complementary to community recovery as individual benefits are 
‘favoured’ over the greater community good.  Meadows (2009) refers to this systems thinking 
concept as the ‘tragedy of the commons’.  Authorities in some of the case studies have 
modified individual’s peace-time market freedoms to ensure community recovery goals are 
met: generally by increasing regulation.  For example, the CER Act in Christchurch, where 
CERA was given authority to intervene when private property owners did not demolish or 
make safe dangerous properties in a timely manner.   
 
Criterion: The recovery facilitates equitable outcomes across the community. 
 
5.3 Balancing objectives 
The criteria given above are ideal and are not always complementary.  It is unlikely that all 
objectives will be able to be met and compromises will have to be made.  That is, when 
efforts are made to meet one objective, another may be compromised.  There are many 
examples of this need to balance objectives throughout this thesis.  For example: 
 Recycling all the waste material might be the most environmentally beneficial 
solution but it might take a long time and can sometimes be more expensive.   
 Reducing management and monitoring efforts and costs could have adverse 
environmental and human health effects. 
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 Hastening the management of waste could compromise environmental and human 
health outcomes or lead to community disaffection.  For example, the hasty World 
Trade Centre clean-up led to human health effects (9-11 Research, accessed 2011a) as 
well as the destruction of forensic evidence (9-11 Research, accessed 2011b); and the 
fast demolition in Wenchuan, China, following the 2008 earthquake led to 
accusations of government corruption as some believed bodies were bulldozed away 
with the building rubble (Demick, 2009). 
 Encouraging public participation when there is a public health risk could have a 
detrimental effect on public health. 
 Allowing individual management of waste at demolition sites may empower 
individuals; but, if poorly managed, may increase the overall economic impact on the 
community due to prolonged business disruption for neighbouring commercial 
properties. 
 
Authorities managing each disaster will need to determine how to prioritise the desired 
objectives.  The relative importance of the criteria is likely to be context specific and is for 
authorities to determine during planning and response / recovery.  In terms of this thesis, 
the author has, where possible, only stated the potential effects of various disaster waste 
management approaches (rather than the overall balance for a particular case study).   
 
One of the major challenges in balancing objectives is managing the desire to clear debris 
quickly – referred to here as ‘urgency to clean-up’ – and the speed at which a quality clean-up 
can occur - ‘speed of clean-up’.  Below is a discussion of how some of the disaster impacts, 
discussed in Chapter 4, affect how urgent the clean-up is and how quickly it can be carried 
out.  The discussion is summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
Disaster scale 
Based on the literature review and the five case studies here it appears that the urgency to 
clean-up increases with the scale of the event.  Christchurch in particular is a good example 
of this, where the response to the September 2010 earthquake was far less urgent than the 
larger 2011 February earthquake. 
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Number of displaced persons 
The urgency of clean-up activities will depend on whether displaced people intend to return 
to the affected area or not.  If the community intends to return (such as the Christchurch 
Central Business District), clean-up activities tend to be more urgent than if the community 
is relocating.  Following Samoa the communities elected to move away from the affected 
area permanently, consequently it appears that, apart from areas related to tourism, there 
appeared to be slightly less urgency for waste management than in other disaster responses 
investigated.   
 
In addition, displaced persons are generally not available or willing to assist with clean-up 
activities.  This may have an impact on the speed of the overall clean-up. 
 
Duration of hazard 
If the effects of the hazard are prolonged, clean-up activities are less urgent as authorities and 
funding agencies tend to want to wait until the damage has ‘peaked’.  However, in some 
cases urgent action might be necessary to mitigate further effects of the hazard.  For 
example, in Christchurch, demolition of buildings became urgent in the central city, as strong 
aftershocks continually hit the city to mitigate potential hazards to the public, workers and 
neighbouring property.  However, repair works on houses (and resultant waste management) 
were delayed until the aftershock activity had reduced to a suitable level to avoid the need to 
repeatedly repair damage. 
 
Disruption to road network 
The higher the disruption is to the road network, the slower the waste management 
programme will be.  If the disruption to the road network is caused by waste or debris then 
this will also increase the urgency to move the waste.  However, if the damage is structural 
(e.g. bridge collapses, road washouts) this will affect the transportation of wastes and may 
slow the speed of the clean-up.  
 
Volume of waste 
The greater the volume of waste, the greater the urgency to clean-up will be.  However, the 
volume of waste will slow the speed of the clean-up. 
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Human health risk 
The greater the human health risk posed by the disaster waste, the more urgency there will be 
to clean up.  However, it is interesting to note that, generally, the greater the hazard, the 
slower the waste management processes tend to be.  For example, tall buildings that pose a 
risk of collapse need to be deconstructed in a slow and controlled manner; and if asbestos is 
present, management techniques need to be in place to protect public and workers during 
demolition.  This dichotomy is explored further in Chapter 10. 
 
Environmental health risk 
As for human health risk above, the higher the environmental health risk posed by the waste, 
the higher the urgency is to clear the waste. 
 
Difficulty in handling the wastes 
If waste is difficult to handle and specialist equipment is required, this is likely to reduce the 
speed of the clean-up. 
 
Table 5.1 Disaster and disaster waste indicators influencing the urgency and speed of a disaster 
waste management system 
 Disaster & disaster waste indicators 
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up 
+ +  -   + +   
Speed of clean-up  -  - - - -   - 
+ = positive influence, - = negative influence 
 
5.4 Systems diagram 
To illustrate how the above discussion, a causal loop diagram has been prepared to, see 
Figure 5-1.  Causal loop diagrams are a common method used to illustrate relationships 
between elements in a system to demonstrate the overall system behaviour.  This causal loop 
diagram shows how the disaster & disaster waste impacts link to the environmental, 
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economic, social and recovery effects.  It also demonstrates how the environmental, 
economic and social effects relate to each other.  Between each factor on the diagram is an 
arrow with a + or a – next to it.  This denotes whether an increase in one system element will 
have a positive or negative effect (respectively) on the adjoining element.  The solid links 
shown are those already developed in the previous two chapters and the dotted links 
represent the aspects to be developed in later chapters.   
 
Generally the diagram shows: 
1) The ‘disaster waste system’ (as will be developed in the following chapters) is driven 
by the disaster & disaster waste impacts (left hand side of the diagram).  Many of the 
disaster & disaster waste impacts create an urgency to clean-up the waste quickly and 
this becomes a decision-driver for disaster waste managers. 
2) The ‘disaster waste system’ is linked to the likely effects.  As discussed in this chapter 
the design of a disaster waste management system will determine how fast the clean-
up is carried out and what the likely environmental, economic and social impacts will 
be.   
3) The effectiveness of the recovery is affected by the disaster & disaster waste impacts.  
Generally the disaster & disaster waste impacts will negatively impact how fast the 
clean-up can be carried out.  
4) The effects relate to each other.  As the feedback loops on the diagram show, the 
effects generally positively reinforce each other.  The social, environmental and 
economic recovery is affected significantly by the speed at which the clean-up is 
carried out.  In particular, a more expedient clean-up has positive economic and 
social effects which also positively reinforce each other.  Thus, it can be inferred that 
carrying out an expedient clean-up would be very positive for the recovery. 
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Figure 5-1 Causal loop diagram: for measuring the effectiveness of a disaster waste management 
system. 
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5.5 Criteria application 
As for the disaster & disaster waste impact indicators (Chapter 4), the disaster waste 
management system effectiveness criteria are only used qualitatively in this thesis to support 
the conclusions drawn.  However, as stated above, these criteria could be used to assess the 
likely effectiveness of the proposed disaster waste management systems – either pre- or post-
event.  To enable this, a semi-quantitative scale (such as that used in Section 4.2) could be 
applied to the criteria.  To allow for the criteria to be balanced, a weighting should also be 
given to each criterion.   
 
5.6 Summary 
The challenge in this thesis is to determine the best design for the ‘disaster waste system’ to 
ensure an effective and efficient demolition and debris management programme.  This 
chapter has outlined a set of 12 criteria, as listed in Table 5.2, to enable the assessment of the 
environmental, economic, social and recovery objectives likely in a disaster waste 
management system.  These criteria will be used, qualitatively, in this thesis to support the 
discussion on the effectiveness of certain approaches to disaster waste management (see 
Chapters 6 to 10).  It is envisaged that these criteria could be adapted as objectives to enable 
future planning for disaster waste management (Section 12.2). 
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Table 5.2 Criteria for an effective disaster waste management system 
 Criteria 
Environmental  
Adverse environmental effects are minimised. 
Environmentally beneficial strategies encouraged (e.g. recycling). 
Economic 
Direct costs8 
 
Indirect costs 
 
Operational (waste handling and disposal) costs are minimised. 
Regulatory and strategic management costs are minimised. 
Local economy stimulated. 
Potential future costs from environmental remediation and adverse health effects 
are minimised. 
Social 
Psychosocial 
 
 
Human health 
 
Improves community spirit. 
Affected persons are empowered to participate in their own recovery. 
Public understands and accepts disaster waste management strategy. 
Human health (both general public and workers, acute and chronic) risks are 
effectively managed. 
Recovery  
The recovery is timely. 
The recovery facilitates equitable outcomes across the community. 
 
                                                 
8 Direct economic costs include for waste collection, demolition, treatment, and disposal and all the 
management / overhead costs which relate directly to management of disaster waste.   
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6. Strategic management 
6.1 Introduction 
As described in Section 1.9.1, disaster waste managers have developed and coordinated 
disaster waste management programmes using a number of different organisational 
structures.  The responsibility for this strategic management can be assigned to: local, 
regional or national authorities; waste management or emergency organisations; or the need 
for strategic management can be neglected altogether. 
 
This chapter analyses the strategic management of the five case studies in the context of their 
respective wider disaster recovery governance.   
 
The general aims in the chapter are to understand: 
1) Why strategic management is important 
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2) Where responsibility for strategic management should lie (local, regional or national; 
waste management or disaster management authority); and 
3) What general principles a strategic management organisational structure should 
adhere to. 
 
As discussed in the methodology chapter (Chapter 2), both the disaster impacts and system 
effectiveness criteria have contributed to, and will be referred to during, the analysis. 
 
Also included in this chapter is a brief discussion of public communication and consultation 
around disaster waste management.   
 
6.2 Case studies 
6.2.1 2009 Victorian Bushfires 
Due to the scale of the event, the Commonwealth and Victorian Governments elected to 
establish the Victorian Bushfire Recovery and Reconstruction Authority (VBRRA) to “guide 
the recovery and rebuild process” (VBRRA, 2009b).  As part of this, VBRRA took overall 
responsibility for the waste management programme.  Thus, VBRRA became the focal point 
for waste management issues.  VBRRA initiated the coordination of the appropriate 
regulators and contractors to implement the project and consistent quality / implementation 
standards were established across the entire affected area.  VBRRA acted as a coordinator for 
the three levels of government and had limited direct decision-making authority.  Legislative 
authority remained with peace-time authorities.  Given the scale of the event, the approach 
was generally sufficient. 
 
In general, the inter-agency communication was ad-hoc (due to the absence of a plan) but 
seemed effective.  Post-disaster, roles and responsibilities were undefined and overall 
responsibilities for various aspects of the waste management process were unclear.  
Community consultation was absent during the planning of the demolition and debris 
management plan.  Some public consultation was carried out during implementation but the 
communication was largely one-way: that is, information provision to communities. 
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6.2.2  2009 Samoan Tsunami 
Overall the coordination of the waste management process was weak.  The UN Cluster 
system response and Samoan government emergency response systems were not integrated 
and neither system explicitly recognised waste management as a specific recovery activity; 
consequently expected roles and responsibilities were ill-defined.  No one agency, national or 
international, took responsibility for a strategic and integrated approach to waste 
management.   
 
There also did not appear to be a clear mechanism for cross-organisational collaboration.  
While the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment was directly responsible for 
waste management works, waste management issues were identified as a need by at least two 
government agencies (Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries).  The 
mechanisms to alert relevant authorities of given recover needs, however, was unclear and 
there was reliance on existing pre-disaster relationships. 
 
A lack of strategic management led to varied programme effectiveness.  Organisations 
formed their own waste management strategies and policies with varying degrees of recycling 
and disposal standards.  Doubling-up on, and omission of, recovery activities also occurred.   
 
There were some public communication attempts, via the media (radio, newspaper), to notify 
people of the potential toxins in the lagoon area due to the debris.  This appeared to be 
effective.  However, poor community understanding and participation in the clean-up 
planning and process led to many villagers managing their own waste haphazardly on site: 
including open burning and burial.   
 
6.2.3 2009 L’Aquila Earthquake 
Emergency management in Italy is the responsibility of Departimento della Protezione Civile 
(DPC) [Government of Italy Department of Civil Protection].  Although DPC was not 
specifically prepared for management of disaster waste, the environmental arm of DPC 
(established in 2006 following the Campania waste crisis) assumed control of establishing 
and operating the waste management system for the first eight months.  Following that, the 
local authorities (Comunes), who have normal operational control of waste management 
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activities in Italian towns, assumed control of waste issues.  Legislative changes were enacted 
by DPC, in consultation with Provincia dell’Aquila, to enable waste management activities. 
 
The initial coordination by DPC appeared to be effective in that it provided an umbrella for 
coordination of all stakeholders and the joint establishment of waste management 
procedures.  The body also allowed for linkages to other recovery activities.  However, once 
DPC withdrew and individual Comunes assumed responsibility for waste management 
within their locality, the regional approach appeared to be lost.  A regional commissioner and 
round table forum were established to oversee the recovery and ensure a regional approach; 
however, their effectiveness appeared to be limited, as critical decisions (such as 
identification of disposal and waste handling sites) were not forthcoming.   
 
The uncoordinated approach contributed to delays in waste management which increased 
public health and environmental risks (due to the presence of the unmanaged waste); led to 
community dissatisfaction (particularly due to slow progress in the historic city centre or red 
zone); and affected the economic recovery of the area. 
 
Some efforts were made by Provincia dell’Aquila to communicate waste management issues 
and procedures (Bonanni and Stagnini, accessed 2010), including press conferences and 
meetings with citizens’ committees and all municipalities to outline waste management 
practices.  No information on communication efforts of other authorities was obtained by 
the author. 
 
6.2.4 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
The general approach to overall coordination of the waste management programme 
following Hurricane Katrina was as prescribed in the National Response Plan (NRP).  The 
NRP clearly outlines specific operational roles, delineated into Emergency Support 
Functions (ESFs), to be enacted in response to a disaster.  Each ESF has a government 
department as lead and they are responsible for facilitating any legislative and organisational 
measures necessary so that the operational roles can be carried out.  In the case of waste, the 
primary lead agencies were the US Corps of Engineers and US Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA).  Generally ESF mandates are operationally focussed.   
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In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf Coast Recovery Office (GCRO) was also 
established to coordinate FEMA / NRP activities across all affected States.  Generally, it 
appears that: (1) USEPA set minimum standards for waste management; (2) LDEQ ensured 
State laws were met, established minimum standards for clean-up operations and streamlined 
regulatory processes where necessary; and (3) local authorities identified disposal sites and 
ensured that contractors had sufficient disposal, staging and recycling sites.  However, it is 
unclear who oversaw the efficiency and effectiveness of the disaster waste management 
system. 
 
Overall, based on the data gathered, the strategic management and coordination of the waste 
management process was missing.  Established operational roles worked well, as did 
organisations working within their peace-time capacities.  However, there was a distinct lack 
of coordination across federal, state and local authorities with respect to waste management 
activities.  It is unknown how effective the GCRO was and the exact linkages (if any) 
between the GCRO and the ESFs roles, functions and personnel.  There was also, perhaps 
as a result, minimal strategic direction given to implementing organisations in terms of how 
specific streams of waste should be handled.  This led to a slow clean-up operation which 
was inconsistent between localities.  
 
The large number of displaced persons made public communication difficult.  USEPA 
provided some information on their website and gave general guidance on how to deal with 
certain aspects of the waste following Hurricane Katrina, including asbestos, storage tanks, 
polychlorinated biphenyls, hazardous materials and demolition material (USEPA, 2005a).  
However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2007) determined that USEPA’s 
public communication of the health and safety risks involved in residents returning home, 
was inadequate.  The reports were issued too late (3, 6 and 11 months after the disaster) and 
much of the early data did not clarify that the risk assessments were based on short term 
exposure to the hazardous waste components. 
 
6.2.5 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
Emergency response and recovery in New Zealand is managed by Civil Defence under the 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Act.  The provisions under the CDEM 
Act (and related plans and organisational structures) were sufficient to enable emergency 
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response following the earthquake; however, the legal mechanisms and organisational 
structures allowed for under the CDEM Act were not sufficient for recovery from an event 
as large as the Christchurch earthquakes.  Thus, a new law was passed (the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery or CER Act) and a new government department, the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), was formed to strategically manage the recovery of 
Christchurch in partnership with local and regional authorities.  CERA also had some 
operational responsibilities, in particular with respect to demolition and debris management 
in the commercial and residential red zones. 
 
Waste was not explicitly included in the Civil Defence pre-event plans or legislation.  A 
demolition and debris management team evolved during the emergency response phase, 
under Civil Defence.  Representatives from local and regional authorities, Civil Defence, 
project management consultants and contractors were brought together to develop and 
implement the demolition and debris management system.  The team was largely 
operationally focussed but some effort was made to strategically plan for waste management 
in collaboration with local councils.  This team carried over during the transition from Civil 
Defence to CERA.  This carry-over occurred out of necessity as much as with a strategic 
intent for continuity.  By five months after the earthquake, the waste team was reduced to 
one consultant working, primarily, in an operational capacity.  Environmental regulation and 
enforcement was carried out by the local and regional councils according to their peace-time 
functions.   
 
At the time of writing, there appeared to be no role developed for strategic management and 
coordination of the overall waste management process.  Debris and waste management 
issues have been officially divided between CERA (debris management – demolitions) and 
the local authority (Christchurch City Council) (water and waste issues) (CERA, 2011) such 
that no organisation appears to be overseeing the whole waste management system, from 
‘cradle to grave’.  Thus, no organisation is actively identifying bottlenecks, capacity 
limitations, risks or developing integrated protocols & strategy. 
 
Public communication during the response was largely reactionary.  The high number of 
media enquiries and limited human resources meant that proactive messaging was not always 
possible.  Public consultation efforts were limited to those required under law and some of 
these had been stream-lined by provisions under the CER Act, see Section 11.2.5. 
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6.2.6 Case study summary 
As demonstrated above, there are a diverse range of approaches to strategic disaster waste 
management.  Table 6.1 indicates what types of organisations (national, regional, local, 
emergency / recovery or waste/environmental management) were responsible for the 
strategic management of the waste for each case study.  Note that responsibilities shown in 
the table are those beyond their peace-time organisational mandate. 
 
Table 6.1 Disaster waste strategic (overall) management responsibility (beyond peace-time 
responsibilities) during response (E) and recovery (R) phases 
 Governance level Authority type 
National 
 
Regional  Local  Emergency / 
Recovery  
Waste / 
environmental  
2009 Victorian 
Bushfires  E+R  E+R  
2009 Samoan 
Tsunami E+R    E+R 
2009 L’Aquila 
earthquake E
  
R
 
E
 
R
 
2005 Hurricane 
Katrina  
E+R
   
E+R
 
2011 
Christchurch 
earthquake 
E
   
E
  
 
The survey results presented in Appendix C, indicated that there was no obvious choice for 
assignment of responsibility for disaster waste management activities.  49% indicated that the 
emergency / recovery agency should have responsibility for the waste; while 23% and 28% 
indicated local and national waste management authorities respectively.   
 
The spread of the survey responses and the range of organisational structures used in the 
case studies, perhaps, is indicative of the complexity of contextual factors that can potentially 
influence strategic disaster waste management approaches.   
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6.3 Discussion 
6.3.1 Importance of strategic management 
It is important to acknowledge that disaster waste management is a separate function to 
peace-time.  In peace-time, organisations have existing mandates for dealing with various 
peace-time waste streams.  Roles and responsibilities are well defined and consistent.  
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, disasters generate different waste streams with unique 
characteristics and, by definition, the waste is generally managed under time and resource 
constraints.  As a result (as discussed in Chapter 5) peace-time waste management objectives 
are also likely to have shifted.  These factors dictate that, unless the disaster is small, a 
specific management approach, distinct from peace-time is required.   
 
If a central authority had not been established in Victoria, Australia, following the bushfires, 
it would have been unclear where the overall responsibility for and strategic management of 
the bushfire waste would have rested amongst the diverse range of private, state and local 
government bodies involved in daily waste management in Victoria.  A single authority 
allowed for a strategic and centralised approach to waste management.  VBRRA was 
responsible and ultimately accountable for ensuring the clean-up works were complete and 
implemented effectively and efficiently.    
 
A strategic management approach, distinct from peace-time structures is generally required to 
ensure recovery objectives are met. 
 
A strategic management organisation (or group of organisations) is, therefore, necessary to 
manipulate peace-time roles and responsibilities to ensure new post-disaster objectives are 
met.  In L’Aquila, where strategic management was lacking, peace-time mandates and silos 
interfered with meeting recovery objectives.  While it was the local environmental authority’s 
role to advocate for recycling processing sites and to minimise landfilling, they had no 
mandate to establish sites to facilitate this; that had to be done by the municipality (Comune).  
However, it was not necessarily in the municipality’s interest or their priority to establish 
these sites, as their primary aim was to remove the debris from the streets to facilitate 
recovery of the city.  Thus the common goal of regional recovery (both social and 
environmental) was lost as no one organisation was driving the waste management process.  
In Christchurch, the local authority focusses much more on social disruption, whereas the 
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regional authority focusses on the environmental impact.  Decisions appeared to be being 
made independently within each organisation to meet their organisational mandate.  Unless 
there is good overall leadership, different organisations are likely to make decisions based on 
their understanding of the context and peace-time processes and responsibilities.  They are 
unlikely to consider wider recovery goals – either unintentionally or due to legislated 
limitations in their organisational mandate.  In systems terms, this is known as bounded 
rationality: “each actor in a system may not lead to decisions that further the welfare of the 
system as a whole” (Meadows, 2009). 
 
The appropriate legislative framework (including mandate and authority) is required to 
ensure strategic management is possible.  Conversely, inadequate strategic management 
structures can increase the possibility of poor legislative and regulatory decisions.  This is 
discussed in detail in Section 11.3.1. 
 
An entity must be given the responsibility and mandate to lead disaster waste management 
activities toward community-wide recovery goals. 
 
6.3.2 Responsibility for strategic management 
As shown in Table 6.1, overall responsibility for management of disaster waste in the case 
studies investigated here rested with a range of different agencies.  Some were fairly well 
defined in emergency response and/or recovery plans (Hurricane Katrina), others emerged 
during the recovery (Victorian Bushfires, Samoan Tsunami, L’Aquila earthquake) and others 
never fully eventuated (Christchurch earthquake).  A key decision, is determining 1) which 
type of organisation (emergency/recovery or waste/environmental) and 2) what level of 
governance is best to strategically manage the waste.  
 
Organisational function (emergency / recovery or waste / environmental authority) 
As discussed above, existing organisations are often constrained by their peace-time 
mandates and/or mentalities or they suffer from ‘bounded rationality’.  Bounded rationality 
was evident during the author’s involvement in the response to the Christchurch earthquakes 
where existing local authority functions, at times, did not adapt to match the new working 
environment and some decisions were being made using peace-time assessment processes 
and considerations.  In L’Aquila, authorities were bounded by their peace-time approach to 
    Strategic management 101 
   
 
 
identifying waste handling and disposal sites, such that insufficient sites were identified.  
Assigning responsibility for disaster waste management to an organisation which is not 
constrained by peace-time protocols, such as an emergency / recovery authority, may be 
beneficial to the recovery.  The author suggests, therefore, that: 
 
If there is an urgency to clean-up, responsibility for strategic management should be delegated 
to the recovery authority. 
 
At the same time, the disaster waste system must also utilise the existing systems and facilities 
as far as possible and ensure that the proposed intervention does not adversely affect future 
peace-time waste management.  Emergency / recovery authorities may not give enough 
consideration to the effects beyond the duration of the recovery.  The key is to design a 
strategic management structure which utilises these local waste management personnel but 
does not overwhelm or supersede them.  In Samoa, the UN Cluster system appeared to 
completely usurp the Samoan National Disaster Management Plan organisational structures 
and peace-time waste management functions and worked almost completely independently 
from existing governance structures.  This was not ideal as the capacity and knowledge of the 
government was lost during that time.  Existing peace-time organisations have a wealth of 
knowledge in their given area as well as, data systems, monitoring and enforcement 
capacities, regulatory tools etc. 
 
It is vital that the strategic management structure has strong links with those with vested 
interest and long-term responsibility for waste management facilities and operations. 
 
If strategic management does rest with a peace-time waste authority, then measures need to 
be implemented to minimise the effects of bounded rationality.  That is, the organisational 
objectives need to be changed.  For example in some cases an organisational directive may 
be adequate to alter people’s perspectives;; in other cases, however, a formal legal mandate or 
legislative change may be necessary to ensure an appropriate approach is taken. 
 
If peace-time waste authorities are responsible for strategic management of disaster waste, 
appropriate authority and mandate must be given to the organisation for the purposes of the 
recovery. 
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Where waste management activities are likely to affect wider recovery activities, it would be 
beneficial to strategically manage the waste under the recovery organisation.  In particular 
there is greater need for synergy (between waste management and recovery governance) 
where there are a high number of displaced persons, there is high disruption to the road 
network and there are high human health impacts.  For example, the waste presence in New 
Orleans, following Hurricane Katrina, had a significant impact on the willingness and ability 
of residents to return to the affected areas and recovery efforts were difficult to achieve 
when the population was missing.  In this situation waste and recovery managers must work 
together closely to identify priorities and strategies for moving the waste and returning 
people to the area.   
 
Waste activities should be managed under the recovery organisation where waste management 
activities have a strong interconnectedness with other recovery activities.  This is particularly 
relevant where there are a high number of displaced persons, high disruption to the road 
network and high human health impacts. 
 
Governance level (Local versus Regional versus National) 
By definition of a disaster, resources of a community are overwhelmed and external 
assistance is needed.  Determining the relative disaster scale will help to determine how 
affected local authorities are and whether they have sufficient resources to strategically 
manage the waste.   
 
The emergency response arrangements in the US are based on a bottom-up approach.  The 
lowest level of governance is delegated authority where possible and is required to request 
assistance from higher levels when their capacities are overwhelmed.  However, according to 
Weaver (2006), the almost complete collapse of low level government structures following 
Hurricane Katrina meant authorities were neither in a position to lead the recovery nor ask 
for assistance.  Weaver suggests a federal “push” model (that is a top-down approach) as 
opposed to the existing “pull” model would be preferable.   
 
In New Zealand, the emergency plans are also based on a “pull” model.  However, this 
broke down at times following the February earthquake and a number of decisions were 
made at national level without requests from local civil defence authorities.  One example 
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was the approval to reclaim land at Lyttelton Port with inert demolition materials.  It is 
arguable whether or not this national intervention was necessary (to enable the port to 
continue operating or as a waste management solution) or not in this case, however, national 
authorities clearly believed that the reclamation would contribute to the successful recovery 
of Christchurch.  Local authorities following the Victorian Bushfires stated that they were 
relieved not to have to manage (strategically and operationally) the Bushfire waste as they 
were largely overwhelmed by the event.   
 
FEMA’s 2011 National Disaster Recovery Framework (FEMA, 2011) acknowledges the 
effect of scale on management structures.  It recommends that plans are scalable and 
adaptable: “[a] tiered leadership structure helps to accommodate the rapid surge of Federal 
resources that may be needed to assist in large-scale or catastrophic incidents”. 
 
The disaster scale (and resultant economic and social impact extent) will inevitably determine 
what level of government strategic management should occur. 
 
Strategic management organisational structures should be tiered and modular such that they 
can be adapted to different disaster scales.   
 
Local authorities generally have a better understanding of the existing capacities of their 
waste management system.  However, local authorities tend to focus on operations.  Capacity 
to quickly and effectively strategically plan and design a waste management system many 
times larger than their existing system may not be available.  In L’Aquila waste removal rates 
reduced from 600 tonnes / day to 100-200 tonnes/day following the handover from the 
Civil Protection Department to L’Aquila municipality.   
 
In addition, as above, local authorities (as discussed for organisational functions) may be 
restricted by their peace-time operation mentality and mandate.  Regional and national 
authorities arguably have more capacity to step back, and, using information from local 
authorities, develop an objective view of the situation.  The capacity and objectivity of an 
organisation to manage disaster waste should be considered. 
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Strategic management personnel must have the capacity to think strategically and objectively 
(outside their peace-time roles and avoiding silo mentality), therefore, regional and national 
authorities may be more appropriate than local authorities. 
 
The geographic extent of the waste will generally indicate whether or not waste should be 
managed at a local, regional or national level.  More than one locality was affected in all the 
case studies in this thesis.  Each presented opportunities for regional solutions, including 
sharing resources and waste handling facilities.  The management of waste at local authority 
level in L’Aquila (rather than regionally as per the extent of the disaster effects) almost 
certainly contributed to the difficulties in identifying sufficient waste handling facilities in 
L’Aquila.  However, note that if waste volumes are small but widespread, there may be little 
benefit in strategically managing the waste beyond local levels. 
 
The geographic extent of the waste should generally determine the level of government response 
(i.e. strategic management should, at a minimum, correspond to the physical extent of 
damage). 
 
The geographic extent may also indicate what organisations need to be involved in the waste 
management works.  In a tsunami situation, such as in Samoa, wastes were both in the 
marine and terrestrial environment invoking different organisational responsibilities.  This in 
turn increases the number of governmental and non-governmental organisations to 
coordinate.  Management of marsh debris following Hurricane Katrina required consultation 
with eight different stakeholders (LDEQ, 2006a).   
 
The geographic extent of waste will trigger involvement of different organisations, in particular 
where waste extends into different environments (terrestrial, marine, wetland etc.). 
 
It is important to note that if a regional or national approach is adopted, consideration must 
be given to the potential differences in legislative and regulatory frameworks (refer Section 
11.3.1). 
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Summary 
As discussed above, the most suitable organisation to lead strategic management of disaster 
waste may differ depending on the disaster & disaster waste impacts.  This is summarised in 
Table 6.2. 
 
The structure (and effectiveness) of various strategic management approaches can be 
dependent on the funding mechanism.  This is discussed in Section 7.3.3. 
 
Whatever organisation is given responsibility for strategic management of waste (as discussed 
above) it is beneficial for the organisation to have decision-making power, as discussed in 
Section 11.3.1. 
 
Table 6.2 Indicators for selecting an appropriate disaster waste strategic management lead 
organisation. 
 Disaster & disaster waste indicators 
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Level of Governance 
National H - H - - - - - - - 
Regional M - M - - - - - - - 
Local L - L - - - - - - - 
Authority type 
Emergency / 
recovery 
- H-M - - H - H-M - - - 
Waste / 
Environmental 
- L - - M-L - L - - - 
L=low, M=medium, H=high, - = no impact 
 
6.3.3 General principles 
Roles and responsibilities 
Strategic managers must provide clear guidance to enable quality operations that meet the 
recovery objectives.  In Christchurch there was limited formal direction given to contractors 
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on how waste should be managed to meet recovery goals.  For example, individual 
contractors were left to their own devices to determine how much recycling should be 
practiced and whether it should be carried out onsite or offsite.  The only limitation was a 
time constraint using powers under the CER Act.  It is interesting to note that this also 
occurred in Hurricane Katrina.  LDEQ called on contractor knowledge and judgement to 
determine waste management options for the debris (LDEQ, 2005a; 2006a).  In taking this 
‘hands off’ approach, LDEQ essentially allowed the contractors to determine the overall 
recovery goals.  Given a contractor’s primary objective is generally to generate profit; this can 
lead to risky behaviour.  Indeed, a high number of regulatory violations relating to debris 
management were recorded in Louisiana and Christchurch, indicating contractors were not 
behaving responsibly. 
 
Strategic managers must provide operational guidelines to ensure waste is handled 
appropriately.    
 
One of the primary responsibilities for a strategic management organisation is to prioritise 
works appropriately.  In Samoa, the strategic management efforts were weak.  As a result the 
waste management works were not prioritised particularly effectively.  Rather than a risk 
based approach, the works were seemingly prioritised on an as identified basis and/or based 
on proximity to people.  Some priority was given to tourist areas; however, largely the works 
were not prioritised in any particular way to contribute to the recovery.  CERA in 
Christchurch has been integral to the timely opening of the Red Zone, as demolition works 
(and resources) have been prioritised to enable a systematic reduction in the cordon extent. 
 
Strategic management structures must prioritise resources to meet recovery objectives. 
 
Another important role for strategic managers is to anticipate and mitigate potential 
problems.  Anticipating potential problems, through allowing more time to consider effective 
solutions, will reduce the likely delays and associated negative effects.  For example, in 
Louisiana, if the shortage of disposal space had been identified sooner, more consultation 
and environmental impact assessments could have been carried out prior to the opening of 
Chef Menteur and Gentilly landfills.  This may have avoided the controversy and legal action 
and site clearance that followed. 
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Strategic managers must anticipate and mitigate potential problems. 
 
Strategic managers are responsible for ensuring quality control of disaster waste management 
works.  In particular, they are responsible for managing environmental and human health 
risks.  Generally, in peace-time, strategic responsibility for monitoring risks associated with 
waste management is well defined.  Post-disaster these roles and responsibilities may change, 
particularly if a new organisation for strategic management is established.  Any new structure 
must clearly identify the responsibility for environmental and human health risk 
management.  Following the Christchurch earthquake, there was confusion around the 
responsibility for public health protection, in particular with regard to asbestos and dust 
emissions from demolitions.  Under New Zealand law, work place health and safety is 
governed by Department of Labour.  It is their responsibility to monitor and mitigate worker 
exposure.  However, if emissions are released from the worksite, it is unclear who is 
responsible for monitoring effects and protecting the public (if necessary).  Public complaints 
regarding dust and asbestos were fielded by at least four different authorities.  Many of those 
authorities indicated that they believed it was the recovery authority’s (CERA’s) role to 
address these concerns as they were disaster-related issues.  Yet CERA did not necessarily 
have the skills or expertise to do so. 
 
Strategic management structures must assign responsibility for, and oversee, post-disaster 
environmental and human health risk management. 
 
In order to monitor risks, as well as to assess the overall disaster waste management systems 
efficiency and effectiveness, data gathering is important.  Strategic managers, in coordination 
with peace-time waste managers, need to ensure appropriate data gathering mechanisms are 
in place to enable planning.  For example, in Christchurch there is no regulatory or legislative 
mechanism to gather data from demolition sites where buildings are three storeys or less.  
This means that monitoring operations for quality and anticipating waste management 
demands is difficult.  Some have attributed the increase in illegal dumping post-earthquake to 
this lack of monitoring, authority and visibility.  Strategic managers must ensure that 
appropriate mechanisms (organisational or regulatory / legislative) are in place to facilitate 
monitoring and to enable planning.  Data such as location of demolitions, waste generated, 
amount of waste diverted, disposal sites being used etc. would allow for waste managers to 
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build a picture of how much waste is expected and whether facilities have enough capacity to 
deal with it.  Olshansky et al. identify information as a crucial resource in recovery in general 
(Olshansky et al., 2006). 
 
The operational management approach adopted can significantly affect the ability of strategic 
managers to access information.  This is discussed in Section 8.3.  Risk management 
approaches adopted can also affect the ability to gather data / monitor works.  This is 
discussed in Section 10.3.1.  Legislative issues around monitoring are discussed in Section 
11.3.1.   
 
Strategic managers must ensure appropriate monitoring systems are in place to enable effective 
strategic management and planning. 
 
Cross-organisational coordination 
Good cross-organisational coordination is an important function of strategic disaster waste 
management.  As noted by Kobayashi (1995), based on experiences managing waste 
generated from the Kobe earthquake, our waste management systems are becoming more 
complex and specific which reduces our capacity to respond to disaster waste events.  With 
increasing technical complexity comes increased organisational complexity.  Asbestos 
management in New Zealand, for example, is governed by more than five organisations.  In 
addition to the high number of organisations typically involved in waste management in 
peace-time, emergency / recovery authorities must also be included.  A strategic 
management organisation must enable clear and efficient organisational relationships across 
these wide ranging authorities.   
 
Cross-organisational coordination is critical even within emergency / recovery organisations.  
Emergency and recovery systems are often compartmentalised to enable fast responses and 
to simplify organisational structures.  In the US, for example, the emergency response 
structure is based around 14 Emergency Support Functions: three of which relate to debris 
management.  This approach enables activities to be broken into manageable sizes, and helps 
to ensure suitably qualified people are working on areas within their expertise.  Good cross-
organisational coordination is essential in this environment to ensure that there are no needs 
gaps or double ups. 
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Poor cross-organisational coordination had been identified as a weakness of the UN Cluster 
system (ActionAid International, 2007) prior to the Samoan tsunami.  Despite waste 
management being identified as a need or priority by two clusters following the Samoan 
tsunami (Health and WASH) (OCHA, 2009b) neither cluster actively directed waste 
management activities.  As discussed in Section 6.2.2, the Cluster system also did not merge 
well with the existing Samoan National Disaster Management System.  
 
In addition, decisions in other recovery functions will directly affect the amount of debris 
that has to be managed.  The decision to demolish or repair, for example, could significantly 
reduce or increase the volume of waste produced.  Some authors have suggested that 
incentives should be provided for repair as it aids in the speed and effectiveness of 
community recovery (Olshansky et al., 2006).  From a debris point of view this would also 
significantly reduce the volumes of waste.  Coordination across recovery functions is 
important. 
 
Good cross-organisational coordination is essential for making risk management decisions, 
particularly where peace-time standards have to be compromised to meet the recovery 
objectives.  For example the decision to open a new landfill cell in Victoria meant that 
environmental standards were compromised to mitigate health and safety concerns relating 
to truck travel (refer Section 10.3.1).  
 
Strategic waste management structures need to include protocol for cross-organisational 
coordination and collaboration across both waste and recovery functions. 
 
Typical organisations that need to be involved in a strategic waste management 
organisational structure include: 
 Waste management authorities and industry (including demolition) 
 Emergency management / recovery authorities 
 Environmental authorities 
 Health and safety authorities 
 Public health authorities 
 Hazardous substance authorities and industry 
 Lifelines authorities (particularly with respect to demolition works) 
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 Marine authorities (for events with debris in marine environmental) 
 Transportation authorities and industry 
 Non-domestic agencies (e.g. international governmental and non-governmental 
groups) 
 Community groups (including ethnic minorities and indigenous people) 
 
In some cases, where peace-time functions and organisations are integrated into the post-
disaster strategic management structure, existing cross-organisational coordination structures 
may need to be streamlined.  For example, in New Zealand, the Department of Labour 
usually sits above operational activities and acts merely as an enforcement agent and 
standards authority.  However, during the CERA managed demolition works, a Department 
of Labour representative was based at the CERA demolition headquarters and worked 
proactively to mitigate against potential health and safety issues.  Similarly, a representative 
from the Auditor General’s Office worked with the CERA Demolition team to help to 
ensure that all processes were robust during process design – rather than acting as an after-
the-fact process check. 
 
Organisational relationships may need to be streamlined to meet the needs of the recovery. 
 
Transition from response to recovery 
In three of the case studies investigated there was noticeable disruption caused by the 
transition from response to recovery organisational structures.  Disaster waste management 
is a unique aspect of disaster recovery in that it commences during the response but endures 
long into the recovery phase.   
 
In Samoa there was very little consistency between UN Cluster system and the Samoan 
National Disaster Management structure, as mentioned in Section 6.3.2.  The author is 
unaware of any formalised transition between the two structures.  In L’Aquila the transition 
between the Department of Civil Protection and the municipality resulted in a slowing of the 
demolition process (Section 6.3.2).  Following the Christchurch Earthquakes there were 
issues relating to the validity of contracts let during the emergency phase which carried on to 
the response phase (see Section 8.3.5).   
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When designing a strategic management structure, care needs to be taken to ensure a smooth 
transition between response and recovery.  However, distinction also needs to be made 
between the different goals or objectives of the response and recovery plans.  During the 
response phase, little strategic management tends to be carried out.  The focus is largely 
operational.  There is an urgency to save lives and property.  The recovery phase requires 
more considered balancing of objectives (as discussed in Section 5.3).  Carrying the 
Emergency Support Function structure and operational mandate in Louisiana following 
Hurricane Katrina for approximately 18 months, was, in the author’s opinion, too long to 
have emergency structures (and mandates) in place.  Legal frameworks governing response 
and recovery consequently need to be written with these factors in mind (see Section 11.3.1). 
 
Strategic management structures for waste need to bridge between emergency and recovery 
structures as far as possible while recognising that each structure needs a different approach. 
 
Human resources 
When planning it is important to recognise that a number of personnel will be brought into 
strategic management and operational roles from outside the affected area.  Following the 
Christchurch earthquakes, many of the persons involved in the recovery were working in an 
unfamiliar environment.  Many local, regional and national government staff were unfamiliar 
with the Civil Defence arrangements, so there was much confusion over roles, 
responsibilities and protocols etc.  The author herself had no experience working in the Civil 
Defence framework.  In addition, the author, having not worked as a professional in 
Christchurch, found it challenging to learn and adjust to the systems of the respective 
authorities.  When the recovery agency, CERA, was established, all entities had to learn to 
operate in a new institutional arrangement.  Strategies need to be employed to mitigate the 
effects of new people entering the emergency systems and changes in peace-time 
organisational systems.  Preparing plans in terms of positions, not individuals is one useful 
approach (Auf der Heide, 1989). 
 
Training and refresher courses are one mechanism for achieving this preparedness.  
However, there is a limit to how many people can reasonably be expected to be trained for 
these events.   
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Organisational structures and protocols in plans need to account for a range of potentially 
untrained persons needing to be involved.  
 
Public Communication 
An important aspect of the whole waste management system is communication.  
Communication is included in: gathering information to assist in decision-making; facilitating 
decision-making (inter-agency communication); sharing information with the public (to gain 
buy-in); educating on environmental and public health risks; and facilitating community 
participation, if desired (e.g. personal property detritus removal in the US).  Communication 
is also an effective risk management tool.  If carried out effectively it can mitigate against 
risks such as community dissatisfaction and human health and environmental effects. 
 
Communication, it seems however, was not carried out particularly well in any of the case 
studies.  In Victoria, the community survey revealed that there was generally a lack of 
understanding of the waste management system.  This included: health and safety 
procedures, waste disposal options for individual clean-up efforts, funding, recycling efforts, 
procedure for awarding the managing contract, and local labour use.  Interestingly, there 
appeared to be a low level of public concern over waste management operations once the 
waste had been removed from private properties.  In Samoa many communities were 
unaware of and/or did not understand the waste management process.  Many individuals 
managed their own waste haphazardly, for example open burning and burial.  One 
community elected to manage its own waste because they believed the government 
appointed contractors were making a profit on the sale of recycled goods.  In L’Aquila, the 
local environmental authority made concerted efforts to communicate waste management 
issues and procedures (Bonanni and Stagnini, accessed 2010), including press conferences 
and meetings with citizens’ committees and all municipalities to outline waste management 
practices.  However, the Department of Civil Protection and the municipality did not appear 
to make significant communication efforts.   
 
Communication is identified as an important part of the debris management process in the 
US (O'Connell, 2005; USEPA, 2008) and in previous disaster responses in the US as the 
most critical part (Solid Waste Authority, 2004).  However, significant difficulties were faced 
in Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina dealing with the significant number of people who 
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were displaced.  The large community frustration experienced during the clean-up and 
subsequent illegal dumping can be partly attributed, in the author’s opinion, to the lack of 
communication. 
 
Strategic waste management arrangements officially assign responsibility for disaster waste 
management activities: both within waste management / recovery agencies and for the 
community.  It is the responsibility of strategic managers to become a focal point for all 
communications.  They must ensure clear and consistent messages that build public 
confidence.  If strategic management is ineffective or absent, it is likely that multiple agencies 
will be disseminating conflicting information which may distress the public.  In Christchurch 
the author was aware of four different authorities issuing advice on human health risks 
associated with asbestos. 
 
Strategic waste managers must become a focal point for all communications. 
 
Within the strategic management team, responsibility for public communications must be 
assigned.  In Christchurch, there were communications or public information teams involved 
in both Civil Defence and CERA.  The communications teams primarily operated in 
isolation, outside the operational groups.  Generally media or public enquiries were received 
and the public information representatives would seek answers from operations.  There were 
several occasions where information was misinterpreted and the full and necessary 
information was not gathered because of this segregated arrangement.   
 
From an organisational perspective, ideally a communications person should be embedded in 
the waste management (and other recovery functions) team, and linked to the overall 
recovery authority.  This would enable the public information representatives to fully 
understand the issues involved in demolition and waste management and to be able to 
proactively identify the emerging issues before they become a problem.  This would also 
enable more ‘good news stories’ to be told which will have positive effects on both the 
community and the staff of the organisation. 
 
Communications personnel should be embedded within the disaster waste management team. 
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Being proactive, in itself, is an important communication principle.  Due to pressure from 
the media and the limited number of communications personnel, the response in 
Christchurch was initially reactive.  Some public messages that may have been useful were 
not disseminated until media requests came through.  Some public messages around waste 
also appeared to be missed because they were not considered to be the responsibility of 
CERA.  The lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities not only created gaps in 
planning, as discussed above, but also gaps in public communication.  Management of 
asbestos, for example: at least four different authorities have monitoring responsibility for 
asbestos depending on the location of the asbestos, management stage (e.g. manufacturing, 
demolition etc.) and/or persons exposed.  No organisation appeared to take responsibility 
for pro-active messaging around the relative risks and mitigation strategies in place in the 
post-disaster environment.  It is possible that this is attributed to the perceived risks involved 
with asbestos.  This reactive approach changed as the media requests reduced and forward 
communications planning was possible.   
 
A pro-active public information campaign would have had a number of benefits, including 
allaying community fears, developing a community wide understanding of the demolition 
process and likely risks, providing information for people to protect themselves if necessary, 
providing a united front of all organisations and enabling community feedback by identifying 
a single point of contact for future queries, concerns or complaints. 
 
Strategic waste managers should develop a proactive public communications strategy.  
 
Community Consultation 
In most of the case studies examined, including those discussed in the literature review, it 
appeared that few disaster waste management systems were actively designed in a 
collaborative process with the community.  Some elements of the disaster waste management 
system may have included limited community consultation (for example: selected 
consultation carried out in Christchurch prior to approving certain waste handling facilities; 
community consultation during the Community Centred Sustainable Development 
Programme development in Samoa); however, the majority of waste management decisions 
were made by authorities alone.  The author cites several possible reasons for this: 
    Strategic management 115 
   
 
 
 Disaster waste management decisions tend to be made during the response and early 
recovery phases when governance structures are typically command and control (and 
therefore consultation is not expected and can be seen as a hindrance to the recovery 
process). 
 Post-disaster waste management does not appear to be perceived by the public as a 
high priority or a high concern (Victorian Bushfire public survey). 
 Waste management systems post-demolition/waste collection, have a direct effect on 
a limited number of people (predominantly those living on transport routes and 
adjacent to waste handling facilities). 
 Authorities may consider that, as a reasonably complex technical service, the public 
may not understand some of the technical constraints. 
 The waste management system is a temporary measure and public acceptance is not 
necessarily essential. 
 
It is the responsibility of strategic managers to determine the desired level of consultation to 
match the recovery objectives.  Authorities need to recognise what decisions are immediately 
urgent (that is, the activities where the effects of non-action outweigh the effects of public 
objections) and those decisions which can be delayed to allow for consultation.  Authorities 
also need to consider how willing and able community members are to participate.  
Olshansky et al. (2006) note that citizen participation in recovery planning in general 
(predominantly regarding land-use and rebuilding decisions) is crucial.  
 
Regulatory requirements for consultation may need to be changed to reflect the post-disaster 
situation (such as absent population) (see Section 11.3.1).  
 
6.4 Summary 
In all the cases investigated, generally strategic management of the waste could have been 
better designed and implemented.  In none of the cases does the author believe that any one 
or group of agencies had a full understanding and control of the waste management system.  
The primary lessons learned from the case studies are that: roles and responsibilities across 
organisations need to be clearly established; structures must be able to be adapted (and 
authorities must be prepared to do so) depending on disaster impacts; and strong 
collaboration is required.   
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Strategic management should include: identifying bottlenecks; predicting and advocating 
when legislative changes may be necessary; directing a waste management strategy in line 
with recovery objectives; carrying out good cross-organisational collaboration with 
appropriate legislative and operational bodies.   
 
Determining the lead authority for strategic management (including both organisation type 
and governance level) of disaster waste will be context specific.  However, the author 
suggests that decision-makers should be prepared to develop a tiered and modular strategic 
management structure that can be adapted depending on the disaster impacts.  Generally, if 
the disaster scale is high, there are a high number of displaced persons, there is a large spread 
of waste, there is significant disruption to the road network, or there is a human health 
hazard, higher level governance and more recovery focussed management structures are 
desirable.   
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7. Funding mechanisms 
7.1 Introduction 
Disaster recovery activities are significantly affected by funding mechanisms.  The timeliness 
and quality of  recovery activities are not only affected by the extent of  the funding but also 
the mechanisms with which funding is delivered.  As demolition and debris management 
activities are on the critical path to recovery, it is essential that they are effectively funded to 
minimise disruption to the recovery and rebuilding process. 
 
In this chapter the suitability, constraints and implications of different funding mechanisms 
for disaster waste management activities are assessed.  It should be noted that this chapter 
does not address how disaster funds are accumulated, managed or how much funding should 
be allocated.  Instead it looks at how different kinds of funding mechanisms affect the quality 
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of debris and demolition management programmes.  A brief discussion on valuing the costs 
of post-disaster demolition and waste management is also included. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, ‘funding mechanisms’ is divided into two parts: funding 
source and funding delivery: 
 
Funding source 
In a given community, there is generally an expectation that financial preparedness is either a 
private responsibility (individuals, households or businesses) or it is a publicly provided 
service (that is, it is managed by a public entity and theoretically all affected persons have 
access to the funds).  Thus, funding sources will be divided in this analysis into Public or 
Private sources. 
 
Funding delivery 
The method by which financial assistance is distributed to the affected population varies 
based on the context and the funding source.  The primary mechanisms for delivering 
disaster recovery funding discussed in this thesis are: 
1. Direct facilitation (delegated organisation(s) carry out the works collectively). 
2. Reimbursement (individuals facilitate the work and present receipts for 
reimbursement). 
3. Lump sum (value of recovery works is estimated and paid as a lump sum to the 
affected person – who is, in turn, responsible for facilitating the necessary works). 
 
This chapter used information previously presented in the following conference paper (see 
Appendix L): 
 
Brown, C., Milke, M., & Seville, E. (2011), “Disaster Funding Mechanisms: a 
demolition and debris management perspective”. Ninth Pacific Conference on Earthquake 
Engineering.  14-16 April 2011, Auckland, New Zealand.   
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7.2 Case studies 
7.2.1 2009 Victorian Bushfires 
In an effort to speed-up the recovery and eliminate potential health threats from burnt house 
remains (The Premier of Victoria, 2009), and in turn benefit the economic recovery of the 
community, the National and State governments elected to pay for and directly facilitate the 
demolition and debris removal of all affected properties.  Ordinarily debris and demolition 
works are the responsibility of homeowners and their insurance companies. 
Overall the clean-up was a success.  All (approximately) 2000 properties received the same 
demolition and debris removal services and the process was completed within six months; 
leading the way for the reconstruction.  Delays experienced in other disasters due to 
insurance settlements were avoided. 
 
7.2.2 2009 Samoan Tsunami 
The funding system for the Samoan tsunami was very different to the other four case studies.  
Both the Samoan government and Samoan population had and have limited capacity to 
financially prepare for disaster events.  As a result, the tsunami response heavily relied on 
humanitarian donations.  The majority of the funds were either donated to the Samoan 
government, for general use, or were donated directly to a humanitarian organisation, 
primarily for use on specific projects.  The government disseminated the funds, in lump 
sums, to Ministries and individual agencies / organisations based on rapid needs assessments 
and individual project funding requests.   
 
Communities had very little input into what funds were delivered to them and what the 
funds would be used for.  It was not until six months after the tsunami when UNDP 
initiated its Community-Centred Sustainable Development Plan programme that 
communities were involved in identifying and prioritising recovery activities. 
 
Overall, the funding was piecemeal.  This led to incomplete clean-up and a varied quality of 
disaster waste management programmes. 
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7.2.3 2009 L’Aquila Earthquake 
In Italy, the government provides funding for national disaster response and recovery 
activities.  Debris management works are covered under this scheme.  The government 
establishes different payment schemes depending on the damage level.  In response to the 
L’Aquila earthquake, repairs (including debris management) were reimbursed up to a 
maximum value based on property size and damage level.  For properties requiring full 
demolition, demolition and debris disposal was directly facilitated and a reconstruction 
entitlement was paid. 
 
Overall, the government funding scheme was a good foundation to build the centralised 
demolition and debris management plan on (see Chapter 8).  All costs of the system from 
demolition to recycling to disposal were covered by the government.  Everyone, in theory 
got full and equal access to funds to enable appropriate waste management, and recovery 
managers could prioritise works as necessary.  This has a positive community wide impact as 
there is no dependence on individuals to action their own clean-up works.  The extent and 
source of funding appeared to be clear from early in the recovery process.   
 
7.2.4 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
The US has well established debris management funding mechanisms.  FEMA administers 
federal funding for collection of debris from public property, including collection of debris 
removed from private property and placed on the street for collection.  This work is 
generally directly facilitated by the local authority or the US Army Corps of Engineers (on 
behalf of the local authority).  Private property demolition is generally the responsibility of 
property owners and, where applicable, their insurers.  However, due to the large scale of 
Hurricane Katrina, the high public health risk from toxic flood sediments, the large number 
of displaced persons and low level of insurance, FEMA funded debris removal and 
demolition on private properties where there was a public health risk.   
 
Overall, increased federal funding provided a platform for a comprehensive debris 
management system to be built on (see Chapter 8).  The funding ensured equal and full 
access to clean-up resources to ensure a community-wide public health threat was eliminated, 
and therefore enabled recovery.  Had the recovery relied on individuals and insurance 
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companies there would have been significant organisational difficulties and delays and the 
environmental and human health risks may have been harder to control. 
 
7.2.5 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
There were primarily two funding mechanisms relating to demolition and debris removal: 
central emergency funding for emergency works and an individual property level insurance 
system for recovery. 
 
Emergency funding, from the government (via civil defence) paid for activities primarily to 
support life and prevent further loss in accordance with the CDEM Act.  In this case those 
activities included emergency building demolition.  It was unclear whether demolition and 
debris management costs had been forecast for in this fund.  The CDEM Act does not 
include for cost recovery for works, such as dangerous building demolition, carried out on 
behalf of building owners.  Emergency funds were also used to facilitate collection of 
liquefaction silt placed, by residents, on the kerbside for collection. 
 
For the recovery works, the majority of demolition and debris management works on private 
properties were covered by insurance.  In New Zealand, natural disaster damage on 
residential properties is covered by a dual private / public insurance funding system.  All 
private property owners with insurance are also covered by the National Insurer, the 
Earthquake Commission (EQC), for damage up to $100,000 and any land damages.  The 
EQC is a government entity; however, it manages residential insurance like a private insurer.  
Private insurers cover individuals for damage above $100,000.  Commercial property owners 
generally hold private insurance. 
 
Insurance coverage theoretically ensured that building owners would eventually recover most 
of their losses (both direct capital and indirect business loss).  However, many residents felt 
frustrated by the slow actions of some insurers and the ‘unexpected’ exclusions of policies 
(for example asbestos removal). 
 
Operational organisations were established by both EQC and private insurers to collectively 
manage the claims and the physical works.  This enabled a shift in funding delivery 
mechanism from lump sum payments to direct facilitation. 
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The dual EQC / private insurance system created some organisational and logistical 
complexities for residential properties with land damage.  In many cases the damage was 
above $100,000 and the property would need to be handed between EQC and the private 
insurer as the recovery works moved from demolition (private), to land remediation (EQC) 
to rebuilding (private).  The decision to retreat from large affected areas (rather than 
remediate) has considerably reduced this organisational problem.  It is understood that there 
have been significant delays in the residential demolition programme resulting from a slow 
property settlement and cost share agreements process between the EQC and insurers.  
 
Overall, there were significant organisational and logistical deficiencies with the private 
funding mechanisms.  While some organisational changes post-earthquake mitigated the 
complexities of the dual and private funding system, a more considered analysis of 
operational implications or a completely transformed funding system is needed. 
 
7.2.6 Case study summary 
Table 7.1, below, summarises the funding mechanism (source and delivery) for the five case 
studies used in this thesis.  The table uses the waste source categorisations presented in 
Section 4.3.2.  Note that public property detritus management and infrastructure repair has 
been left out due to insufficient data and because it is assumed they are largely the 
responsibility of public authorities both operationally and financially. 
  
Table 7.1    Case study disaster debris management funding mechanisms summary  
 2009 Victorian 
Bushfires 
2009 Samoan   
tsunami 
2009 L’Aquila 
earthquake 
2005 Hurricane 
Katrina 
2011 Christchurch 
earthquake 
Funding source 
1. Private property detritus*  
2. Full demolition debris 
3. Major repair waste 
4. Reconstruction waste 
1. n/a 
2. public 
3. private 
4. private 
1. public 
2. public 
3. public 
4. public 
1. private / public 
2. public 
3. public 
4. public 
1. private / public 
2. private / public 
3. private 
4. private 
1. private / public (silt) 
2. private 
3. private 
4. private 
Funding delivery (DF = directly facilitated, Re = reimbursement, LS = lump sum, n/a = not applicable) 
1. Private property detritus  
2. Full demolition debris 
3. Major repair waste 
4. Reconstruction waste 
1. n/a 
2. DF 
3. LS 
4. LS 
1. DF 
2. DF 
3. unknown 
4. LS 
1. Re 
2. DF 
3. unknown 
4. unknown 
1. Re / DF 
2. unknown / DF 
3. ** 
4. ** 
1. ** / DF 
2. ** 
3. ** 
4. ** 
* Note where a private / public split is denoted this generally means that individuals cleared their own property but that a public service was provided for collection 
and/or disposal. 
** Payment mechanisms varied depending on the insurance policy and could be either DF, Re or LS. 
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7.3 Discussion 
7.3.1 Funding source 
In very simple terms – whoever holds the purse, holds the power.  The ability of an authority 
to strategically manage the demolition and debris management activities (as discussed in the 
previous chapter) is considerably improved if they are also in control of, or have considerable 
influence over, how the funds (and subsequently resources) are distributed, prioritised and 
managed.  For example, in L’Aquila, the government funded works were prioritised by the 
local authority such that smaller repairs were carried out first to enable large numbers of the 
community to return to their home and to ‘normal’, while larger repairs and demolitions 
were a lower priority.  This, in turn, had an impact on the type and volume of waste being 
generated over time.  In Samoa, the number of individual entities bringing funds into the 
area and independently implementing projects, created a piecemeal approach to waste 
management.  There were some double-ups and many omissions in recovery works as a 
result.  This piecemeal approach was also noted in Thailand after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami (Petersen, 2006).  Information flows between insurance companies and recovery 
planners in Christchurch, were not always smooth as insurance companies were bounded by 
privacy issues and commercial sensitivities.  Without good information, planning (e.g. 
estimating the number of uninsured persons, estimating the total volume of waste to be 
generated and subsequently what waste management facilities are required) is difficult (as 
discussed in Section 6.3.3).  Thus, public funding models offer advantages over a private 
funding model as there is much greater control over the nature of the works, prioritisation 
and information management and monitoring.  In the absence of a centralised funding 
source, strong organisational structures and legislative authority (Section 11.3.2) would be 
required to manage the different funding sources. 
 
Public funding mechanisms generally enable more effective strategic management. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, different disasters and contexts have different recovery objectives.  
Generally the objectives focus on a quality, timely, and community-wide recovery.  Funding 
mechanisms, both in terms of source and delivery, inevitably contribute to how effectively 
these objectives can be met.  
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In terms of time, in the case studies investigated here, publicly funded disaster waste 
activities were generally carried out in a timelier manner than privately funded activities.  
Private insurance claims, for example, take time to settle: it took approximately 11 months to 
complete EQC assessments for the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake event and longer 
for private insurers.  Claim settlements are still continuing at the time of writing.  Delays due 
to slow insurance settlements were also observed following Hurricane Katrina  (The World 
Bank and The United Nations, 2010).   
 
Second, publicly managed funds generally allow for disaster waste works to be implemented 
with a community focus.  This is a particularly important consideration for funding waste 
management activities as waste can pose environmental and human health hazards as well as 
affect the ability of a community to return to normalcy (from an economic and social 
perspective).  Private mechanisms, such as self-funding or insurance, tend to have an 
individual focus.  As a result, funding decisions, and subsequent actions, are made without 
consideration to the wider community.  In Christchurch, there were several instances where 
property owners were significantly affected by inaction of neighbouring property owners.  
For example, one building posed a fall hazard to a neighbouring building and rendered it 
uninhabitable.  Fortunately, provisions under the CER Act allowed for CERA to intervene 
and facilitate the works necessary to mitigate some of the wider impacts of individual’s 
actions or non-action.  There were also cases where building owners chose to demolish 
buildings very slowly (generally to reduce costs through increased recycling (see Chapter 9)) 
and in doing so, increased the business losses for neighbouring buildings.  For example, 
following the 2010 Canterbury earthquake, demolition of one building initially estimated to 
take six weeks took more than 11 weeks.  One neighbouring business owner estimated that 
their turnover was reduced by 50% during the works (Sachdeva, 2010).   
 
Public funding, in general, more readily allows for a macro (community wide) rather than 
micro (individual property) level approach to demolition and waste management. 
 
If a private funding mechanism is preferred, measures need to be in place to ensure adequate 
coverage for a community wide recovery perspective (including residential, commercial, 
public properties and infrastructure).  In the US an attempt was made to make the National 
Flood Insurance Programme compulsory for all homes in the 100 years flood plain as a 
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condition of their mortgage.  However, due to poor enforcement and an absence of flood 
events, approximately two-thirds of homeowners in Florida had cancelled their policy within 
five years of it becoming compulsory (The World Bank and The United Nations, 2010).  As 
a result of the low level of insurance discovered after the Bushfires, some experts are calling 
for a national disaster insurance to be established in Australia (Sexton, 2010).   
 
If private funding approaches are preferred, mechanisms must be in place to ensure there is 
adequate cover across the community, including for residential, commercial and infrastructure. 
 
While it is generally believed that public funding is more advantageous for the recovery as a 
whole, there are several circumstances (categorised by the disaster & disaster waste impacts 
presented in Chapter 4) which indicate that it is critical that a public approach is taken.   
 
First, the number of displaced persons may indicate a public approach will be necessary.  In 
the US, FEMA expects property owners to clear detritus from their own property (to 
kerbside for collection) at their own or their insurer’s expense.  The large displacement of 
people after Hurricane Katrina (Brookings Institute, 2009) meant that many properties were 
not cleaned and the kerbside collection was highly ineffective and inefficient (Cook, 2009).  
Due to this and the hazardous nature of the debris (see below) FEMA elected to fund 
private property detritus removal and demolition.  The FEMA funded clean-up facilitated 
the return of thousands of families (Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness, 2007) that otherwise might not have had the means to pay for or facilitate the 
debris removal.  Public funding was necessary to expedite the clean-up and to subsequently 
encourage people to return to the area. 
 
Where there is a high number of displaced persons and there is a desire to repopulate the 
affected area, public funding may be needed to ensure work on private property is completed 
where owners are absent. 
 
Second, the degree of human health hazard needs to be considered.  In Louisiana, it was 
determined that in some places the floodwater sediments posed a public health and safety 
threat.  Subsequently (and due to the higher displacement of persons (above)) FEMA elected 
to pay for private property clearance.  The FEMA policy stated that debris removal on 
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private property would only be performed to “address an immediate threat to life, public 
health, safety or property” (FEMA, 2005).   
 
High human health hazards affect not only the private property owner but all neighbouring 
properties.  Presence of unmanaged hazards can have a severe impact on public health, as 
well as the psychosocial and community recovery of the area.  A publicly funded system in 
this case can help to remove the hazard more efficiently and mitigate against negative effects. 
 
Where there are significant human health hazards in the waste matrix, a publicly funded 
approach is preferable. 
 
Similarly, and third, if the waste poses a high environmental hazard, it may be desirable to 
maintain control of the waste stream so that adverse environmental effects, caused by 
inappropriate waste handling, are minimised. 
 
Where there are significant environmental health hazards, a publicly funded approach may be 
desirable. 
 
Fourth, suitability of funding mechanisms is affected by trans-boundary movement of waste.  
When waste has moved away from its origin, ‘waste ownership’ (or responsibility for the 
waste) becomes difficult to assign (see Section 11.3.3).  A significant quantity of debris from 
the 2011 Japanese tsunami is, at the time of writing, floating across the Pacific Ocean 
(NOAA, 2011).  Waste that has moved across property boundaries will inevitably, regardless 
of original ‘ownership’, need to be managed by a public funding body, rather than private.   
 
Communities susceptible to hazards that can cause trans-boundary movement of wastes should 
consider public funding mechanisms for debris management.    
 
Last, where there is a high disruption to the road network, public funding is likely to be 
essential.  Authorities are likely to be trying to minimise traffic movements on a heavily 
affected road network, therefore, it will likely be necessary to provide a consolidated waste 
management service, which will inevitably have to be publicly funded. 
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Public funding for waste collection will be necessary where there is a high disruption to road 
networks. 
 
A summary of the relationship between the disaster & disaster waste impacts and the 
preferable funding source is shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 Indicators for preferable funding source 
 Disaster & disaster waste indicators 
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L=low, M=medium, H=high, - = no influence 
 
7.3.2 Funding delivery 
In terms of funding delivery, direct facilitation of the works can be an effective way of 
contributing to the recovery objectives.  Direct facilitation has the same benefits and 
drawbacks as a centralised operational management strategy, as discussed in Section 8.3.3.  
Benefits include the ability to: reduce initial assessment times; prioritise works; achieve 
economies of scale; mitigate disruptive effects of property owners who are slow to act.  
Lump sum and reimbursement delivery mechanisms leave the responsibility of timely and 
effective action with individuals; individuals with a likely focus on their own recovery rather 
than the wider community. 
 
Funding mechanisms that directly facilitate the waste management works are more effective at 
achieving recovery objectives than lump sum or reimbursement delivery mechanisms. 
 
Where there is a significant human health hazard or environmental health hazard, direct 
facilitation will more likely ensure that the works are carried out to completion, meeting 
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necessary quality standards and with the necessary expedience.  This is elaborated on in the 
discussion on centralised management of operations in Section 8.3.3. 
 
Where there is a significant human health hazard or environmental health standards, direct 
facilitation of the works is beneficial. 
 
In lieu of direct facilitation, reimbursement offers an opportunity for some quality control by 
restricting what works are eligible for reimbursement.  For example reimbursement could be 
limited to management of waste at approved facilities only; or payment only on confirmation 
of asbestos removal code compliance.  Lump sum payment mechanisms offer none of these 
checks and balances on quality as money is paid irrespective of the action taken by the 
recipient.  In some cases, owners may elect not to spend the money on waste removal and 
any hazards and visual nuisance could remain unmanaged at the property.  This affects the 
wider recovery. 
 
A directly facilitated programme also assumes the risk of cost overruns.  Cost overruns are a 
possibility following a disaster where price escalation is sometimes observed (see Section 
7.3.3).  If costs inflate and property owners have been given a lump sum to complete the 
works, low quality works (to reduce costs) may be a result.  Preferably, demolition and debris 
management funds should be delivered using a structure that reflects the actual costs faced 
post-disaster, rather than an estimated pre-disaster value (that is, reimbursement or direct 
facilitation).  This will ensure adequate funds are allocated to demolition and debris 
management and are not diverted for private interest or gain.   
 
Direct facilitation reflects the actual costs post-disaster and therefore offers greater quality 
control.  Reimbursement and lump sum offer less and the least quality control, respectively. 
 
Funding strategies where funds are delivered as a reimbursement or lump sum, lead to waste 
management facilities operating under a high risk and highly uncertain environment.  Waste 
handling facilities, under these funding delivery schemes, inevitably have to operate 
independently from the demolition, collection and transportation aspects of the waste 
management process and therefore charge an upfront gate rate (or disposal fee, usually based 
on weight).  Gate rates are difficult to accurately establish in an uncertain post-disaster 
130  Disaster waste management: a systems approach 
  Charlotte Brown 
 
 
environment where waste type, volume and potential hazards are difficult to predict.  If the 
venture charges too little, it is possible that insufficient funds will be collected to 
appropriately manage the waste and an environmental legacy may be left.  It would be 
preferable to include the waste handling facilities in the demolition and debris management 
system to increase the facilities ability to anticipate future waste demand and set their pricing 
structure accordingly.  It would be simplest to achieve this using a directly facilitated funding 
mechanism.  This idea is developed further in Section 8.3.3. 
 
Direct facilitation reduces the uncertainty in operating waste handling facilities and 
consequently reduces the potential for environmental legacy issues.    
 
As will be discussed in Section 8.3.5, maintaining cash-flow for contractors and affected 
persons during a disaster response is sometimes a challenge.  The choice of funding delivery 
mechanism can reduce cash-flow issues, particularly for residents.  For example, direct 
facilitation and, to a degree, cost reimbursement if implemented well, reduces (or eliminates) 
costs which the affected persons has to carry before receiving payment for works, as the 
funder can pay the service provider directly.  
 
7.3.3 Funding mechanism principles 
Form and scope 
For individuals and governments to be adequately prepared for a disaster, funding 
mechanisms (both source and delivery) need to be flexible in their design such that they can 
be applied to different scales of disaster.  FEMA funding mechanisms are well established in 
the US.  The systems work well for most ‘medium scale’ disasters;; however, the extent of 
Hurricane Katrina required extra-ordinary measures and increases in funding.  In 2007, 
permanent changes were made to the FEMA funding guidelines to reflect the measures 
necessary following Hurricane Katrina.  One important change was the inclusion of a policy 
and protocols for private property demolition.  Following the Victorian Bushfires, the 
planned privately funded demolition and debris management system (insurance-based) was 
replaced by a publicly funded approach. 
 
Funding mechanisms need to be scalable / adjustable to match the disaster scale. 
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It is essential that whatever funding mechanisms exist, that the funds are sufficient to meet 
the overall recovery objectives.  In particular, it is necessary to ensure that there are no 
significant gaps.  Following both the Victorian Bushfires and the Canterbury Earthquakes, a 
number of concerns were raised regarding the insufficient or non-existent allowances for 
demolition and debris management in insurance policies.  Despite demolition being funded 
by the government, following the 2009 Victorian Bushfires only 43% of homes were rebuilt 
with insurance money due to high levels of under or no insurance (Sexton, 2010).  One early 
estimate in Christchurch was that 50% of the commercial buildings were underinsured for 
demolition: insurance policies either excluded demolition or the value allocated to the 
demolition was less than the actual post-disaster cost.  The author believes that under-
insurance was a contributing factor to the reported incidences of illegal dumping following 
the Christchurch earthquake (Sachdeva, 2011; The Press, 2011; Williams, 2011b; Wright, 
2011) as individuals attempted to make cost savings.   
 
As discussed in the previous section, if there are insufficient funds, some property owners 
may take short cuts in demolition and debris management activities to allow for rebuilding 
activities.  This could leave environmental and human health legacy issues.  It is, therefore, 
advantageous to delineate demolition and debris management activities from other recovery 
aspects (in private or public policies) to ensure that funds are not diverted from these 
activities, resulting in low cost (and subsequently low quality) approaches.   
 
Some believed that the perceived under insurance was actually due to post-disaster price 
gouging by demolition contractors.  It is the authors understanding however, that demolition 
and waste prices, post-earthquake, while higher than peace-time, were not substantially 
higher.  The author suggests that the original insurance generated estimates of demolition 
costs may have been based on national demolition and waste management costs, which in 
this case are significantly lower than the local costs9.  
 
Price escalation is an expected unknown in disaster response and recovery.  The author is 
unaware of any data on the change of waste management prices after disasters, however, 
price gouging (Pelling et al., 2002; Jackson, 2008) and market fluctuations (Chang et al., 2010) 
                                                 
9 There is a significant difference in the waste   management   costs   between   landfills   in   New   Zealand’s  
largest city Auckland, for example, (multiple landfill, high value market for recycled materials such as 
crushed concrete) and Christchurch (single landfill, limited recycling market capacities and values).  
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for services and resources is well recognised in post-disaster situations.  This indicates that 
market fluctuations and service prices are likely to change in the deconstruction and waste 
management sectors as well.  The author believes that there is a current market reality: when 
demand outstrips supply (there is a resource constraint), prices will increase.  Demolition and 
debris management costs are particularly sensitive, not only to the cost of labour and plant 
but to the value of the recycling markets which can become flooded after disasters (see later 
discussion in Section 9.3.1).  Demolition and debris management costs can also increase 
when buildings need to be taken down quickly, without opportunity for peace-time practices 
for cost savings (i.e. stripping building interiors and maximising recycling).  Conversely, 
following some disasters, waste management costs can decrease.  As examples: free inert 
material disposal at Lyttelton Port of Christchurch, and relaxation of landfill disposal 
standards and subsequent disposal cost reduction in Louisiana (Katrina).  However, the 
author believes that in general there is a net increase in waste management costs.  This post-
disaster ‘premium’ needs to be accounted for.   
 
Disaster funding mechanisms, public or private, must routinely include allowances for 
demolition and debris management, preferably as an item separate from rebuilding.  Estimates 
for post-disaster demolition and debris management costs need to: 
 Be updated regularly 
 Be priced to match the local market 
 Include a post-disaster premium (due to time and/or resource constraints and recycling 
market changes) 
 
The discretionary nature of some funding mechanisms is difficult to manage.  In particular, 
some authors have alleged that the political climate has a significant influence on funding 
distribution (Olshansky et al., 2006).  It has been shown that flood disaster declarations in 
the US are more frequent in re-election years (The World Bank and The United Nations, 
2010).  FEMA reimbursement in the US, for example, is not guaranteed and is subject to 
change depending on the current political environment.  The increase from 75 to 100% cost 
share for example post-Hurricane Katrina may not have been implemented by another 
government or at another time.  Disaster compensation in Italy is also undefined pre-
disaster.  Values are set post-event and are vulnerable to the political environment.  Disaster 
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victims and local authorities relying on public funds are therefore very vulnerable to the 
political dimensions at the time which makes strategic planning difficult.  The more 
established and certain the funding scope is, the easier it will be for strategic managers to 
plan and determine the recovery objectives. 
 
Funding sources that determine funding amounts post-disaster need to establish these as soon 
after the disaster as possible. 
 
Funding policies 
Funding policies can restrict the management options for demolition and waste management.  
In San Diego after the 2003 Cedar and Paradise Firestorm, the majority of the debris 
management programme was declined reimbursement by FEMA.  Bins to collect waste, for 
example, were put on private properties in some cases due to space restrictions on roads and 
driveway lengths; however, FEMA only reimburses for bins located on public property.  The 
county also deemed that a private property clearance was necessary due to the hazards in the 
waste;; however they did not meet FEMA’s criteria for private property removal.  In addition, 
FEMA has very rigid record keeping and monitoring requirements which local authorities 
must meet to ensure cost reimbursement.  Authorities in San Diego were unable to 
sufficiently monitor the waste management programme (due to poorly regulated waste 
facilities) and as a result were not successful in receiving FEMA reimbursement (County of 
San Diego, 2005).  In a situation such as this, authorities are in a position where they must 
choose to either 1) fit within the regulations (and design a less efficient debris management 
system); or 2) design the most effective system (from a cost, environment, economic and 
social point of view) possible and risk not being able to recover the funds from the funding 
provider.  Assessing eligibility for funds can consume many resources which could instead be 
used to improve the recovery process.   
 
It is not only publicly funded schemes that have restrictive policies: in New Zealand, insurers 
have a ‘one shift’ policy for waste.  That is, they will only pay for one movement of the 
waste.  Thus, any costs for the management of the waste need to be estimated upfront (as 
discussed in the previous section for lump sum funding delivery mechanisms).  This can have 
perverse consequences by increasing the cost of waste management activities as contractors 
increase their costs to reflect the risk that are assuming (see Section 8.3.4).  In turn it limits 
the ability of creative waste management systems (such as temporary staging facilities). 
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The contract types stipulated in some funding policies can also counteract wider recovery 
objectives.  For example, the FEMA regulations favour lump sum contracts, which, as 
discussed in Section 8.3.4, is not necessarily the most effective.   
 
Funding policies often have legislative requirements that need to be met.  Where these 
requirements exist, authorities must be careful that legal waivers, aimed at expediting the 
recovery, do not exclude waste management programmes from receiving funding.  The 
FEMA funding policy, as established under the Stafford Act (FEMA, 2007), sets out 
statutory requirements that debris management operations must meet to be eligible for 
funding.  In particular, it states that federal laws must be met.  There was some concern that 
one of the legal waivers used in Louisiana - the expansion of the waste acceptance criteria at 
C&D landfills - may have excluded the disposal activities from funding.  It was later 
determined that the legal waiver met the statutory requirements (GAO, 2008).  Following 
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was also moved to alter its policy on requirements for legal 
approvals for removing debris from private properties as the process was lengthy and caused 
a bottleneck.  In L’Aquila, disaster waste management funding was dependent on managing 
the waste in accordance with European and Italian waste laws, in particular the European 
Waste Coding (EWC) system.  However, there was no code suitable for the mixed 
earthquake waste.  It was not until a decision to specially code the waste was made that 
surety of funding was provided.   
 
The often strict rules around funding mechanisms can have unintentional consequences.  In 
systems thinking this is referred to as Rule Beating (Meadows, 2009).  In the US, if debris 
was contaminated with garbage or it was suspected the waste was not disaster generated, 
then the piles would be missed, as these ‘contaminated’ loads were not eligible for payment 
by FEMA.  It is understood that this was not the intent of the FEMA regulations and 
contractors were using this as a front to reduce the work required in their lump sum 
contracts.  The regulations were established to try to educate people on what they can and 
cannot put out for collection, however, it was expected that all waste collected within a 
specific time frame could reasonably be expected to be disaster waste.  FEMA also wanted 
waste removed to mitigate secondary hazards caused by piles of debris, such as blocked flow-
paths, vermin and vector (mosquitos, rats, flies etc.) breading, and fire hazards etc. 
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Some funding policies can significantly restrict the environmental outcome of the operations 
or indeed can increase the environmental risks being taken.  For example, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in the US, stipulates that lowest cost solutions 
must be used.  Following the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the city of Los Angeles was 
running short of landfill space and needed to start recycling the disaster waste.  Recycling 
was, however, a more expensive option.  FEMA initially resisted the move but eventually 
accepted it on the understanding that recycling was in the long term waste management 
strategy for Los Angeles (State of California, 1997).  If recycling had not been allowed, the 
recovery may have been stalled, or a low cost (with potentially high environmental risk) 
landfill may have been required.  In Louisiana, following Hurricane Katrina, the lowest cost 
option was landfilling, however to facilitate landfilling, environmental standards were relaxed 
significantly. 
 
The lowest cost approach, stipulated in many funding policies, does not always have a 
positive social impact.  For example, following Hurricane Katrina, demolition was favoured 
over deconstruction as the lowest cost option.  Denhart (2010), however, observed that 
deconstruction (allowing material salvage) provided a more positive psychological end to a 
house for some property owners.  The lowest cost policy also removed the ability for 
building owners to determine the fate of their own building.   
 
While funding policies are understandably strict, some flexibility needs to be incorporated 
into the policies such that the desired recovery outcomes can be achieved.  The current 
situation where the funding mechanism and policy drives the response needs to be reversed, 
such that the system objectives can be met.  One option would be to have outcome targets 
rather than have process constraints.  The outcome targets could reflect cost as well as 
environmental, social and economic goals.  The drawback to this is the reduced certainty in 
receiving funding when designing the disaster waste management plan.  This concept needs 
further development and has been recommended for future research in Chapter 12. 
 
As discussed in Section 6.3.3, data and information monitoring are necessary to facilitate 
strategic management.  Requiring data collection in funding policies is an effective way of 
ensuring the necessary data are collected to enable planning.   
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Funding mechanism policies need some flexibility to allow for effective and efficient waste 
management options. 
 
Funding policies should not only consider direct costs, but also environmental, social and 
economic effects (and must avoid perverse outcomes). 
 
Funding policies should include provision for data collection. 
 
Exclusions in funding policies (private or public) can mean that some aspects of the 
demolition and debris management, in some cases critical to the wider recovery, are not 
managed.  In New Zealand, one notable omission to most insurance policies is 
compensation for asbestos removal.  This exclusion is not surprising as the extent of 
asbestos in most properties is unknown and removal costs are very expensive.  However, this 
can create organisational complexities where direct facilitation is being used to deliver the 
funds.  Demolition sites need to be transferred between contractors engaged (by the owner) 
to remove the asbestos and contractors engaged by the funder.  Policy exclusions like this 
can increase the financial burden on property owners and, as described above, this can lead 
to low quality approaches for cost reimbursement or lump sum delivery mechanisms.  Illegal 
dumping of asbestos was observed in Christchurch (Wright, 2011).  In the case of asbestos, 
poor quality management approaches can have significant human health risks.   
 
Where possible, policy exclusions which may affect implementation, or have significant 
environmental and human health effects, should be avoided (e.g. asbestos). 
 
If, for whatever reasons, exclusions are unavoidable, significant efforts need to be made to 
ensure individuals have the right tools, information and incentives to manage the ‘exclusions’ 
themselves.  In Victoria, Australia, individual property owners were responsible for any 
clean-up works outside the scope of the government funded and facilitated clean-up works 
(which was generally limited to the building footprint).  There was a general reluctance to 
carry out the work due to an expectation that the government should or would provide 
additional funding.  Some even noted that they felt neglected by the government.  As a 
result, there were reported instances of illegal dumping from residents unwilling to pay high 
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disposal costs.  Limited systems were put in place to ensure residents were aware of their 
responsibilities and were in a position to manage the waste in an appropriate manner.   
 
Having appropriate risk management strategies that account for limited funding availability 
will also reduce the risks and potential negative effects (see Chapter 10). 
 
If funding scope is limited, efforts need to be made to provide education, assistance and 
incentives for individuals to appropriately deal with that waste. 
 
Overall funding system 
Multiple funding sources can introduce funding gaps and overlaps.  During Hurricane 
Katrina, for example, a large number of boats sank.  Under the law at the time, the Coast 
Guard (sponsored by FEMA) was responsible for clearing all debris in the (public) shipping 
channel (Stafford Act).  However, no one was responsible for waste outside the shipping 
channel.  It is unlikely private property owners or their insurers would have interest in 
salvaging the boat.  Thus no funding was provided.  In contrast, the combined hurricane and 
flood damage on land created confusion between responsibilities of flood and hurricane 
insurance companies.  Insurance in the US is by hazard.  Private insurance generally is 
required for hurricane damage and the National Flood Insurance Programme covers flood 
damage.  Flood damage caused by levee breach in Louisiana led to many insurance 
companies denying hurricane insurance claims.  Unfortunately, as a compounding factor, 
most people in these hurricane zones had insurance for hurricanes; however, many people 
did not have flood insurance.  It is not uncommon for disaster events to occur 
simultaneously (fires induced by earthquakes, floods induced by hurricanes).  Extreme care is 
needed in determining respective funding scopes and how this may affect the completeness 
of works and the operational systems.  As discussed previously, there are currently significant 
delays in the residential red-zone demolition process in Christchurch as EQC, private 
insurers and the government agree cost share arrangements prior to any demolitions taking 
place. 
 
Where multiple funding sources are relied upon, efforts must be made to ensure there are no 
funding gaps, or overlaps. 
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The number of funding mechanisms contributing to recovery efforts can create 
organisational complexities.  For example, in New Zealand there is a dual insurance scheme 
for residential properties.  The national insurer EQC covers the first $100,000 damage 
(within eight metres of the footprint of the building) and any land damage; and the private 
insurer covers any additional cost.  Generally for works under $100,000 EQC facilitates the 
works and over $100,000 is managed by the private insurer.  However, for properties 
requiring land remediation, the private insurer would facilitate demolition, then EQC would 
take over the land repair (generally in coordination with neighbouring properties all with 
different private insurers) and then the private insurer contractor would remobilise on site 
for the reconstruction.  All these works also have to be coordinated to minimise the 
disruption to the property owner10.  As well as organisational complexities, multiple funding 
sources can reduce efficiencies in the operations (such as timeliness, completeness and 
recycling opportunities) and can increase costs (from coordination and site de-mobilisation 
and re-mobilisation).   
 
Organisational complexities also arise out of apartment or buildings with multiple owners 
and insurers, as was noted in Christchurch.  In some buildings there were multiple owners 
and tenants all with different insurers.  The author is aware of one such building which 
involved eight insurance companies.  Single funding sources would inevitably reduce the 
complexities of management.  It should be noted that despite the public funding source in 
L’Aquila, decisions regarding buildings with multiple owners were inevitably slower than 
single ownership properties.  This has been observed in disaster recovery (generally: not 
specifically attributed to disaster waste) in Kobe and Los Angeles (Olshansky et al., 2006). 
 
More generally, funding mechanisms and operational strategies (Chapter 8) are inextricably 
linked.  Either funding mechanisms must be designed with desired operational strategies in 
mind, or vice versa.  If the systems are not designed together, logistical challenges and 
operational inefficiencies, such as those described above, are likely.  Legislative measures can 
be implemented to manipulate the funding to the desired operational approach (such as in 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that the original intent of the EQC threshold ($100,000) was to cover the value of an 
average house.  This value has not been revised since the figure was set in 1993.  If the figure had been raised 
accordingly, the number of properties having to deal with both EQC and their private insurer would have been 
reduced.   
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Christchurch where private funding sources were managed centrally courtesy of the CER 
Act) (discussed further in Section 8.3.3 and 11.3.3).   
 
Funding mechanisms and operational organisational strategies should be designed together to 
ensure systems can be effectively implemented and there are no funding gaps. 
 
A single funding source for each property / building is preferable to avoid organisational 
complexities and improve recovery efficiencies.    
 
Liability 
Funders must also be aware of possible liability issues.  The potential for liability of disaster 
recovery funders was noted in the US following Hurricane Katrina.  USEPA found they 
could not clear FEMA of any liability should there be adverse environmental effects due to 
activities that they funded (such as the expanded waste acceptance criteria at construction 
and demolition landfills) (Luther, 2008).  According to one report, many jurisdictions have 
sued FEMA for reimbursement post-disaster for compensation over the loss of landfill space 
due to disaster waste management operations and the restrictions placed on authorities in 
post-disaster situations by the FEMA regulations (County of San Diego, 2005).  Liability 
issues in general are discussed in Section 11.3.5. 
 
Funding providers need to consider the potential for liability due to adverse effects resulting 
from the disaster response. 
 
Strategic management 
As discussed in Chapter 6, strategic management structures are beneficial to the quality of 
the recovery efforts.  However, establishment of strategic management structures for waste 
(or any other recovery function) incurs costs - whether the function is embedded in existing 
organisations or whether it is part of a new entity specific for the recovery.  Potential costs 
for this need to be accounted for in funding mechanisms.  Where private funding is being 
relied upon for physical recovery, additional public funding may be required to enable 
strategic management functions as private organisations may not believe it is their duty or 
responsibility to ensure that the wider recovery objectives are met.  Payment allowance also 
needs to be considered for central management of operations (if desired) (see Section 8.3.3). 
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Funding mechanisms for large scale disasters needs to include a strategic waste management 
function. 
 
7.4 Summary 
As discussed in this chapter, there are currently a range of approaches to funding of 
demolition and debris management works.  Funding mechanisms can be categorised into the 
funding source (public or private) and the delivery mechanism (lump sum, cost 
reimbursement or direct facilitation).  Demolition and debris management funding often 
piggy-backs onto general response, recovery and reconstruction funding and is not always 
considered as a specific task with unique requirements and impacts on the wider recovery.   
 
The presence of disaster debris can have a significant and community wide impact, therefore 
having appropriate funds to enable an efficient and effective recovery is imperative.  
Generally, where the risk (likelihood and consequence) of mismanagement of waste is high, 
then a low risk (quantity, quality and timeliness) funding source and delivery mechanism 
should be used.  High risk of mismanagement of waste may occur when there is: a high 
number of displaced persons, disruption to the road network, high human and 
environmental health hazards and movement of waste across property boundaries.  The 
lowest risk funding mechanisms, in the author’s view, are those which are publicly held and 
are directly facilitated.  Low risk funding approaches offer more control over how funds are 
managed and distributed and, therefore, the impact of demolition and disaster waste 
activities on the recovery.  
 
Funding policies need to avoid being too restrictive so that they do not inhibit innovative 
debris management options which contribute to meeting the wider recovery objectives.   
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8. Operational management 
8.1 Introduction 
The success of  a disaster waste management system is dependent on effective operational 
management.  That is, the physical works need to be carried out using organisational 
structures and procurement strategies that facilitate the overarching recovery objectives being 
met.  Ineffective operational management (as discussed in Section 1.9.2) can significantly 
affect the timeliness and quality of  the recovery.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to: 
1. Summarise the operational management strategies (organisational and procurement) used 
in the five case studies, 
2. Define typical operational strategies, and 
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3. Propose basic principles for operational management (organisational and procurement) 
for disaster waste systems. 
 
The chapter includes discussion on both the operational organisational structures and the 
procurement strategies.  The following definitions apply: 
 
Operational organisational strategy 
Based on the case study findings basic operational organisational structures can be divided 
into the following two categories: 
1. Centrally managed works (large quantities of  work managed collectively as a single 
body of  work).  
2. Individually managed works (works managed by individuals). 
Procurement strategies 
In terms of this thesis, procurement strategies are the contract conditions under which the 
operations are carried out.  This thesis will focus on contract conditions for centrally 
managed works.  The procurement strategies included in the analysis/discussion are: 
1. Lump sum. 
2. Cost reimbursement (also known as time & cost or time & material). 
 
The chapter includes material from the following conference paper (see Appendix M): 
Brown, C., Milke, M. & Seville, E., 2011. Implementing a disaster recovery programme: a 
demolition and debris management perspective. International Conference on Building 
Resilience, July 2011, Kandalama, Sri Lanka. 
 
8.2 Case studies 
8.2.1 2009 Victorian Bushfires 
In an effort to speed-up the recovery, and eliminate potential health threats from burnt 
house remains, the National and State governments elected to facilitate, through a centralised 
contract, the demolition and debris removal of all affected properties.  The contract was 
awarded to a large national contractor who engaged a number of subcontractors (70% local) 
to complete the works.  All works were carried out on a cost reimbursement basis.  
Individual property owners were not required to participate other than to salvage personal 
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belongings if desired.  Waste was primarily disposed of at existing, privately owned landfills.  
A landfill cell was constructed to support the recovery efforts.  The landfill cell construction 
and operations were integrated into the central demolition and waste management contract. 
 
Overall the clean-up operations were a success.  The centralised demolition and debris 
removal contract allowed for efficient removal of waste.  All waste was removed within six 
months – leading the way for reconstruction.  Effective prioritisation of works was practiced.  
Streamlined and consistent health and safety and environmental procedures were also 
implemented across all affected areas.  Organisational structures were simple and economies 
of scale for the physical works were also possible.  Some affected persons, however, felt that 
more labour and contractors should have been sourced from the affected community and 
more consultation could have been carried out.  Some claimed their exclusion reinforced the 
victim mentality and contributed to mental health problems. 
 
8.2.2 2009 Samoan Tsunami 
The tsunami response and recovery programmes were primarily implemented through 
central government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  Clean-up projects were 
generally ad-hoc and piece-meal.  Primarily waste was collected and segregated at the affected 
site by the community (both paid and unpaid) and contractors were employed to collect and 
transport the waste to the disposal site or recycling depot, see Figure 8-1.  The effectiveness 
of the contractors, generally paid on a cost reimbursement basis, was dependent on the 
degree of supervision.  The JICA programme, for example, monitored works to ensure 
recycling and reuse was maximised and that full truckloads went to the landfill.  This had 
environmental benefits and provided cost savings.  The government programme was not so 
effectively supervised and limited waste segregation was practiced. 
 
The majority of the work did not require specialised skills and was conducted effectively and 
efficiently by community labourers.  Paying for community members to assist in the clean-up 
operations was a boost to the economy of the affected area.  Some, however, suggested that 
by paying the community members, an increasing dependence on humanitarian aid was being 
fostered.  Participation in the clean-up also reportedly helped support traumatised persons 
and allowed the community to participate in their own recovery, including salvage of wastes 
where desired.   
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Figure 8-1 Contractors collecting bulky metal for recycling 
 
There was some difficulty in recruiting community members to participate in the clean-up, in 
particular where no monetary or in-kind compensation was provided.  Some attributed this 
to the need of individuals to concentrate on their own recovery rather than participating in 
community clean-up.  The author suggests that the mass movement of people from the 
affected area reduced the perceived need of and desire to participate in the clean-up. 
 
A community level, centralised response was suitable following the tsunami, given that waste 
materials were moved from their point of origin and ownership of and responsibility for the 
waste was difficult to determine.   
 
8.2.3 2009 L’Aquila Earthquake, Italy 
The organisation of the demolition and debris management operations in L’Aquila was 
essentially aligned with the government funding.  Demolition works were carried out as a 
centrally managed programme which allowed for economies of scale and prioritisation of 
works and resources.  Army and fire personnel were used for a large portion of the 
demolition works.  Reasons given for using the army and fire personnel over private 
contractors included: 1) it was a cost saving strategy, 2) it was to avoid laws and regulations 
    Operational management 145 
   
 
 
around hiring private contractors, 3) they were the only organisation with available capacity 
and equipment, and 4) legal requirements around dealing with collapsed structures (where 
criminal investigations were pending).  The building repair works and associated debris 
management was carried out by private contractors (certified as environmental managers).  
Private property owners were responsible for managing detritus (up to one tonne) from their 
own properties.  Central debris collection centres were established for residents to dispose of 
their waste.  The provision of central collection facilities for private property detritus 
empowered residents to manage their own waste.  The majority of the waste handling 
facilities (including community drop-off centres, temporary storage and recycling) were 
operated by locally appointed contractors.  No data were collected on the procurement 
strategies for the works. 
 
Overall the centralisation of the demolition works offered opportunities for efficiencies and 
economies of scale.  However, there were a number of other factors (criminal investigations, 
regulatory bottlenecks, shortages of waste management areas, insufficient capacity / 
resources within the Comune) that limited the effectiveness of the operational organisational 
strategy.   
 
8.2.4 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
The US, pre and post-Hurricane Katrina, has well established debris management processes 
including operational strategies.  Generally clearance of private properties is carried out by 
private property owners.  Private property detritus is placed on the kerb for collection by 
local authority or FEMA appointed contractors.  Demolitions (and the associated debris) are 
also the responsibility of individual home owners or their insurers.  However, due to the 
large scale of Hurricane Katrina, the high public health risk from toxic flood sediments, the 
large number of displaced persons and low level of insurance, FEMA funded and facilitated 
all debris removal and demolition on private properties.  The works were awarded as lump 
sum contracts to large contracting and demolition firms.  Waste was handled in accordance 
with standard debris management procedures developed by the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality. 
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Waste and debris was taken to existing private recycling and disposal facilities.  Some 
additional disposal facilities were required and they were generally managed by as private 
endeavours (according to the local approach to waste management). 
 
Because of the lump sum contract approach to demolition and debris removal, contractors 
aimed to minimise costs for their particular contract.  Contractors did not necessarily view 
the benefits for the recovery and community as a whole from approaches that minimised 
disruption to communities or minimised waste to landfill.  LDEQ, in fact, issued a directive 
that contractors were responsible for determining the most appropriate waste management 
approach based on cost.  
 
Overall the centralised approach to debris removal and demolition works allowed for 
streamlining of the clean-up operations.  The high level of displaced property owners, and 
high degree of health hazard present in the waste matrix, made necessary a coordinated and 
large-scale response.  It was not feasible to rely on a conventional FEMA response where 
private property owners participated in the clean-up.  The centralised approach allowed for 
expedient management of environmental and public health risks and for stream-lined 
mitigation procedures to be put in place.  However, the lump sum contract approach allowed 
contractors opportunities to adopt risky behaviour and waste management approaches not 
necessarily beneficial to the overall recovery.  Limited use of local contractors was a 
community complaint noted. 
 
8.2.5 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
Despite the individually-oriented funding mechanisms in Christchurch (see Section 7.2.5), a 
centralised demolition and waste management approach was adopted by most insurance 
companies (residential property repair and demolition) and CERA (commercial and 
residential red zone property demolition).  A centralised approach had been trialled on a 
small earthquake event in Te Anau, New Zealand, in 2003 and was noted to present 
opportunities for efficiencies and quality control (Rotimi et al., 2006).  However, following 
the Christchurch earthquake, it was not compulsory to participate in the insurance nor the 
CERA commercial property centrally managed programmes.  Many individuals accepted cash 
settlements with insurers and elected to manage their own works.  This led to many 
independently managed projects, particularly within the city centre.  Under the CER Act, 
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CERA had some control over independent demolitions (as the CER act allowed CERA to 
intervene when works were not being carried out in a timely manner).  However, because 
CERA was not managing the contracts it was not possible to have complete control over the 
works programme.  As a result, the ability to prioritise resources and timeliness of 
demolitions was lost and as a consequence the demolition times increased. 
 
CERA developed a selective demolition procurement strategy for its centralised demolition 
works.  The strategy allowed for simple, low risk jobs to be carried out quickly and efficiently 
using cost reimbursement contracts.  A cost reimbursement approach was adopted as it 
allowed a greater opportunity to efficiently share resources across the city.  The higher risk 
jobs (e.g. tall building demolition) were tendered, as lump sum projects, to ensure prices were 
competitive and the risk of cost overrun rested primarily with the contractor.  As the works 
progressed, however, pressure from insurance companies to maintain a competitive tender 
process (for commercial red-zone properties being demolished by CERA but being paid for 
by insurance) led to more and more demolition contracts being tendered as lump sum 
contracts.  Lump sum contracts were perceived as being more competitive and resulting in 
lower cost demolitions.  After the emergency demolitions were completed following the June 
13 earthquake, it is understood all demolitions were carried out under lump sum contracts.  
This created a waste management problem as contractors tried to minimise costs (maximise 
their profit on lump sum jobs) through creative waste management.  A number of illegal 
waste sites have been established across the city. 
 
Waste is predominantly being handled at pre-earthquake, privately-owned, waste handling 
facilities.  Several new facilities were established to specifically manage the earthquake waste: 
Lyttelton Port land reclamation, Burwood Resource Recovery Park (BRRP), Burwood 
disposal facility (still in the planning process at the time of writing), and several private waste 
sorting facilities operated by demolition contractors (both legal and illegal).  The new 
facilities were all private ventures.  Generally the facilities charged a waste receipt fee on a 
per tonne basis.  
 
The establishment and operation of BRRP provides some interesting lessons.  BRRP was 
established in the first two weeks after the earthquake.  It was established to take mixed 
materials from demolitions carried out to enable urban search and rescue activities and as a 
storage facility for waste from buildings where fatalities occurred.  The facility was initially 
148  Disaster waste management: a systems approach 
  Charlotte Brown 
 
 
operated by a private joint venture.  The land was leased from the local authority, 
Christchurch City Council, for a nominal fee.  The site operators had to estimate a price to 
receive, store, sort, process and remove the waste based on an unknown waste quantity and 
quality.  Within the first two months, the operators noted that they were not receiving the 
quality or quantity of waste that they anticipated.  As described above, the lump sum 
contracts led to increased recycling and establishment of private (illegal and legal) waste 
management sites which reduced the quantity and quality of waste going to BRRP.  The 
operators had no control over what waste they would receive and in the dynamic and 
uncertain post-disaster environment this meant the commercial risks of the operation were 
extremely high.  The disposal price had to be increased to reflect these risks.  This, in turn, 
likely fuelled more contractors to establish their own waste handling sites, further reducing 
the waste quantity and quality received at BRRP.  Eventually, the operators of BRRP 
determined the risk to be too high to operate alone, and in November 2011, ownership of 
BRRP was transferred to the public-private partnership which operates the regional landfill 
in Canterbury.  The alternative to this scenario was to close the BRRP operation.  In the 
authors view, BRRP served and will serve an important purpose for the recovery and, 
therefore, sharing the risk between private and public entities is a good arrangement.  Initially 
a storage facility was needed for demolition material.  Transfer stations could not handle the 
demolition material and the regional landfill was too far away to transport directly (130km 
round trip and there are logistical constraints around trucks numbers and truck types the 
landfill can accept).  Long term a large scale recycling plant is needed to reduce the volumes 
of waste going to the regional landfill (to reduce costs and environmental impacts from 
trucking the waste to the regional landfill).   
 
8.3 Discussion 
8.3.1 Typical operational strategies 
To better understand and plan for disaster waste management and to enable the following 
discussion, it is useful to define a generic operational management system.  The system 
definition comprises five different demolition and waste management stages: waste source, 
waste handling, waste treatment, final disposal / end use, and transportation.  The 
components are described below and the indicative relationships or waste flows between the 
components are illustrated in Figure 8-2.  Figure 3-5, Figure 3-6, Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 
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show specific applications of this diagram for L’Aquila earthquake, Hurricane Katrina and 
the Christchurch earthquake respectively. 
 
Waste source 
As described in Section 4.3.2, the waste source describes where the waste originates from 
and in some cases what type of waste is being dealt with.  There are likely to be different 
management techniques depending on the source.  It may also be useful to delineate waste 
sources by who is responsible for managing the waste.  For example, in Christchurch, private 
(residential) property detritus includes both (source 1) broken household items and damaged 
furnishings (dealt with by private property owners and insurance); and (source 2) liquefaction 
silt (dealt with by private property owners, volunteers and a local authority provided kerbside 
collection programme).   
 
Typically disaster waste management systems are organised based on the waste source.   
 
Waste handling 
Waste handling facilities are those where waste is temporarily stored, for example, a transfer 
station or a temporary staging area.  Some sorting may be carried out but generally there is 
no processing.  These are useful facilities in a disaster waste management system as they act 
as buffers which allow waste to be moved out of affected areas quickly while long term waste 
management options (recycling and disposal facilities) are being established.  Use of waste 
handling facilities inevitably increases direct costs because of the double handling required 
but has the indirect benefits of expediting waste removal and potentially allowing the time 
for more environmentally beneficial waste uses to be found. 
 
Waste treatment 
Waste treatment facilities are where waste is physically or chemically changed in form, for 
example, incineration, concrete crushing and recycling.  Waste handling and treatment sites 
are commonly combined.  For example, the Burwood Resource Recovery Park facility in 
Christchurch where waste is stored, separated, timber is mulched and concrete is crushed for 
recycling markets etc. 
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Final disposal / end use 
Final disposal / end use sites are where waste is either resold as a useable product (e.g. 
crushed concrete) or is buried with no plans for use in the immediate future (i.e. landfill). 
 
 
Waste transportation 
Transportation includes the movement of waste between any of the above waste 
management activities.   
 
 
Figure 8-2 Generic operational disaster waste management system template (waste flows shown 
are indicative only) 
 
8.3.2 Operational risk management 
When designing an operational management strategy, one of the major determinants in its 
success is how risks to the project objectives (i.e. those defined in Chapter 5) are considered 
and managed.  Aside from the regulatory and legislative mechanisms for risk mitigation (in 
particular for environmental and human health risks, as discussed in Chapters 10 and 11) 
organisational and contractual mechanisms are useful tools in ensuring project objectives are 
met.   
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Part of determining how project risks should be managed is first determining what the 
potential impact of poor risk management will be.  For example: What is the economic 
impact of slow demolition?  What is the social impact?  What are the remediation costs of 
illegal waste disposal?  Indirect impacts as well as direct impacts must be considered.  If a 
serious death or injury were to occur during the recovery process, health and safety 
regulations would almost certainly be tightened and controlled, likely introducing 
cumbersome procedures which may slow down the recovery.  If a waste handling facility was 
closed this may reduce the waste management capacity and slow down the recovery. 
 
Based on the above risks, decision-makers need to determine where the ownership of those 
risks should best be held.  Decision-makers need to ask themselves: does the entity have any 
incentives to manage the risk appropriately / inappropriately?  Conversely, are there 
incentives for risky behaviour?  Is there long term vested interest in good quality work?  For 
example: an individual may make financial savings by illegally dumping hazardous materials. 
 
Last, once risk ownership is assigned, risk mitigation strategies need to be put in place.  
Strategies include contract incentives (bonds, bonuses) towards appropriate behaviour and 
establishing monitoring, reporting and enforcement procedures.   
 
These concepts will be used in the following discussion to determine the most appropriate 
operational management strategies in a post-disaster situation. 
 
Operational strategies need to consider how project risks should best be managed including: 
consequences of poor risk management; ownership of risk; incentives for risky behaviour; and 
appropriate mechanisms to mitigate risks.   
 
8.3.3 Operational organisation 
Benefits of centralised operational management 
Post-disaster, resources will invariably be limited (Chang et al., 2010).  Ideally those limited 
resources should be prioritised on activities that facilitate community recovery.  For example, 
works around lifelines, schools and critical industry should generally be prioritised ahead of 
other activities.  Following the Bushfires, demolition of schools, community buildings and 
petrol stations were prioritised.  The central contractor could manage its work programme 
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against these priorities.  With a private approach, all individuals must vie for resources and 
contractors will determine their own priority (likely based on price), which could potentially 
lead to ‘priority premiums’ being paid (contributing to price escalation as discussed in Section 
7.3.3).  
If well managed, centralised management offers opportunities to ensure recovery objectives are 
met by prioritising resources and works. 
 
The timeliness of demolition and debris removal works can also be more effectively 
controlled when centrally managed.  As discussed in Section 7.3.1, individually funded and 
managed works following the September 2010 earthquake, in Christchurch, led to significant 
disruption for some neighbouring buildings of unsafe structures that were not managed in a 
timely manner.  In places, safety fencing also encroached into roadways.  Likely in response 
to these experiences, to this the recovery law passed following the February earthquake (the 
CER Act) included powers for the recovery authority CERA to intervene if demolitions were 
taking too long.  Central government clearly did not want the community recovery to be held 
up by individual’s actions or non-actions.   
 
In theory, the CER Act provisions to ensure works were completed in a timely manner, was 
a good approach to maintain momentum in the recovery process.  Generally, it is believed 
that the demolitions works have proceeded for more expediently than if the CER Act had 
not been passed.  However, where works were progressing too slowly, the ability of CERA 
to intervene using the specific provisions in the CER Act, was very limited.  The costs and 
time to take over poorly managed private works were often too high to justify any 
intervention.  Commercial demolitions managed by individuals, post-February, were, in the 
majority, slower than CERA managed jobs.   
 
If well managed, centralised management offers opportunities to monitor and control the 
timeliness of the works. 
 
A centralised management approach reduces the demands on affected communities.  If a 
centralised clean-up programme is offered, affected persons are not required to secure and 
manage contractors on top of other post-event demands, such as employment and business 
disruption, temporary accommodation concerns, post-traumatic stress etc.  A central 
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management structure is generally easy for communities to understand as a single point of 
contact for the demolition is created.  In Victoria following the Bushfires the government 
sponsored clean-up became the ‘Grocon’ clean-up.  Many community members stated they 
were not even aware that the government funded Grocon.  Potential for rogue contractors to 
take advantage of the affected community is also reduced. 
 
Centralised processes, however, can also takes the initiative and control (over the timing and 
the nature of works) away from individuals, which can have negative psychosocial effects, as 
suggested by Denhart (2009).  In L’Aquila, frustrated residents protested over the 
unacceptably slow management of the waste in the city centre eleven months after the 
earthquake (AreaGenova, 2010).  Residents had no control over how quickly the waste was 
managed and clearly felt frustrated. 
 
Centralised management reduces the demands on the affected community and is easy (for 
communities) to understand. 
 
Centralised management can disempower the community. 
 
Central management can improve the quality outcomes of the works.  As for public funding 
sources (Section 7.3.1), a centralised approach takes the responsibility (and risk) away from 
the individual.  Concerns about illegal dumping by the Department of Civil Protection in 
L’Aquila led to the provision of free central waste collection centres where individuals could 
deposit waste.  In Christchurch, CERA and insurance Project Management Offices set 
standards to which works should be completed to, for example, backfilling basements to a 
level site.  If owners are self-funding the works, they may leave the site in an unsafe or an 
aesthetically unsatisfactory state, particularly where funding may be limited (Chapter 7).  
While authorities can set standards, in a post-disaster situation they often lack the human and 
financial resources to enforce the standards.  If authorities establish standards in conjunction 
with large organisations implementing the works, the organisations can use contractual 
means to ensure standards are met.  Large organisations are likely to uphold standards to 
protect their long term corporate reputation. 
 
Central management potentially improves the quality control of the works.  
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Cost quality control 
Centralised contracts have the ability to regulate price escalation (Section 7.3.3) on behalf of 
individuals.  Following the Christchurch earthquakes, CERA, and the insurance Project 
Management Offices all registered contractors for the works.  Contractors submitted unit 
rates and the lowest rate providers were given the most work.  Contractors were also more 
confident of their forward work load and were therefore more willing to reduce unit rates.  
This created competition in a saturated market.  Following the Bushfires the managing 
contractor was able to control the apparent escalation of landfill prices by frequenting the 
lowest cost sites.  Privately run contracts do not have the same ability to self-regulate.  This is 
discussed further in Section 8.3.4.   
 
Economies of scale can also be achieved in centralised programmes.  This can be achieved 
by combining neighbouring building demolitions, synergy of waste transportation, 
negotiation or high volume service contracts etc. 
 
Centralised processes, however, can be seen as anti-competitive.  For example, there was 
some concern over the directive approach taken initially by Civil Defence and CERA to use 
certain waste handling facilities over others.  Contrary to the above argument, the concern 
was that there was a lack of competition and the result would be price escalation.  There 
were environmental and organisational reasons why Civil Defence and CERA identified 
certain sites for waste handling as well as economy of scale arguments.  Mitigation measures, 
such as reviewing facility pricing structures, were carried out to ensure costs were 
competitive.  
 
Macro (community level) cost control can be better achieved through centralised recovery works. 
 
Waste system efficiency 
Generally, waste management systems are most effective where they are managed as a ‘cradle 
to grave’ operation: from waste source to final disposal / end use.  For example, a ‘cradle to 
grave’ approach is necessary to assess the costs and benefits of using waste handling facilities 
for sorting, versus sorting on site and slowing site clearance.  At a macro (whole of recovery) 
level, centrally managed systems allow for operational managers to assess the wider effects of 
different approaches most effectively.  Following the Christchurch earthquakes, the centrally 
managed CERA programme was initially designed around sorting mixed waste offsite to 
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reduce demolition times to aid recovery.  The large volumes anticipated reduced the 
additional expense of sorting offsite.  However, the contractors working privately perceived 
no commercial benefit of sorting offsite and elected to maximise their profit by recycling 
large amounts of materials on the demolition sites.  This slowed down the demolition and, 
therefore, the recovery works.  This is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.   
 
A ‘cradle to grave’ approach also reduces the uncertainty that the waste handling facilities 
operate under.  As discussed in Section 7.3.2, demolition and debris management systems 
that include waste handling and disposal facilities can increase quality control of the works, 
assist in planning and can reduce costs, primarily due to a reduction in operational risks.  
BRRP in Christchurch was a private operation operating independently from the waste 
source operations (predominantly demolition).  In the author’s opinion, BRRP was critical to 
the success of the originally intended post-disaster waste management system.  The operators 
had to estimate operating costs to manage an unknown quantity and quality of waste in order 
to charge an appropriate gate rate.  This high level of uncertainty presented a large risk to the 
operation, so the gate rate included a large risk contingency.  If the operation fails then this 
could significantly affect the recovery (by limiting waste management options) as well as 
potentially create a costly remediation exercise.  In the authors’ view, a facility of such 
significance to the recovery of Christchurch should not be operating independently of the 
front-end waste management process (i.e. collection and demolition) under such high risk 
and changeable conditions.  Centralised management allows for linking front-end operations 
with waste handling facilities. 
 
Private operational management approaches, on the other hand, tend to be more efficient at 
managing ‘cradle to grave’ waste effects on a micro (single site) level.  Reuse of waste 
materials on site for rebuilding purposes, for example, is possible on a site by site basis.  On 
a larger (centralised) scale, the logistics of on-site reuse can become cumbersome and waste 
ownership issues could become difficult to manage.  In Christchurch many contractors 
crushed concrete at commercial properties to fill excavated basements. 
 
Centralised works allow for waste management systems to be designed on a macro 
(community) scale. 
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Risks associated with establishing post-disaster waste handling facilities can be mitigated by 
linking them with front-end (collection and demolition) centralised waste management 
processes. 
 
Individual / private operational management approaches allow for ‘cradle to grave’ waste 
management at a micro (site level) scale. 
 
Works Insurance 
Because of the increase in seismic risk in Christchurch following the earthquakes, and the 
on-going aftershocks, many contractors were unable to gain insurance for the demolitions.  
Risks can be more readily shared under centralised management systems. 
 
Strategic management 
Centrally managed works (particularly where a ‘cradle to grave’ approach is taken, as above) 
enable better information gathering, which in turn enables strategic planning for the 
demolition and waste management systems.  For example, contracts can be used to require 
reporting.  Alternatively, financial information could potentially be interrogated to provide 
waste information.  Centralised management simplifies the job of strategic managers.  Data 
are more readily collectable and this enables potential system bottlenecks (for example, 
labour and equipment shortages, waste handling facilities) and emergent risks (for example 
the Black Spur health and safety hazard following the Bushfires (see Section 10.3.1)) to be 
more easily identified and mitigated than for privately operated works.  Many smaller 
organisations are less likely to identify and respond to potential macro scale problems, 
creating challenges for strategic managers.  Data gathering from private works (demolition 
contractors and waste handling facilities) may also be difficult as there may be privacy issues 
(e.g. under private insurance schemes).   
 
For example, the proliferation of waste handling facilities associated with the private 
demolition following the Christchurch earthquake is creating challenges for dealing with 
difficult waste streams such as treated timber11.  First, it is hard to estimate total quantities.  
Second, it is unknown what “cost” each contractor has allocated for disposal of the 
                                                 
11 Treated timber was a significant portion of the waste stream and had no existing market. 
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component.  Third, there are commercial sensitivities among contractors as each are trying to 
find low-cost disposal / recycling options.  All of these factors make assessment and 
comparison of alternative treatment options difficult, particularly where options are 
dependent on economies of scale.  Each contractor owned the risk of their own waste but no 
one officially owns the risk of the disposal on a city wide scale.   
 
Centralised management of works can be an effective way of gathering the data (particularly 
where legal mechanisms are not sufficient (see Section 11.3.3).  Where an individually 
facilitated approach is adopted, more rigid regulatory requirements would be useful for data 
collection and monitoring. 
 
Centralised management methods facilitate information gathering, which enables planning and 
monitoring. 
 
Operational management strategies must include mechanisms for information gathering (to 
enable strategic planning). 
 
By centralising management of demolition and waste management works, the number and 
complexity of the organisational interfaces is reduced.  Regulatory and recovery authorities 
will be able to more easily liaise with a small number of large contractors than numerous 
individual contractors.  Stream-lining of organisational interfaces is particularly important in 
a resource constrained post-disaster environment (see Chapter 10).  For example, in 
Christchurch, the seven insurance companies each established a Project Management Office 
in Christchurch to manage their respective insurance demolitions and repairs.  Each project 
management office managed hundreds of contractors and carried out tens of thousands of 
house repairs and demolitions.  This was a far simpler arrangement for regulatory authorities 
to deal with than each individual property being dealt with independently (e.g. by the 
property owner).  Links between demolition contractors and waste handling facilities were 
also simplified.   
 
Operational management strategies need to, where possible, reduce the number and complexity 
of organisational interfaces. 
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Funding mechanisms 
As discussed in the previous chapter, funding mechanisms and operational management 
strategies are inextricably linked.  Private funding approaches inevitably result in private / 
individually managed implementation strategies; and publicly funded works result in centrally 
managed operations programmes.  There are exceptions to this, for example, the central 
management of demolitions in Christchurch (paid for by individual property owners’ 
insurance);; and the individually facilitated repair works in L’Aquila reimbursed by 
government funds.  In the former case, legislative measures were required to facilitate a 
central approach to demolition (refer Section 11.3.3) as well as considerable coordination 
efforts. 
 
Funding mechanisms must be designed with the desired operational strategy (or strategies) in 
mind. 
 
Applying a centralised approach to a privately funded system can be challenging.  In 
particular, there is a need to accurately record costs for each private interest (building owner 
/ insurer / tenant etc.) rather than accruing costs over the entire project.  This leads to high 
administrative demands.  This can also introduce inefficiencies in the waste management 
works.  For example, trucks transporting debris to waste handling facilities in Christchurch 
could not be used for more than one job at a time as this would make allocation of costs 
difficult.  Publicly funded schemes enable the efficiencies gained in centralised approaches to 
be maximised. 
 
If a centrally managed operations programme is desired, public funding mechanisms can 
significantly reduce administrative demands and can improve operational efficiencies.    
 
As discussed in Section 7.3.3, where private funding mechanisms exist, but centrally managed 
programmes are required (such as the private property demolition and debris removal in 
Louisiana and the commercial property demolition in Christchurch) cost recovery 
mechanisms need to be in place.    
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When central management systems are imposed in a privately funded disaster recovery 
environment (by an entity other than the funder), consideration into cost recovery mechanisms 
is important. 
 
Also discussed in Section 7.3.3, one difficulty in managing works centrally, where individual 
funding mechanisms exist, is determining who should pay for the management costs.  In 
Christchurch, the CERA management costs were charged to the building owners (or their 
insurers) as a percentage of the total demolition cost.  Many owners (and insurers) felt that 
they should not have to pay this overhead.  Given that centralised management is a strategy 
to benefit the wider recovery (rather than individual benefit), this may be an appropriate fee 
for public / recovery authorities to cover. 
 
Public funding for central management overhead costs should be considered. 
 
Disaster & disaster waste impacts 
There are a number of disaster & disaster waste impacts that may indicate a centralised 
management approach is operationally beneficial.  These are discussed below and 
summarised in Table 8.1. 
 
The scale of the event and the resultant urgency to clean-up will directly affect the adopted 
response.  All five case studies here adopted a centralised process for some or all of the 
waste management works.  In two of the case studies (Christchurch and Victoria) this 
involved altering pre-established (and/or default) recovery approaches.  The scale of both 
events led disaster managers to increase the level of control in the recovery and take 
extraordinary measures to mitigate any further negative impacts.   
 
The difference in scale, in terms of damage, between the September 2010 (smaller) and 
February 2011 (larger) earthquakes in Christchurch led to a completely different response.  
As described earlier, the insurance and private property approach moved from an individual 
level response in September to a centralised management approach in February. 
 
For a large disaster scale, centralised management is likely to be highly beneficial. 
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Centralised management can help to mitigate environmental and human health risks where 
they are present.  The waste matrix from Hurricane Katrina contained significant hazards 
(largely due to the petro-chemical hydro-carbons present in the floodwater sediments).  If 
there had not been a centralised clean-up, individuals would either be required to engage a 
specialist to carry out the work (potentially creating a resourcing bottleneck); or, as Allen 
(2007) observes, those that could not afford to pay contractors may have put themselves at 
risk; or, in the most extreme case, no action would have been taken, which would pose a risk 
to the wider community.   
 
The close quarters of the damaged properties in the Central City Business District in 
Christchurch, meant that demolition work would present a significant worker health and 
safety hazard (e.g. demolition fall hazard, increased truck movements).  For health and safety 
purposes, CERA maintained control of the entire Central City Business District to ensure 
that both the CERA managed and individually managed works were carried out safely in the 
confined environs of the central city. 
 
One of the questions in the survey outlined in Appendix C specifically addressed this issue.  
Respondents were asked to determine whether a centralised or decentralised approach was 
more appropriate based on the amount of asbestos in the demolition waste.  Respondents 
favoured a private approach for small amounts of asbestos in the waste, but a centralised 
approach for significant volumes of asbestos (50% of houses containing asbestos and 
above).  As discussed above, it is likely that the respondents have assessed that the risk to the 
wider community is too great to assign responsibility to private contractors and a more 
controlled approach is desirable. 
 
Where there are significant environmental and human health hazards, a centrally managed 
clean-up is preferable. 
 
The movement of waste can also influence the waste management strategy.  The violent 
action of the floodwaters during Hurricane Katrina caused waste materials to spread across 
property boundaries.  It was difficult to determine who was responsible for various parts of 
the waste and who had right to ownership of the recovered materials.   
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A centralised approach may be necessary where there has been a significant trans-boundary 
movement of waste during the hazard event. 
 
Person displacement can also influence operational strategies.  The high number of people 
displaced following Hurricane Karina, coupled with the high human health hazard, led to 
FEMA electing to centrally manage the private property detritus and demolition 
management to ensure any public health hazard was minimised.  Correspondingly, for works 
on private property, a private approach may be more desirable where there is minor 
displacement of people.  Note that legislative or regulatory provisions may be needed to 
allow for property access, remediation works and associated waste ownership assignment for 
works carried out on behalf of property owners and/or on private property.  This is 
discussed in Section 11.3.3.   
 
In Christchurch, for example, there were many habitable houses that needed major repairs or 
demolition.  The timing of the demolition needed to be coordinated with the building 
owners to minimise the time that they required temporary accommodation.  Therefore, a 
private approach may allow for individuals to better manage the works to meet their 
individual needs. 
 
A high number of displaced persons may indicate a need for a centrally managed approach. 
 
Where the road network has been heavily affected, centralised management may be necessary 
in order to effectively control traffic movements.  Centralised management offers 
opportunities to control and potentially minimise vehicle movements (through rationalising 
vehicle movements) which would help to relieve congestion and damage to a disrupted road 
network. 
 
Centralised management will be beneficial where there is high disruption to road network (by 
controlling and rationalising vehicle movements). 
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Table 8.1 Indicators for selecting an appropriate operational organisational strategy 
 Disaster & disaster waste indicators 
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8.3.4 Operational procurement strategies 
Procurement strategy  
When works are to be centrally managed, the appropriate procurement strategy (that is the 
contract type) for services needs to be selected.  The initial discussion will focus on separated 
contract types; integrated contracts will be discussed briefly later.  The model in Figure 8-3, 
shows two separated contract types at the extreme ends of the procurement spectrum: cost 
reimbursement and lump sum.  The contract types are plotted against two project 
considerations: Principal’s project control and flexibility (in terms of time and scope) (which 
is positively correlated with Principal’s cost risk) and Contractor’s incentive (to work cost 
effectively).  The model will be used to discuss post-disaster contract selection. 
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Figure 8-3 Procurement strategy comparison (adapted from unknown source) 
 
Contracts are, in essence, risk management tools which are used to ensure project objectives 
are met.  In traditional separated contracts, the Principal establishes the project objectives 
(primarily output related) and determines which project risks (financial and operational) will 
be either transferred to, or shared with, the Contractor12.  Based on the level of risks 
involved, and whether risk transfer or sharing is preferred, the contract type is selected.  The 
Contractor in turn has objectives which are primarily profit driven.   
 
In peace-time, the work scope and risk context for demolition projects is usually well 
defined.  Minimum Principal flexibility is required (the Principal wants the building 
demolished), thus the Principal wants to transfer as much risk to the contractor as possible 
(minimum Principal cost risk) and to minimise the price by encouraging competition 
between contractors during bidding (maximise contractor incentive).  Referring to Figure 8-3 
this equates to a lump sum contract, which is, generally, the default contract type for 
demolition projects. 
 
                                                 
12 Risks can be transferred to third parties.  However for this analysis, third party risk transfer is not included.   
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Post-disaster, the project context and, thus the risk context, changes.  First, project scope is 
less well defined.  It is advantageous for the Principal (for a centralised operation with 
multiple demolition and/or waste management projects) to maintain as much flexibility in 
the contract terms as possible.  Following the Christchurch earthquakes the number of 
buildings to be demolished increased progressively as buildings were structurally assessed, 
thus the scope constantly changed.  In addition, many buildings had to be demolished 
without a full understanding of the volume and nature (for example, presence of asbestos) of 
the waste because initially buildings were too damaged to assess fully prior to demolition.  
There were also complex stakeholder relationships, as well as a need to coordinate with other 
demolition works.  In terms of Figure 8-3, desired Principal flexibility was high. 
 
Second, the Contractor’s incentive also changes.  In peace-time contractors want to 
maximise profit.  For a cost reimbursement contract that may mean working inefficiently 
(and this is undesirable for the Principal).  In other words, there is minimum (financial) 
incentive for contractors to work efficiently.  If a lump sum approach is taken, contractors 
have incentives to reduce the bid price to secure the contract and to perhaps generally accept 
higher risks as a result.  However, in a post-disaster environment, where resources are 
maximised13 and availability of work is all but ‘guaranteed’, there is less incentive for 
contractors to take financial risks on projects (when other less low risk projects could be 
accepted).  Consequently lump sum prices can increase to account for the risks and demand 
for resources.  A cost reimbursement contract in this case, mitigates the potential for risk 
loading on prices.  Contractors are also encouraged to work efficiently to gain a higher 
volume of work.  There is no such incentive for efficiency in lump sum contracts as the costs 
will dictate the work speed (unless there are penalties or incentives for timely completion).  
In terms of Figure 8-3, the need to create Contractor incentive is minimised. 
 
The above incentive shift has been illustrated in Christchurch.  When demolition contracts 
were slowly released14 to the market there was stiff competition between contactors trying to 
secure jobs.  Lump sum contract prices were driven so low that authorities believed the work 
would not be possible in the time desired and within expected environmental and human 
                                                 
13 Note that resources may not be maximised if there is no urgency to clean-up. 
14 Slow release of works can result from a number of factors, such as delays in insurance payments, engineering 
assessments, building owner inaction etc. 
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health standards.  When there was an oversupply of work, contractors were seen to inflate 
lump sum prices.  Generally this latter scenario led to a timely clearance of the city but at a 
higher price.  Contractors wanted to finish the job quickly in order to move on to the next 
project before the contracts dried up again.   
 
Post-disaster cost reimbursement contracts allow the Principal to retain control of the works 
(and arguably costs) while providing low risk, high volume work for Contractors. 
 
Third, project objectives and risks change.  As discussed earlier, because of the community-
wide work scope, the risks no longer only focus at the individual project (micro) level, but 
there are significant community wide (macro) risks to be considered.  That is, if the projects 
are not well managed and controlled then there could be wider community effects including 
business loss, social disruption, public health impacts etc.  In terms of Figure 8-3, because of 
the consequences of project failure, it is more desirable for the risks to be held by the client / 
Principal rather than the contractor.  Therefore, the Principal should hold the maximum 
project control and, subsequently, risk. 
 
Based on all of the above, this indicates that cost reimbursement contracts are the most 
appropriate contracts for post-disaster demolition works because of the change in risk 
context.  In particular, there is a need for project risks and control to be held by an entity 
with responsibility for meeting recovery objectives rather than solely profit.  Interestingly, 
FEMA prohibits cost plus percentage contracts and does not allow time and material 
contracts past the emergency phase.  As discussed in Section 7.3.3 and the previous section, 
operational and funding systems must be designed together. 
 
In Christchurch, demolition contractors reported that they were generally happy with a cost 
reimbursement approach.  However, there were some who insisted on marketing their 
services, on a lump sum tender basis, outside the CERA process to building owners.  The 
lump sum option offers Contractors potentially greater return but at a higher risk.  Also, in 
turn, it creates greater risk to the overall recovery programme, in particular by contractors 
trying to reduce costs; in the Christchurch case this was achieved by salvaging more 
recyclables on-site and slowing the demolitions (see Chapter 9).   
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Cost reimbursement contracts can also reduce incentives for risky behaviour in terms of 
environmental and human health.  This is essentially because under cost reimbursement 
contracts contractors are instructed to carry out specific works and are paid for what they do; 
whereas, under a lump sum contract, there is an incentive for contractors to cut corners for 
economic gain.  The gradual shift to lump sum contracts in Christchurch created an incentive 
for contractors to establish their own debris management sites to try to reduce costs (and 
therefore increase profits).  Subsequently a number of debris management sites emerged 
across the city.  Many of these facilities were not legal and posed potential environmental and 
public health hazards.  There is concern that some contractors have underestimated the costs 
involved in handling the waste and will not be able to pay for the residual waste to be 
disposed and the site to be remediated.  There were also some cases where contractors, 
engaged on a lump sum basis, were working inside a building, stripping out the interior (to 
reduce disposal fees), when significant aftershocks occurred.  The contractors had been 
instructed not to strip-out the building.  Contractors were, evidently, willing to accept higher 
levels of human health and safety risk to gain financially.  There was also concern from the 
public and CERA that some contractors would not handle hazardous materials properly.  In 
particular release of asbestos particles presented a major concern and, indeed, illegal 
dumpsites containing asbestos were found (Greenhill, 2011; Wright, 2011).   
 
As discussed in Section 8.3.5, regardless of the contract type, contracts can be written to 
mitigate potential negative effects and associated monitoring systems designed but the 
increased volume of work may make monitoring difficult.  Therefore, low risk contract types 
should be utilised.   
 
Cost reimbursement contracts reduce incentives for contractors to adopt risky behaviour 
(environmental or human health), particularly in cases where there is a high human and 
environmental health hazard in the waste. 
 
Cost reimbursement contracts can, however, reduce ingenuity, creativity and diversity when 
managing waste.  Lump sum contracts give contractors some latitude to manage waste as 
they see fit.  In Christchurch this freedom led to a number of markets being developed by 
contractors which may not have been found if contractors had been instructed how to 
manage the waste under a time and cost contract.  For example, crushed concrete changed 
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from a cost negative recycled commodity (a $20/T fee to dispose of waste for crushing), to a 
cash positive endeavour ($2/T payment for concrete debris).  Markets for hogged timber 
also emerged. 
 
Cost reimbursement contracts may reduce contractor incentives to independently develop new 
waste management options, including recycling markets. 
 
Management 
There is a perception that, from an administration and management perspective, cost-
reimbursement contracts create more work than lump sum contracts, particularly in terms of 
on-site supervision and contractor payments.  According to Turner and Simister (2001), cost 
savings for administering a lump contract (over cost reimbursement contracts) are only really 
made when the uncertainty of the works is low (see Figure 8-4).  Post-disaster situations, as 
described earlier, hold large uncertainties, such as, waste volume and nature, and complex 
stakeholder issues, etc.  Therefore, it could be inferred that administrative savings made from 
not having to assess payment claims and monitor works, would not be significantly more or 
less than the costs incurred for auditing and quality control on lump sum contracts in this 
high risk environment.  Further research into this would be beneficial. 
 
 
 
Figure 8-4 Administration costs of different contract types relative to the uncertainty of the 
product (or project) (Turner and Simister, 2001) 
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Integrated procurement 
Integrated approaches to procurement (including management oriented contracts, 
collaborative contracts, turnkey, alliances etc.) has been proposed by some authors as a 
potentially suitable approach for post-disaster reconstruction (Le Masurier et al., 2006; Zuo, 
2010).  In line with the arguments presented above, Le Masurier et al. propose that if a 
recovery was attempted as a coordinated programme of work, alliancing would be a possible 
way of managing the degree of uncertainty and complexity.  Le Masurier et al. also stated that 
alliances offer clearer communication systems which are imperative following a disaster.  
Project alliancing is essentially a form of risk sharing between project Principal, Contractor 
and other key stakeholders.  The key aspect of an alliance is that rather than transferring the 
risk to the contractor (which has been established above as undesirable) or taking the entire 
risk under a cost reimbursement contract, alliancing offers a risk share arrangement.  Zuo 
suggests that the appropriate procurement mode will depend on the scale and type of the 
disaster and the control mode (organisational structure) governing the reconstruction. 
 
Following the Christchurch earthquake an alliance was established to manage the repair of 
the damaged local authority owned water and wastewater infrastructure.  It is too early to 
determine how effective the approach was, however, early indications are that the approach 
is fairly effective. 
 
According to Ross (2003) there are eight project characteristics that indicate when risk 
sharing should be practiced and, therefore, alliancing (or other risk sharing procurement 
arrangements) may be appropriate.  These are shown in Table 8.2.  Each project 
characteristic was assessed as unlikely, possible or likely to occur in a post-disaster demolition 
and debris management situation at both a micro (site) and macro (community wide) level.  
It was clear that 1) the project characteristics are very different when assessed at a micro and 
macro level and 2) risk sharing is beneficial at a community level.  
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Table 8.2 Applicability of risk sharing project characteristics in a post-disaster demolition 
project using characteristics from Ross (2003) 
Project characteristic 
Micro  
(individual property 
demolition) 
Macro  
(community wide) 
Numerous complex and/or unpredictable risks Unlikely Likely 
Complex interfaces Possible Likely 
Difficult stakeholder issues Likely Likely 
Complex external threats Unlikely Likely 
Very tight timeframes Likely Likely 
High likelihood of scope changes (eg due to 
technological change, political influence etc) 
Possible Likely 
A need for owner interference or significant value-
adding by the owner during delivery 
Unlikely Likely 
Threats and/or opportunities that can only be 
managed collectively 
Unlikely Likely 
 
Contract conditions 
If a centralised management process is implemented, contract conditions need to be written 
to limit inappropriate behaviour.  The risks associated with cost reimbursement contracts 
discussed above can potentially be mitigated by appropriate contractual measures.  For 
example, contractors could be contractually required to install self-reporting GPS systems in 
their trucks so that anomalies in truck behaviour (for example diverting loads or performing 
work outside of a given task) can be more easily monitored.  This was investigated in 
Christchurch, however various factors hampered these attempts (in particular the fluidity of 
the truck fleet between CERA and privately managed jobs and the concern that requiring 
specific GPS systems might limit the available truck fleet and create a bottleneck). 
 
Contracts conditions can be written to mitigate risks associated with cost reimbursement 
contracts. 
 
Contracts must include waste ownerships issues.  Approaches to waste ownership are likely 
to change between contract types.  As the demolition process matured following the 
Christchurch earthquakes, in May 2011, waste ownership issues were written into the 
demolition contracts.  The different contract types (cost reimbursement and lump sum) 
required different approaches to waste ownership.  For cost reimbursement contracts, the 
170  Disaster waste management: a systems approach 
  Charlotte Brown 
 
 
waste was essentially owned by CERA.  CERA assumed the risk and the responsibility for 
ensuring appropriate management of all the waste components.  Under the lump sum 
contracts however, the ownership of the waste, and therefore any profits gained from the 
waste, belonged to the contractor (unless some or part of the waste was excluded in the 
contract documents).  Thus, there was much less control on management of any personal 
items that were found during the demolition process for lump sum projects.  For example 
there were several media reports of the improper salvage of personal belongings from 
Community House in Christchurch (NZPA, 2011a; Van Beyen, 2011a; Van Beyen, 2011b).  
It is likely, though unconfirmed, that this was as a result of a lump sum contract. 
 
With the high tangible and intangible value associated with contents of disaster damaged 
goods (personal value, value to business continuity, confidentiality issues), waste ownership is 
an important consideration.  Cost reimbursement contracts have a significant advantage in 
that there is greater clarity around ownership of any valuable personal items recovered.   
 
Legal issues regarding waste ownership are discussed in detail in Section 11.3.3. 
 
Waste ownership needs to be appropriately incorporated into contracts.  Waste ownership will 
be different depending on contract type.   
 
8.3.5 Operational management principles 
Contractor selection 
In a post-disaster situation, peace-time procurement policies can be expedited to facilitate 
aspects of the recovery.  In Christchurch, post-earthquake, a number of contracts and 
appointments were awarded without following standard peace-time procurement procedures.  
Included in the appointments of concern was the selection of contractors to operate the 
Burwood Resource Recovery Park (BRRP) facility without a tendering process (Gorman, 
2011).  There was no contract for the operations (that is, it was run as an independent 
operation and no guarantee of business was given), however the contractor were given a low 
cost lease of the recovery park land on the provision that a resource recovery park would be 
established.  Regardless of the legal particulars, there was discontentment by some 
contractors, the public and Christchurch City Councillors, that, certain companies had been 
given the opportunity to make a profit from the venture.   
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In the author’s opinion, there are several reasons that ameliorate the decision not to tender 
this particular contract.  First, a facility was urgently needed post-earthquake to take waste 
from the city centre during search and rescue operations.  In addition, a secure area was 
necessary to take building materials that may have been required for coronial or other 
investigations.  The urgency did not allow for a tender process to be carried out.  Second, the 
waste industry is small in New Zealand and the main contractor selected was arguably the 
only company with sufficient expertise and financial means to establish and operate a facility 
of this scale and risk.  The level of risks involved are illustrated by the fact that two of the 
original joint venture partners withdrew from the project because the financial risks were too 
great (Williams, 2011c).  In addition, local and regional authorities eventually agreed to 
manage the facility under a public private partnership (the same partnership that operates the 
regional landfill) (Heather, 2011) so that the risks of the project would be shared.   
 
Given waste was largely being stockpiled at BRRP for the first 12 months, in hindsight it 
may have been possible to engage the contractors on a temporary basis before a formal 
tender process could be carried out for the long term operation.   
 
When appointing contractors quickly in uncertain environments (such as in a post-disaster 
scenario), risk management is very important.  With limited time to act, there is little time to 
gather information on potential unknown contractors.  Engaging contractors with proven 
work records and commercial reputation to uphold is a method of managing the potential 
risks.  Engaging contractors where there is already a working relationship, again reduces the 
project risk.  If unknown operators were appointed, even at a ‘lower cost’, the potential 
negative (economic as well as environmental and social) effects of an unknown entity may 
outweigh the projected savings.  Zuo (2010) also identifies the importance of utilising 
existing relationships in his study of post-disaster procurement processes. 
 
Because debris management activities transition from the response to the recovery phase of 
disaster management (see Section 6.3.3), different procurement approaches are likely needed 
for each phase.  For example, those contracts that commence during the emergency phase 
may need to be time limited such that longer term contracts can be appropriately and 
transparently let. 
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Generally procurement procedures will be legislated and/or regulated.  Therefore 
appropriate provisions to enable expedient procurement processes must be in place (see 
Section 11.3.3).  Note, that if diversions from peace-time procurement procedures are to be 
considered, the potential for corruption must be managed15.  For example, if contracts are 
awarded without standard procurement procedures, it is important to document the reasons 
for the decisions for future auditing.   
 
Transparent post-disaster procurement policies need to be established. 
 
Where possible, contracts let during the emergency phase should be time limited to allow for 
full procurement procedures to be followed for long term operations. 
 
Cash-flow 
Cash-flow was identified, in both the Christchurch earthquake and Victorian Bushfire case 
studies, as an issue for many contractors participating in recovery works.  Under the CERA-
managed commercial demolition programme, a process was established several months into 
the recovery effort whereby contractors were paid directly from a revolving credit provided 
by the government.  The contractor would charge CERA, the Government would pay and 
the costs would then be recovered from the property owner (who would generally be 
claiming the money from their insurer).  This ensured that contractors could continue 
operating without waiting for lengthy insurance claim settlement delays. 
 
One of the benefits of the cost reimbursement contracts in Christchurch was that the 
contractor did not receive the invoice for the disposal fees.  The dedicated disposal facilities 
would charge CERA directly.  This reduced one link in the payment chain, meaning 
payments could be made within a month of invoice.  For lump sum contracts the contractors 
would theoretically have to pay for the waste disposal costs until invoices were paid by 
CERA.  However, in some cases the disposal fees were too high for contractors to do this.  
In this case, payments to disposal facilities would have been delayed by a further one to two 
months.   
                                                 
15 In L’Aquila, there were allegations that contracts for construction of temporary housing units were awarded 
to contractors for reasons other than capability and price. 
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Similar concerns, regarding cash-flow, were expressed by the public in Christchurch.  There 
were some complaints that, despite being able to claim reimbursement from their insurers, 
that disposal costs for debris were too high.  Immediately post-earthquake, particularly where 
livelihoods had been affected, immediate cash-flow was a concern for residents and they 
sometimes could not afford to pay waste management fees, even in the short term.  Where 
possible, it would be beneficial to investigate the possibility of directly charging the funding 
‘source’ (as for the contractors above).  This would relieve pressure on affected persons and, 
in turn, reduce the potential for improper waste disposal.  
 
Regardless of the procurement strategy (and funding mechanism) contractor cash-flow must be 
facilitated to ensure recovery works can continue. 
 
Cost reimbursement contracts can simplify payment chains as service providers can directly 
charge the Principal (rather than the subcontractor). 
 
Human resourcing 
The success of a disaster waste system is highly dependent on the skills and effectiveness of 
the people involved in the strategic management (see Chapter 6) and the operations.  Thus, 
the operational systems discussed in this chapter must be considered in light of the human 
resources available (quality and quantity). 
 
The first and most important realisation is that demand is likely to outstrip supply of 
qualified resources16.  Consequently, personnel and organisations who do not have 
demolition and waste management skills will almost certainly emerge.  For example, the 
contractor managing the Bushfire response in Victoria was a construction contractor with no 
demolition experience;; in L’Aquila the majority of the demolition was carried out by Army 
and Fire personnel; and several waste handling facilities were established after the 
Christchurch earthquake by organisations who have never operated waste management 
facilities before.  The US is perhaps an exception to this rule, where there is a growing 
                                                 
16 Human resource constraints are likely but not inevitable.  For example, resource limitations may not 
eventuate if there are delays in demolition or recovery decision-making, such as, slow insurance settlements, 
heritage building approvals, and building owner issues. 
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industry of disaster debris management specialist contractors around the country which can 
be mobilised quickly (Fickes, 2010).  It should be noted that, despite this, the scale of 
Hurricane Katrina generated resource shortages. 
 
A lesser skilled workforce is likely to be less effective at management of human health and 
environmental risks, as well as maintaining work programmes (Lawther, 2009).  The 
increased operational control offered by both the centralised control and cost reimbursement 
type contracts would help to manage the increased risks associated with a less skilled 
workforce.  Following the Christchurch earthquake a tiered contractor accreditation process 
was implemented.  Contractors were accredited to carry out certain activities to ensure 
unqualified contractors were not allocated works outside their abilities.  This seemed to be an 
effective way of managing the risk for the expanded workforce.   
 
Legislative and regulatory provisions that can limit (or increase) human resource availability 
are the waste classification processes (if any) and the operational personal certification 
requirements.  These are discussed in Sections 10.3.1 and 11.3.3. 
 
The work force is likely to be less skilled and operational strategies which increase control of 
operations (such as centralised management and cost reimbursement contracts) are beneficial. 
 
There were two notable comments from communities and experts from three of the five 
case studies about the demolition and debris management programmes: 1) there was a 
resentment of the use of non-local labour; and 2) communities and individuals wanted the 
opportunity to physically participate in the recovery.  Some communities and experts have 
expressed concerns over the quality (in particular with respect to environmental and public 
health outcomes) of the waste management works by outside contractors.  Allen (2007) cites 
the lack of local knowledge and lack of care for long term impacts of debris management 
activities by non-local contractors as a concern.  In addition, where non-local contractors are 
brought in, jobs and the associated economic benefits are perceived as being taken away 
from the affected area (as observed following the Victorian Bushfires, the Christchurch 
earthquake (with respect to hiring of insurance loss adjustors), and as observed by Haas et al. 
(1977)).  However, it must also be noted that using non-local contractors stimulates other 
areas of the economy, particularly hospitality (accommodation and food).  Some authors and 
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community members interviewed identified adverse psychological effects from not directly 
participating in their own recovery (as observed following the Victorian Bushfires and 
Hurricane Katrina (Denhart, 2009)).   
 
When considering use of local unskilled labour and volunteers, authorities must consider the 
desired quality of outcome and how risks will be managed.  Poorly supervised or informed 
volunteers can inadvertently cause additional distress to community members.  Overzealous 
volunteers following the 1995 Kobe earthquake, for example, reportedly led to a significant 
loss of personal property during debris removal (Atsumi and Yamori, 2008).  Figure 8-5 
shows community members participating in some mangrove clean-up activities in Samoa. 
 
Use of unskilled local labour is constrained by some of the disaster and disaster waste 
impacts (as discussed below and summarised in Table 8.3).  First, public participation is 
constrained by the level of human health risks workers may be exposed to.  For example, 
many people volunteering their services following the 2001 World Trade Centre collapse 
were turned away due to the potential risks and specialist skills required to work on a crime 
scene holding human remains.  Even those skilled in emergency and demolition works have 
since reported significant health impacts (Landrigan et al., 2004).  Many volunteers reported 
they were left feeling frustrated that they were not allowed to help (Phillips, 2009).   
 
Where volunteers or local labourer are used, legislative provisions around liability (for effects 
caused by and effects on the volunteer or labourer) need to be considered (see Section 
11.3.3). 
 
Where there are significant human health hazards, public participation should not be called 
on. 
 
Second, public participation is also limited by how difficult the waste is to handle.  As was 
observed following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, communities were generally unable to 
contribute to the clean-up effort due to the weight of the collapsed masonry structures which 
required heavy machinery to move (Booth, 2010).  A review of the response in Kobe, Beirut, 
Lebanon and Mostar also identified the need for heavy machinery as a constraint in the 
selection of waste management options (Lauritzen, 1998). 
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When waste is difficult to handle and when specialist waste handling equipment is required 
public participation cannot be relied upon. 
 
Third, and conversely, there is not always a desire by the public to participate.  As Cook 
(2009) observed following Hurricane Katrina, the large displacement of people meant that 
the usual expectation for residents to participate in the clean-up was not feasible.  Lawther 
(2009) observed indifference in the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami in the Maldives where 
locals were unwilling to participate either due to private recovery / livelihood efforts or 
dissatisfaction with proposed pay-rates.  Following Hurricane Katrina and the Samoan 
tsunami, some community members did not want to participate in the clean-up because they 
were afraid of finding human remains in the debris.   
 
Reliance on private property owners to manage waste should be avoided when there are a high 
number of displaced persons or where it is anticipated that there is not a strong desire to 
participate. 
 
Despite these constraints, operational strategies need to be sensitive to a community’s needs.  
In particular, residents have a desire to salvage personal property and access their properties 
in general.  As Esworthy et al. (2006) note, public health protection must be balanced with 
allowing the public to access homes and businesses. 
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Table 8.3 Indicators for determining the feasibility of public participation in clean-up works 
 Disaster & disaster waste indicators 
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Figure 8-5 Community members participate in a Conservation International sponsored 
mangrove clean-up following the 2009 Samoan Tsunami. (Photo date: April 2010.) 
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8.4 Summary 
As the case studies have shown, the suitability of operational management strategies is highly 
dependent on many contextual (in particular funding and legal) constraints and the disaster 
impacts.  Many of the case studies discussed here significantly altered established approaches 
to disaster response because existing systems were not seen as appropriate for the scale and 
impact of the event.  Disaster waste managers need to have flexible plans in order to 
determine the most suitable implementation strategies specific to that event.  Generally 
operational management structures can be divided into individual or centrally managed 
systems.   
 
As the impacts of a disaster increases, greater control of operations is needed.  In particular, 
where the following impacts are present, centralised operational management systems should 
be considered: high disaster scale, high number of displaced persons, high disruption to the 
road network, medium to high environmental and human health hazards, medium to high 
movement of the waste (across property boundaries) and high difficulty in handling the 
waste.  When these impacts are present, centralised, controlled approaches will help to offset 
the potential negative effects on the recovery through slow or inappropriate demolition and 
waste management.  Centralised management processes should also include waste handling 
facilities.  This enables forward planning, better quality assurance, and is arguably more cost 
and time effective.  Use of local labour, has many positive environmental, economic and 
social effects on the affected community. 
 
In terms of procurement, in the author’s opinion, operational risks during a recovery process 
should be held by persons or authority with the overall recovery in mind, such as the 
designated recovery authority.  The collective (community-wide) risk of failure of the 
demolition programme, community-wide, is far greater than the risks considered by a series 
of independent contractors planning their own operations.  In the absence of an integrated 
management procurement structure, time and cost contracts remove the majority of risk 
from the contractors and places it with the authority / organisation managing the demolition.   
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9. Post-disaster reuse and recycling 
9.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Section 1.5.2, recycling post-disaster has not been systematically researched.  
Many authors describe recycling as a necessary part of disaster waste management; however, 
few have critically analysed the opportunities and constraints of recycling in a post-disaster 
situation, and how recycling can best be achieved.  For example, why and how did waste 
managers achieve a 95% reuse and recycling rate following the 2000 Cerro Grande Wildfire 
in New Mexico (USEPA, 2008), whereas, in Louisiana, following Hurricane Katrina, the 
primary management option was landfilling? 
 
Despite environmental benefits, in peace-time recycling is generally only carried out if it is 
the most economically favourable option.  Figure 9-1 is a diagrammatic representation of the 
economics of recycling.  From an economic point of view the feasibility is dependent on: the 
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cost of waste disposal (including transportation), and the value of the recycle materials 
(including transportation) (which in turn is dependent on the usability of the product and the 
cost of raw materials).  Incentives are sometimes provided to ensure the economics of 
recycling are favourable (such that the environmental benefits are realised). 
 
 
Figure 9-1 Costs of demolition without recycling (I) and with recycling (II) where A: amount of 
natural materials and transportation; B: amount of transportation and disposal of 
waste materials; X: amount of recycled materials. (Lauritzen, 1998) 
 
Post-disaster, the equation is largely the same.  However, how does an increased volume of 
waste and a post-disaster environment alter the feasibility and desirability of recycling? 
 
The mechanism for post-disaster recycling also needs to be considered.  Recycling can either 
be carried out at the waste source site (for example, the demolition site) or it can be 
transported mixed to a waste handling facility.  In peace-time the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of each method are reasonably well known, see Table 9.1.  The relative merits 
of each method have not, however, been assessed post-disaster. 
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Table 9.1 Advantages and disadvantages of source and co-mingled separation (Department of 
Labour, 2011)(reformatted) 
Recycling 
Method 
Advantages  Disadvantages  
Source Separation   Higher recycling rates 
 Lower recycling costs; revenues paid for 
some materials  
 Often a cleaner, safer worksite 
 Multiple containers on site 
 Workers must separate materials for 
recycling  
 More complex logistics  
 Multiple markets; more information to 
manage 
Co-mingled 
Recycling 
 Only one or two containers onsite  
 No need for workers to separate 
materials for recycling 
 Easier logistics  
 One market; less information to manage 
 Lower recycling rates 
 Higher recycling costs  
 
The aim in this chapter is to answer, in qualitative terms, the following: 
 What are the drivers and barriers to recycling post-disaster? 
 How should recycling be integrated into the recovery works? 
 
9.2 Case studies 
9.2.1 2009 Victorian Bushfires 
Initially no provision or requirement for recycling was made by either the managing 
contractor or environmental authorities.  However, as part of business best practice and in 
order to reduce costs of demolition, the contractor instigated a recycling programme.  The 
proceeds from the recycling were donated to the community and bushfire recovery funds.  
Recycling did not appear to significantly affect the demolition activities.  Figure 9-2 shows 
metal being removed from a bushfire affected property. 
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Figure 9-2 Contractors remove metal separated from bushfire waste following the 2009 Victorian 
Bushfires. (Photo date: March 2010.) 
9.2.2 2009 Samoan Tsunami 
Efforts to recycle in Samoa, following the tsunami, were mixed between agencies and clean-
up projects.  Some recycling was carried out at source and some recycling was carried out at 
the disposal site by informal scavenging.  In peace-time, Samoans actively recycle, therefore it 
was natural aspect of the recovery.   
 
9.2.3 2009 L’Aquila earthquake 
Early in the recovery process, the Department of Civil Protection decided that the debris 
would be recycled.  It is unknown why this decision was made.  There is a law regarding local 
authorities responsibilities to increase recycling rates (Ministerial Decree 11.4.2007), however 
there is currently no legislated target for recycling. 
 
The desire to recycle, however, was not well supported by the operational plan and legal 
framework.  Initially waste was taken mixed to a waste handling facility (temporary staging 
areas) to be sorted.  The limited available staging areas were soon full as authorities struggled 
to find temporary staging areas and end-use markets for the predominantly aggregate 
material.  Markets considered by authorities included aggregates for quarry remediation, and 
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recycled aggregate for engineering applications.  Perhaps as a result, a decision was made to 
separate waste at source.  This contributed to a reduction in the speed of demolition and 
debris removal from an estimated 600 tonnes/day to 100-200 tonnes/day. 
 
9.2.4 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
Initially, recycling was not included as a priority for emergency and early recovery phase 
works in Louisiana.  Two months after the hurricane, recycling was identified as a priority to 
minimise waste going to landfill.  Despite this intent, the majority of waste was taken mixed 
to low cost Construction and Demolition landfills (with expanded post-disaster waste 
acceptance criteria).  There were several reasons cited for this: 
 
 Time constraints on contractors (Roper, 2008; Ardani et al., 2009) / recycling was 
believed to be unreasonably slow (GAO, 2008) 
 Mixed nature of the waste (Esworthy et al., 2006; Roper, 2008). 
 Presence of formosan termites (Roper, 2008). 
 Presence of asbestos. 
 Flood damage to gypsum (Roper, 2008). 
 Limited number of temporary staging sites (LDEQ, 2006b). 
 Cheap disposal fees (Roper, 2008) due to high competition between private landfills. 
 Higher (than landfilling options) transportation time and fossil fuel use (GAO, 2008) 
 Large geographical collection area (loss of economies of scale) (Roper, 2008). 
 Possible disruption and/or capacity of local or regional recycling industry and/or 
funds to purchase capital equipment (Ardani et al., 2009). 
 Lack of capital equipment or operating space to recycle (Ardani et al., 2009). 
 Lack of assured income from tipping fees or from electricity sales (waste to energy 
technology) (Ardani et al., 2009). 
 Lack of contract specific requirements for recycling (Roper, 2008). 
 Contract payment methods (e.g. payment per load to staging area or landfill) (Ardani 
et al., 2009). 
 Lack of education / awareness of recycling options (Roper, 2008; Yepsen, 2008). 
 Extended ‘crisis’ mentality leading to inertia in establishment of recycling facilities 
(Ardani et al., 2009). 
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 Directives mandating either transport of vegetative debris from processing sites to 
landfills or air curtain incinerators (Ardani et al., 2009). 
 Lack of a plan and/or means to implement recycling opportunities identified in the 
plan (Ardani et al., 2009). 
 Absence of residents to carry out initial waste separation (Cook, 2009). 
 
There seemed to be a disconnect between the stated intent to recycle and the practicalities of 
achieving this goal.  The systems and facilities were not put in place to ensure the recycling 
objectives were met (see Section 6.2.4).  Conversely, the objectives did not consider the 
realities of the situation. 
 
9.2.5 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
Recycling was included in the debris management plan for many reasons:  
 To reduce waste going to landfill and therefore disposal costs17  
 To avoid bottlenecks in the transportation of waste to Christchurch’s regional 
landfill. 
 To optimise cost recovery and the environmental benefit of beneficial reuse and 
recycling. 
 To maintain Christchurch’s ‘green image’. 
 
Recycling, in peace-time, is generally feasible due to the high disposal costs in Christchurch 
and several regulatory provisions (the Christchurch City Cleanfill Bylaw and the Waste 
Minimisation Act).  The economic feasibility of recycling concrete for reuse (e.g. in roads and 
construction) is marginal however, due to the ample and low cost supply of raw aggregate in 
Christchurch.   
 
Post-earthquake, the free disposal of aggregate at Lyttelton Port, initially further reduced the 
economic feasibility of traditional aggregate / concrete recycling.  However, it is interesting 
to note that within a year of the earthquake, the crushed concrete re-sale market had changed 
                                                 
17 Waste disposal at Christchurch’s regional landfill is, generally, the most expensive waste management option.  
This is partly due to the distance of the landfill from Christchurch (130km return) and the requirement to use 
specialist trucks (requiring double handling between demolition trucks and closed landfill trucks). 
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from a cost negative ($20/T disposal fee for waste concrete) to a cost positive ($2/T 
payment for receipt of waste concrete).  It is unknown whether other recycling markets 
improved or reduced during the clean-up. 
 
Initially, no on-site separation was carried out post-earthquake.  All mixed waste was taken to 
Burwood Resource Recovery Park (BRRP) or other mixed waste facility for separation.  
Following completion of search and rescue type activities, a ‘quick pick and go’ demolition 
model was established.  This enabled ‘clean’ debris that could be easily and quickly removed 
from the buildings to be directed straight to end-use market while the remaining mixed waste 
could be sent to BRRP or other for separation, processing, recycling and onward disposal.  
The aim of this approach was to maximise speed of demolition but also to balance costs and 
environmental impacts.  Full building internal strip-outs (as is practiced in peace-time) were 
often not possible due to the continuing aftershocks and subsequent danger to workers, 
therefore waste often included building contents and fittings.  It was acknowledged that the 
‘quick pick and go’ approach would likely be marginally more expensive on a site by site basis 
but the economic benefits of the faster recovery for the community would outweigh the 
additional costs.  As the recovery progressed, the buildings being demolished became more 
stable, lump sum contracts (see Section 8.2.5) were issued, and more and more recycling 
(including full internal strip-outs) was carried out on site. 
 
Waste from major building repairs, infrastructure, detritus and reconstruction were / are 
being largely handled in line with peace-time regulations and approaches.  That is, recycling is 
being carried out where economically feasible. 
 
9.3 Discussion 
9.3.1 Feasibility of post-disaster recycling 
The drivers for, and barriers against, recycling in peace-time are well acknowledged.  
Generally the drivers stem from a desire to reduce costs, reduce the demand for raw 
resources, reduce a community’s environmental footprints, to meet government policies and 
take advantage of recycling incentives.  The barriers generally arise from: high collection, 
separation, disposal, and transportation costs; the absence of viable recycling markets; the 
availability of low-cost raw materials; and high carbon emissions from recycling processes. 
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This discussion is going to focus on the drivers and barriers which are specific to the post-
disaster situation. 
 
Using the disaster & disaster waste impacts developed in Chapter 4 the major ‘driver’ for 
recycling identified by the author is the volume of waste.  Other disaster & disaster waste 
impacts which indicate where recycling may not be feasible include: the geographical extent; 
the human health hazard; and the difficulty handling the waste.  These are discussed below 
and summarised in Table 9.2. 
 
The desire to recycle disaster waste is likely to increase as the volume of waste increases.  
This is particularly true if the capacity of alternative waste management options such as 
landfilling and incineration are insufficient to handle the waste.  In Japan, following the 2011 
tsunami, the limited land area and peace-time reliance on incinerators (with limited capacity) 
have made recycling an imperative part of the recovery effort. 
 
As the volume of waste increases, the need to recycle will generally increase. 
 
As the volume of waste increases, however, the economic feasibility of recycling is likely to 
decrease.  Peace-time reuse and recycle markets will quickly become flooded with the huge 
amounts of recyclables potentially generated, which will decrease the value of the items / 
materials.  For example: what is Christchurch or New Zealand going to do with 10,000 
second hand toilets?  New markets may emerge because of improved economies of scale; 
however, the author believes that new markets are unlikely as the short duration of the waste 
supply will counter the economies of scale benefits, especially for operations with high 
capital investment.  One option would be to store the large waste volumes for later recycling 
(at a more sustainable rate).  However, this requires significant storage areas.  A medium 
term storage option is currently being investigated in Christchurch for treated timber.  The 
treated timber is being disposed of in a separate site for later mining if a suitable and 
economically beneficial use for the timber is developed (for example, waste to energy).  
 
As the volume of waste increases, the economic viability of recycling will likely decrease. 
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Recycling is generally more labour intensive than other waste management options. 
Consequently, as the volume of waste increases, the demand on labour resources will 
increase.  In a resource constrained post-disaster environment, this could create delays and 
therefore may limit the feasibility of recycling.  Availability of sufficient plant, equipment and 
space, similarly, will also constrain a community’s ability to recycle post-disaster. 
 
As the volume of waste increases, resource shortages (plant, personnel and processing facilities) 
are likely to limit recycling capacities. 
 
As the geographical extent of the damage increases, the economies of scale are likely to 
decrease (for a constant volume).  Transportation distances to recycling processing facilities 
and the recycling markets themselves will increase and will reduce the feasibility.   
 
As the geographical extent of damage increases, the feasibility of recycling likely decreases. 
 
The economics of recycling will also depend on the geographical isolation of the affected 
community.  In a small and isolated community like Samoa or New Zealand, there are 
unlikely to be large recycling markets (compared to, say, Europe).  Constraints arising from 
geographic isolation are likely to be reflected in peace-time recycling practices, so for the 
purposes of this thesis they are not considered a disaster specific consideration. 
 
Geographical isolation will decrease likelihood of post-disaster recycling being feasible. 
 
If the waste presents a human health hazard the feasibility of waste separation / recycling 
decreases.  In particular, if there is a chemical hazard it may become too difficult, too 
expensive or even impossible to separate the recyclables and non-recyclables.   
 
As the human health hazard increases, the feasibility of recycling decreases. 
 
Highly mixed wastes can be costly to separate.  Poorly separated wastes in turn can reduce 
the value of the recycled product.  Given the volume and speed at which the waste is being 
dealt with post-disaster, impurities are highly likely.  The hurricane and flooding damage 
caused by Hurricane Katrina meant that wastes were often mixed beyond the point where 
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separation was practical (Esworthy et al., 2006).  Much of the material was also damaged 
beyond the point of being able to recycle it (e.g. flood damaged gypsum) (Roper, 2008).  The 
collapsed buildings in Christchurch meant that building contents (personal property, 
putrescible wastes, electronic goods, furnishings etc.) were mixed with the construction and 
demolition wastes and this made separation difficult, time consuming and potentially 
hazardous.  All these factors tend to have a negative effect on recycling. 
 
The more mixed the waste is (the more difficult it is to handle), the less feasible recycling is. 
 
Table 9.2  Indicators for recycling feasibility 
 Disaster & disaster waste indicators 
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Post-disaster market challenges 
As discussed in Section 7.3.3 price escalation is a common phenomenon in disaster 
responses.  The subsequent and inevitable increases in labour and service costs post-disaster 
coupled with the likely drop in recycled product market demand and value (as described 
above), severely affects the economic feasibility of recycling.  Compounding that, there are 
some cases where the disposal costs also dropped, such as in the highly competitive C&D 
landfill market in Louisiana.  The low disposal costs in Louisiana made recycling less tenable.  
In contrast, the regulated landfill in Christchurch ensured disposal costs remained constant 
and recycling largely remained viable.   
 
If recycling is a desired part of the waste management strategy, but is less feasible than other 
options, authorities could use legislative or regulatory provisions to ensure recycling is a 
viable option (see Section 11.3.3). 
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Recycling, as in peace-time, is dependent on the availability and relative costs of alternative 
waste management options. 
 
Further research into the challenges of post-disaster recycling market fluctuations would be 
beneficial.   
 
Funding 
The policies around debris and demolition management funding often dictate which waste 
management options have to be taken, including the level of recycling.  In general, as stated 
in Section 7.3.3, policies stipulate the lowest (direct) cost option should be taken.  Additional 
direct costs for a more environmentally sustainable option (such as recycling) are harder to 
justify when private funding systems are in place (such that individuals essentially take the 
additional costs for wider community benefits).  If there is a private funding, one option 
could be for the local, regional or national authorities to accept the responsibility of paying a 
‘disaster premium’ – the value between the lowest cost to the individual and the cost of the 
option most beneficial to the wider community.   
 
Stringent reporting and monitoring requirements, required by funding providers, have also 
reduced the viability of recycling options in the past.  Following the 2003 Cedar and Paradise 
Firestorm, San Diego County elected to used recycling to conserve landfill space.  However, 
the waste monitoring systems at the recycling facilities did not meet FEMA’s funding 
eligibility requirements.  Therefore, the County did not receive reimbursement (County of 
San Diego, 2005). 
 
Generally, it would be beneficial to have funding mechanisms that consider indirect as well 
as direct costs, such that options like recycling are not inadvertently ruled out.  
 
Funding mechanism policies need to consider indirect costs (as environmentally beneficial 
options such as recycling are not always the least expensive option). 
 
Public perception 
Last, an important consideration is the public acceptance of and desire for recycling.  
According to Ardani et al. (2009) communities in Louisiana were in favour of recycling.  
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Following the Christchurch earthquake, residents were reportedly disappointed that there 
was limited recycling: particularly in response to the disposal of native timbers and the 
consenting of the land reclamation at Lyttelton Port (in place of concrete recycling).  Some 
residents in the residential red-zone were disappointed that they were unable to relocate their 
houses due to restrictive building covenants on new subdivisions.  In contrast, one 
community member in L’Aquila felt it was wrong to recycle and reuse rubble that ‘had killed 
people’ to rebuild the city.   
 
Public perception towards recycling should be assessed and considered during the decision-
making process. 
 
9.3.2 Post-disaster recycling strategies 
After determining whether recycling is feasible / desirable, it is necessary to assess how 
recycling strategies should be implemented.  As discussed in Section 9.1, primarily this is the 
decision to either recycle onsite or offsite.  The following factors should be considered: 
 
Time constraints 
As discussed in Section 5.2.4 the speed of recovery is often a key recovery objective.  The 
urgency to clean-up is not a total barrier to recycling but it does affect how recycling can be 
implemented.  In terms of demolition and debris management, ‘the speed of recovery’ 
essentially translates to ‘the time taken to clear the site’ (as opposed to completely managing 
the waste).  Site separation can typically take upwards of two times longer than straight 
demolition, depending on the level of recycling achieved.  Therefore, if there are time 
constraints, an offsite recycling model may be the most effective approach.  After the 2010 
September earthquake in Christchurch, Manchester Courts was an example of where site 
separation was practiced and the community became disgruntled over the extended 
demolition time and resultant economic impacts on neighbouring businesses (Sachdeva, 
2010).  In L’Aquila the decision to move from offsite to onsite waste separation slowed the 
debris removal rate from 600 tonnes/day to 100-200 tonnes/day.   
 
Offsite separation reduces the time required onsite to demolish structures. 
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Costs 
Offsite separation, as noted in Table 9.1, can increase the waste management costs.  It is 
acknowledged that collection of mixed wastes and the use of waste handling facilities (such 
as temporary staging areas) increases the cost of waste management systems (FEMA, 2007).  
In addition, with less material likely being recycled, there will be reduced recycling revenues 
and potentially (depending on the context) higher disposal costs.  In Christchurch, where 
disposal costs are particularly high, it was initially estimated that offsite recycling would 
increase the demolition and debris management costs by approximately 15%.   
 
Therefore, in general, direct costs are likely to increase as site separation reduces, however 
the time to demolish will decrease and therefore indirect costs (such as business losses) will 
reduce (as discussed in Section 5.2.4).  Direct costs of offsite separation may reduce if labour 
costs increase significantly and/or offsite separation costs reduce (say, for example, through 
advanced labour-free technology). 
 
Offsite separation increases the direct costs but likely reduces the indirect costs. 
 
In order for separation offsite to be more feasible (than onsite separation) the net cost of 
transport to the resource recovery park, sale of processed materials, and disposal of residuals, 
needs to be comparable to onsite net costs.  If the resource facility is close to the affected 
area and the facility is large (that is, there will be economies of scale) this is possible.  
Burwood Resource Recovery Park in Christchurch met these criteria, however the large 
number of demolition contractors working independently affected the feasibility of this 
model.  The demolition contractors were only interested in maximising profits for the 
demolition works: generally, maximising revenue from recyclables and minimising residual 
disposal costs.  Many contractors established independent waste management sites to achieve 
their own financial objectives (legal and illegal) so the possible economies of scale at the 
Burwood Resource Recovery Park were not fully realised.  As a result, the offsite sorting 
costs were higher than necessary, more onsite recycling was carried out and the demolition 
times increased. 
 
Offsite separation costs can be comparable to onsite separation costs where the recovery facility 
(facilities) is close to the affected area and economies of scale can be realised.  
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Resource availability 
The feasibility of offsite separation is of course dependent on an available waste handling 
facility or facilities close to the affected area. 
 
Offsite separation is dependent on access to a suitable waste handling facility, relatively close to 
the affected area. 
 
The feasibility of site separation is dependent on the availability of demolition resources (e.g. 
equipment and trained personnel).  As discussed in Section 8.3.4, if buildings are continually 
identified and released for demolition (by authorities or insurance companies) then resources 
should theoretically be maximised.  Therefore, contractors are able to work quickly on site 
and move to the next site to reduce the overall recovery time.  However, if works are not 
released quickly and there are ample contractors, there is more time to carry out onsite 
recycling.   
 
Site separation is more feasible when there are more demolition resources available. 
 
A fast demolition or debris management programme due to offsite separation, may introduce 
resource bottlenecks.  For example, there may be insufficient trucks to transport the waste to 
the offsite facility, as feared (but not realised) in Christchurch.  There could also be 
bottlenecks on roads or at waste handling facilities.   
 
Offsite separation may create resource bottlenecks due to the fast demolition, such as: 
contractor availability, truck availability and waste handling facility capacity. 
 
Disaster and disaster waste impacts 
A number of disaster and disaster waste impacts will influence whether recycling is feasible 
or not.  These are discussed below and summarised in Table 9.3. 
 
Generally if the waste is very mixed (but separation is generally feasible, see Section 9.3.1), 
site separation may be more costly and time consuming than offsite separation.  Offsite 
separation may be more feasible, particularly where mechanical equipment is necessary to 
separate the wastes efficiently. 
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Generally, the more mixed the waste (difficulty in handling), the less likely site separation is 
feasible. 
 
While chemical hazards make it almost impossible to recycle, physical hazards (e.g risk of fall 
or collapse) generally indicate that offsite separation should be used.  For example, 
demolition of buildings in Christchurch initially had to be carried out without internal strip-
outs due to their risk of collapse.  This made the wastes very mixed and onsite material 
separation, less feasible. 
 
In addition, as described in Section 5.3, environmental and human health hazards are also 
likely to need to be cleared quickly to manage the risks.  This, in turn, makes site separation 
less desirable.  Hazards with a high potential for human health hazards such as tsunami and 
flood events (see Table 4.7), therefore, are less likely to be able to be site separated.  
 
Offsite separation is appropriate where (physical) human health hazards exist. 
 
Separation off-site at temporary staging areas, potentially exposes workers at the temporary 
separation sites to greater levels of hazards (both physical and chemical) as they have less 
control over what materials they receive.  The risk to the environment is also higher.  
Mitigation measures, however, can be put in place to minimise exposure to potential risks 
more easily at a limited number of disposal sites as opposed to hundreds or thousands of 
individual demolition and debris management sites.  On-site separation exposes the 
community around the demolition and debris management sites to greater risks and 
potentially exposes a greater number of workers to hazards within the waste.   
 
Human and environmental health hazards can be better managed by off-site waste separation. 
 
In the US, public participation is relied upon to carry out source separation of wastes (for 
private property detritus removal).  The absence of residents to carry out initial waste 
separation following Hurricane Katrina, significantly affected the ability and feasibility of 
waste contractors to source separate (separate on-site) materials for kerbside collection 
(Cook, 2009).   
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The ability to rely on public participation for site separation (on residential properties), 
decreases as the number of displaced persons increases. 
 
Conversely, onsite separation becomes more feasible when there is a large displacement of 
people because there are fewer space and vehicle movement constraints.  Note that this only 
applies if contractors (not residents) are doing the separation.  It should also be noted that 
contractor separation on-site will take more time which will prevent people returning for 
longer (see Section 5.3). 
 
The ability for contractors to site separate waste (on residential properties) increases as the 
number of displaced persons increases. 
 
If the road network has been heavily affected, authorities will likely want to rationalise truck 
movements – in both quantity and routes taken.  Separation offsite would limit the 
destinations for waste coming from the site to designated waste separation areas.  Separation 
onsite, on the other-hand, would mean trucks would be travelling to multiple destinations (to 
recyclable end-markets).  The number of trucks may be slightly higher for sites relying on 
offsite separation due to the bulkiness of the waste leaving the site. 
 
Separation offsite will allow for greater consolidation of truck movements if there is significant 
disruption to the road network.  
 
Table 9.3  Indicators for recycling strategy 
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Environmental effects 
From an environmental point of view, increased site separation increases the amount of 
material salvaged.  But environmental benefits of recycling are also dependent on 
transportation distances and energy input for recycling.  Some recycling operations, also, can 
have environmental risks.  For example, the large stockpile of unprocessed waste at the 
Burwood Resource Recovery Park in Christchurch has the potential to contain materials that 
may have adverse environmental effect, such as electronic equipment, whiteware, 
putrescibles etc.  This is especially possible due to the uncertainty in the nature and quality of 
wastes received during the initial stages of the operation (see Section 10.3.1).  While the 
intent of the recycling operation is an environmentally beneficial waste management solution 
(by reducing waste to landfill and maximising raw material reuse), there are some immediate 
environmental concerns with the operation and potential for contamination.   
 
Environmental risks around both onsite and offsite separation need to be considered. 
 
9.3.3 Recycling Principles 
Generally it is the responsibility of strategic managers to determine the extent and mode of 
recycling.  Strategic managers must weigh up the factors discussed in this Chapter to 
determine the most appropriate approach for the recovery effort.  The case studies show, 
however, that in the past strategic managers have not proactively set recycling policies 
and/or they have not established the systems to support the recycling policies.  This was 
particularly evident following Hurricane Katrina. 
 
Following the Bushfires, all recycling decisions were the responsibility of the main 
contractor.  Following L’Aquila, the decision to recycle everything was made without a 
robust operational plan and legislation to enact the intent.  This caused a stale mate in the 
debris management activities.  Following Hurricane Katrina, as discussed in Section 9.2.4, 
recycling decisions were largely left to contractors.  Authorities failed to educate on, 
implement and coordinate substantial recycling facilities.  In Christchurch, while initially 
there were limits over the degree of recycling onsite, the lack of control of individual 
contractors and business owners (as discussed in Section 9.2.5), led to individual decision-
making regarding recycling.  This arguably slowed the demolition activities as there was 
increased on-site sorting. 
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Strategic management strategies need to include recycling policies and corresponding 
institutional support systems. 
 
From an operational point of view, control of recycling initiatives can be better affected if a 
centrally managed approach is used.  In Christchurch, for example, during the early 
demolition in the CBD, there was a time imperative.  Contractors working independently 
consistently recycled more on site and in turn took longer to clear the store than contractors 
engaged by CERA.  As discussed in Section 8.3.2, private approaches more effectively allow 
for reuse opportunities (e.g. to crush concrete on site) on a site by site basis. 
 
Recycling operations (particularly in terms of timeliness) are better effected under a centrally 
managed approach. 
 
From a procurement perspective, lump sum contracts tend to give the recycling decisions to 
the contractor.  Lump sum contracts, in the high disposal cost environment of Christchurch, 
provided incentives for recycling: whereas in low value recycling environments, such as 
Louisiana, disposal became the favoured option.  As discussed in Section 8.3.4, lump sum 
contracts will generally favour highest profit options and will not consider effects on overall 
recovery.  Some recycling and debris reuse advocates have cited the default option under 
FEMA regulations of contracting disaster waste activities (lump sum contracts) as a limiting 
factor in achieving desired recycling levels.  Contractors in the past have brought in the 
wrong equipment and have not processed materials to match the markets that are available 
(Yepsen, 2008).  By contrast, in Christchurch, contractors have shown initiative in 
developing new recycling markets and making existing markets more economically viable.  
Regardless of contract type, contract conditions could be written to include desired levels 
and mode of recycling, as suggested by Roper (2008). 
 
Payment mechanisms within contracts, for example, can be written to encourage recycling.  
After both Hurricane Katrina and the Samoan tsunami, contractors were paid on a per truck 
trip basis to the point of disposal.  There was no incentive to source separate.  In Samoa, in 
fact, waste was sometimes segregated at source and then carried mixed to the disposal site.  
More monitoring or incentives for separated loads may have increased the recycling rate.  
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Incentives were suggested as an improvement after the Cedar and Paradise Firestorm 
(County of San Diego, 2005) and following Hurricane Katrina (Ardani et al., 2009). 
 
Contract types and terms need to include for recycling. 
 
Legislative and regulatory provisions can be used to achieve the desired recycling goals.  The 
discussion in this chapter can be used to determine where legislative and regulatory controls 
may be most effective to facilitate or manage post-disaster recycling.  This is discussed 
further in Section 11.3.3.   
 
9.4 Summary 
The case study analyses have identified a number of factors that influence the viability of 
recycling post-disaster.  While it is possible to list the factors in isolation, a much deeper 
understanding can be gained by looking at how the individual factors influence each other, 
and the overall recovery goals.  Based on the discussion in this chapter, over and above the 
peace-time challenges to recycling (largely economic feasibility), the following barriers to 
post-disaster recycling have been identified:   
 Time constraints 
 Resource availability (plant, personnel and processing facilities) 
 Mixed nature of waste 
 Hazards in the waste matrix 
 Displaced population 
 Post-disaster market challenges (capacity, availability, value, disruption, space 
limitations, location relative to affected area) 
 Contractual arrangements 
 Availability and feasibility of alternative waste management options 
 
Generally, the method of integrating recycling into the demolition will depend on the 
urgency to demolish the structures.  If there is an urgency to clean-up, and there are facilities 
/ spaces available to operate a resource recovery facility close to the affected area, recycling 
should be carried out offsite.  However, if a processing facility cannot be established within a 
reasonable distance to the affected areas and/or the market, source separation may be 
preferable.   
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10. Environmental and human health risk management 
10.1 Introduction 
Most communities have established environmental standards that guide the process of 
managing waste in peace-time.  Environmental standards generally include the protection of 
land, air and water and will often provide special protection for sensitive ecosystems such as 
marine and wetland areas.  Similarly, communities will generally have human health standards 
in place to protect both workers and the general public from risks associated with waste 
management.   
 
These standards or risk management mechanisms are generally developed in, and for, a 
peace-time context.  In a post-disaster situation, this context changes considerably: the 
affected community’s priorities have generally been altered; there can be pressure to manage 
the waste as quickly as possible (see Chapter 5); and waste management personnel and 
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facilities are often overwhelmed.  In past disaster events some peace-time risk management 
approaches have been considered too time or resource intensive or too costly.  
Consequently, as described in Section 1.11, disaster waste managers have been forced to 
either alter peace-time standards and/or implement alternative risk management strategies.   
 
This chapter includes an analysis of how environmental and human health risks were 
managed in the five case studies discussed in this thesis.  The aims of this chapter are: 
1. To identify the key environmental and human health risks associated with post-
disaster waste management; 
2. To understand the different methods of altering risk management strategies; and 
3. To determine the key principles for managing environmental and human health risks 
post-disaster. 
10.2 Case studies 
In all of the case studies presented in this thesis, except for the Samoan Tsunami, peace-time 
environmental and/or human health standards were altered to facilitate recovery through 
legislative, regulatory or organisational changes.  Key deviations from environmental risk 
management standards (related to waste management) are presented in Table 10.1.  
Deviations from human health standards (related to waste management) are presented in 
Table 10.2.  The tables outline the nature of the standard alteration, the reason for altering 
the standard (if known) and the management strategy.  For the purposes of this analysis the 
nature of the standard change is divided into four categories: higher risk accepted (standard 
altered); higher risk ignored; exempted permitting (i.e. no specific consent is required to carry 
out the activity); expedited processes (i.e. approval is required to carry out the activity but the 
peace-time process is stream-lined to allow more expedient approval).  
 
It should be noted that Table 10.1 and Table 10.2 shows the strategy taken not the outcomes 
achieved.  That is, acceptance of high environmental risk does not mean that the 
environment was adversely affected.  In addition, expediting processes to achieve peace-time 
outcome does not mean that peace-time outcomes would always be achieved.  As outlined in 
the Methodology Chapter (Chapter 2), the intent of this research is not to make absolute 
assessments of the suitability of peace-time standards, rather it is to determine whether the 
desired outcomes where achieved, relative to the context.  Thus, only examples where 
existing standards have been altered have been included in the analysis. 
  
Table 10.1 Case study deviations from environmental risk management standards (associated with waste management)  
Disaster Management strategy Nature of standards alteration* Justification 
Environmental 
standard 
Higher risk 
accepted 
(standard 
lowered) 
Higher risk 
‘ignored’ 
Exempted 
permitting 
(no approval 
needed) 
Expedited 
processes 
(stream-lined 
approval 
process) 
2009 Victorian Bushfires 
1. Bushfire waste 
classification 
All waste was classified as “C&D waste 
with contamination” and authorised for 
disposal at municipal landfills despite 
potentially containing elements which 
ordinarily would need to be disposed at a 
prescribed industrial waste landfill.  No 
testing was carried out. 
     To remove hazardous materials, 
minimise public health hazard and to 
help communities recover as quickly 
as possible.   
 To simplify regulatory and 
procedural requirements to handle 
the waste. 
2. New landfill cell 
constructed 
An existing landfill site, with known 
hydrogeology and existing monitoring 
equipment, was utilised for bushfire waste 
disposal.  The waste was qualitatively 
assessed to be primarily inert and posing 
low environmental risk in an unlined 
landfill cell.  It is unlikely this would have 
been approved in peace-time. 
     To eliminate the need for waste 
trucks to drive over a dangerous 
stretch of road. 
 
2009 L’Aquila earthquake 
1. Temporary 
staging, 
recycling and 
disposal siting. 
Existing standards for identification of 
waste handling facilities were maintained, 
while regulatory processes for approval of 
the sites were expedited and delegated to 
the earthquake recovery commissioner (as 
opposed to the local and regional 
environmental authorities). 
     To expedite debris management 
works. 
* Note that this indicates the risk management strategy taken, not the outcome achieved.  That is, acceptance of high environmental risk does not mean that the environment 
was adversely affected.  In addition, expediting processes to achieve peace-time outcomes does not mean that peace-time outcomes were always achieved. 
 
  
Disaster Management strategy Nature of standards alteration* Justification 
Environmental 
standard 
Higher risk 
accepted 
(standard 
lowered) 
Higher risk 
‘ignored’ 
Exempted 
permitting 
(no approval 
needed) 
Expedited 
processes 
(stream-lined 
approval 
process) 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
1. Open burning  
 
Open burning permits were no longer 
required. 
     To maximise treatment options. 
 To reduce delays due to permitting. 
2. Landfill waste 
acceptance 
criteria   
 
The waste acceptance criteria at Type III 
(C&D) landfills were expanded.  Furniture, 
carpet, painted or stained lumber 
contaminated waste (LDEQ, 2005b) were 
also included where it could not be 
separated. 
    “the most expeditious and 
environmentally sound manner as 
possible under the circumstances” 
 To provide adequate disposal space. 
 To reduce the cost of disposal. 
 To reduce the time-lag that would be 
incurred in lining new landfill cells. 
 To preserve space in Type I and II 
landfills (LDEQ, 2006b) 
3. Landfill 
permitting 
Gentilly and Chef Menteur landfills were 
reopened and opened, respectively, using 
emergency powers. 

     To reduce waste haul times. 
 To reduce cost. 
 To minimise waste disposal facility 
bottlenecks. 
2011 Christchurch earthquake 
1. Temporary 
staging area 
permitting 
An Order in Council was passed to permit 
all facilities, meeting specific criteria, to 
operate as waste storage facilities for up to 
five years.  Minimal environmental impact 
assessment and public consultation was 
carried out. 
 
     To prevent delays in approval of 
temporary staging areas. 
* Note that this indicates the risk management strategy taken, not the outcome achieved.  That is, acceptance of high environmental risk does not mean that the environment 
was adversely affected.  In addition, expediting processes to achieve peace-time outcomes does not mean that peace-time outcomes were always achieved. 
 
  
Disaster Management strategy Nature of standards alteration* Justification 
Environmental 
standard 
Higher risk 
accepted 
(standard 
lowered) 
Higher risk 
‘ignored’ 
Exempted 
permitting 
(no approval 
needed) 
Expedited 
processes 
(stream-lined 
approval 
process) 
2. Lyttelton Port 
land reclamation 
permitting 
 
An Order in Council was passed to allow 
for land reclamation at Lyttelton Port.  
Expedited environmental impact 
assessment and public consultation was 
carried out. 
     To ensure continuing economic 
activity of the Port (by allowing 
repairs and providing more space). 
 To enable the Port to manage 
building supplies for the rebuild.  
 To reduce waste disposal costs. 
3. Burwood 
Resource 
Recovery Park 
permitting. 
An Order in Council was passed to allow 
for operation of Burwood Resource 
Recovery Park.  Minimal environmental 
impact assessment and public consultation 
was carried out. 
     To reduce waste going to landfill. 
 To reduce waste management costs. 
4. New disposal 
site permitted 
An Order in Council was passed to allow 
the permanent disposal of residual (post-
recycling) earthquake waste at Burwood 
Resource Recovery Park.  Minimal 
environmental impact assessment and 
public consultation was carried out.
     To reduce waste going to municipal 
landfill. 
 To reduce waste management costs. 
* Note that this indicates the risk management strategy taken, not the outcome achieved.  That is, acceptance of high environmental risk does not mean that the environment 
was adversely affected.  In addition, expediting processes to achieve peace-time outcomes does not mean that peace-time outcomes were always achieved. 
 
 
  
  
Table 10.2 Case study deviations from human health risk management standards (associated with waste management) 
Disaster Management strategy Nature of standards alteration* Justification 
Human Health 
standard  
Higher risk 
accepted 
(standard 
lowered) 
Higher risk 
‘ignored’ 
Exempted 
permitting 
(no approval 
needed) 
Expedited 
processes 
(stream-lined 
approval 
process) 
2009 Victorian Bushfires 
1. All waste 
classified as 
“C&D waste with 
contamination” 
Workers were required to protect 
themselves against potential asbestos 
and other contaminants.  However, 
standard mitigation measures 
protecting public health and safety 
were reduced such as removing the 
requirements to double bag asbestos 
and to seal demolition sites.  No 
material testing was carried out.  
     To remove hazardous materials, 
minimise public health hazard and 
to help communities recover as 
quickly as possible.   
 To simplify regulatory and 
procedural requirements to handle 
the waste. 
2009 L’Aquila earthquake 
Insufficient data for analysis 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
1. Landfill waste 
acceptance 
criteria.   
Some construction and demolition 
landfills were designated as 
“enhanced landfills” and were 
authorised to accept asbestos. 
     To provide adequate disposal 
space. 
 
2. Demolition 
asbestos 
management.   
 
Demolition procedures for buildings 
with asbestos were streamlined by 
reducing notification, inspection and 
reporting requirements, expediting 
contractor certification, reducing 
demolition risk mitigation 
requirements (for example, pre-
demolition asbestos removal).  
     Minimise exposure while 
expediting clean-up (Luther, 2008). 
* Note that this indicates the risk management strategy taken, not the outcome achieved.  That is, acceptance of high human health risk does not mean that human health was 
adversely affected.  In addition, expediting processes to achieve peace-time outcomes does not mean that peace-time outcomes were always achieved. 
  
Disaster Management strategy Nature of standards alteration* Justification 
Human Health 
standard  
Higher risk 
accepted 
(standard 
lowered) 
Higher risk 
‘ignored’ 
Exempted 
permitting 
(no approval 
needed) 
Expedited 
processes 
(stream-lined 
approval 
process) 
2011 Christchurch earthquake 
1. Demolition 
asbestos 
management.   
 
Authorities advised that asbestos 
handling standard best practice could 
be modified to allow for work on 
dangerous buildings. 
     To minimise risk to demolition 
workers. 
2. Building material 
salvage 
The recovery authority, CERA, 
advised building owners and 
demolition crews whether or not it 
was safe to enter damaged buildings 
to carry out strip-outs.  There were 
no existing standards. 
no existing 
standards 
no existing 
standards 
no existing 
standards 
no existing 
standards 
 To minimise risk to demolition 
workers. 
* Note that this indicates the risk management strategy taken, not the outcome achieved.  That is, acceptance of high human health risk does not mean that human health was 
adversely affected.  In addition, expediting processes to achieve peace-time outcomes does not mean that peace-time outcomes were always achieved. 
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10.3 Discussion 
10.3.1 Risk management principles 
Balance environmental, economic, social and recovery objectives  
As discussed in Chapter 5, it is important to recognise the contextual shift when assessing 
and managing risks post-disaster.  Peace-time environmental, economic, and social norms 
may have changed and the recovery objectives provide the added dimensions of timeliness 
and community focus.   
 
The risk management decisions following the Victorian Bushfires were largely successful.  
Both the decision to classify the waste as a single waste stream and the construction of the 
new landfill were examples of where environmental and human health risks were balanced to 
achieve recovery outcomes.  The decision to construct a new landfill cell was largely driven 
by health and safety concerns for workers and the public resulting from truck travel on a 
dangerous stretch of road.  The landfill cell design did not undergo the same rigorous design 
and assessment of effects that would have occurred during peace-time to ensure the recovery 
was not delayed.  Decision-makers here made a conscious decision to prioritise human health 
and safety ahead of environmental protection during recovery.  The decision also had 
secondary benefits of reduced disposal and transportation costs and reducing truck travel 
time.   
 
Several other cases included examples where environmental standard reduction decisions 
were made to meet recovery objectives.  In Louisiana, after Hurricane Katrina, Gentilly 
Landfill (a site previously closed on environmental grounds) was reopened on the belief that 
it would halve the waste disposal time (LDEQ, 2006b).  The land reclamation at Lyttelton 
Port in Christchurch (which pre-earthquake was going through a length Environment Court 
approval process) was permitted on the understanding that it would aid the economic 
recovery of Christchurch and assist in the rebuild (through ensuring continuity of Port 
operations) (Brownlee and Smith, 2011). 
 
The response to the L’Aquila earthquake clean-up, however, was the antithesis to the above 
examples.  The adherence to peace-time environmental standards all but halted the recovery 
process.  It took four months to locate and approve the first temporary storage facility 
(Bonanni and Stagnini, accessed 2010).  Eleven months after the earthquake, expedited 
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processes for identification of the sites were only just established; however, no dispensation 
on environmental outcomes had been made and authorities were expected to achieve the 
same environmental outcome in a shorter time.  Consequently authorities did not utilise the 
expedited processes established and the waste removal process was stalled by a lack of waste 
handling facilities; the environmental outcome at the disposal sites was preserved but the 
overall recovery objectives (including economic and social objectives) were not being met.  
The slow waste removal also had public health risks, including: asbestos exposure from an 
estimated 40-50% of houses containing asbestos; vector breeding from unmanaged 
putrescible wastes; and risks associated with other unmanaged household hazards.   
 
While balancing environmental, economic and social objectives as part of recovery, it is 
important to distinguish local effects versus community effects.  Following Hurricane 
Katrina, an activist group protested against the opening of landfills believed to be too close 
to the affected, and already marginalised, communities (Allen, 2007).  Recovery authorities 
countered that the closer the facility was, the quicker the recovery would be (which would be 
beneficial to the wider community).  If the facility had not been allowed to open, the 
recovery process would have been slowed significantly and additional disposal facilities 
would have had to be sought.  In Christchurch, at least one potential waste handling facility 
was prevented from opening because of protests from the neighbouring community 
(Mathewson, 2011; Sachdeva and Mathewson, 2011).  Fortunately this facility was not 
essential to the recovery and had no noticeable effect on the overall recovery.  Somehow, 
risk assessments must be able to balance these local and wider effects transparently, and 
communicate these trade-offs to affected communities.   
 
The long term effects of risk management decisions also need to be considered.  During the 
clean-up of the World Trade Centre (WTC) collapse in 2001, regulatory authorities ignored 
their own health and safety regulations (in particular with respect to asbestos) to facilitate the 
recovery (Lange, 2004).  Air monitoring during the clean-up suggested that the particulate 
matter (resulting from the collapse and burning of the WTC) was not particularly hazardous 
due to low asbestos levels, short dust particles and low concentrations of volatile organic 
compounds.  However, construction and demolition workers clearing debris have since 
shown increased prevalence of respiratory symptoms, particularly those that were exposed to 
the contaminants for an extended period of time (Landrigan et al., 2004).  Short term 
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benefits to the recovery need to be balanced with long term effects on individuals and the 
wider community. 
 
When establishing post-disaster environmental and human health standards, disaster waste 
managers need to understand the effects of various approaches on the overall recovery.  
Most of the decisions in the case studies were qualitatively assessed independently and 
consequently were, at times, not well received by the affected communities.  It would be 
beneficial to have a more robust and transparent approach to empower the decision-maker 
(see Section 11.3.5) and to increase public support for decisions that significantly affect the 
recovery.  A possible approach would be to apply the semi-quantitative system effects 
measurement approach developed in Chapter 5 to risk management decisions.  Generally it 
should be the responsibility of strategic managers to lead this process (see Section 6.3.3). 
 
Environmental and human health risk decisions need to be made (1) in the context of the 
wider community recovery and (2) as transparently as possible. 
 
Strategic management 
As discussed in Section 6.3.2, good cross-organisational coordination is essential for post-
disaster risk management.  This is especially important when peace-time standards managed 
by one authority are altered to reduce risks faced by another authority: for example, the 
Victorian Bushfire landfill cell construction where environmental authorities essentially 
reduced standards to reduce a health and safety risk.  The role of a strategic management 
authority is vital in risk prioritisation such as this. 
 
Coordination is also essential between risk managers and operational personnel to ensure 
that risk management strategies proposed are practical and effective.  In many of the case 
studies investigated, there appeared to be minimal coordination between risk decision-
making and operational implementation.  In terms of risk management, this means that the 
risks being regulated may not be being managed as effectively as possible.  For example, in 
Christchurch a health and safety issue emerged when independent contractors elected to 
enter buildings deemed unsafe to perform internal material strip-outs.  A central 
management system (Section 8.3.4) for operational activities is one way that these emergent 
risks could be better managed.   
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Risk managers must maintain oversight of operations to ensure emergent risks are identified 
and managed effectively.  Centralisation of operational activities may reduce likelihood of 
emergent risks. 
 
Accept the uncertainty 
Uncertainty is always a factor in risk management.  However, the level of uncertainty post-
disaster is undoubtedly increased due to: difficulties in gathering and assessing information 
(see Section 4.2); the volume of waste and the speed at which the work is being carried out; 
and probably, an augmented waste management work force (experienced and inexperienced) 
often working under time and financial pressures (see Section 8.3.5).  In Louisiana there was 
significant public concern over the potential for hazardous material inclusion in the debris 
due to the speed of the clean-up process and the number of out-of-town contractors.  These 
concerns were particularly strong in respect to landfills which had not been operating prior 
to Hurricane Katrina (Luther, 2008) as operators were inexperienced and were perceived as 
disaster ‘opportunists’.   
 
In the decisions analysed in Section 10.2, disaster waste managers either accepted higher 
levels of uncertainty and mitigated against all potential effects; or they failed to recognise (or 
ignored) the increased uncertainty.  Examples of where greater uncertainty was 
acknowledged, included: the management of asbestos following the Bushfires (single waste 
classification); and the management of asbestos following Hurricane Katrina.  When higher 
risks are assumed and accepted, appropriate mitigation strategies can be put in place to 
reduce potential short term and long term effects.  In the Bushfire case, the mitigation 
measures put in place provided a high protection level for workers as all waste was assumed 
to contain asbestos and personal protection equipment was mandatory.  Mitigation 
management techniques can be more-time consuming when a risk-averse approach is taken 
but considerable time can also be saved by not requiring individual site testing.  Increased 
protection levels also invariably induce higher costs.  These costs are often outweighed by 
the positive effects on the recovery quality and expedience.   
 
Examples of where the uncertainty had been ignored or not fully recognised include: the 
permitting of open burning following Hurricane Katrina; and the permitting of temporary 
storage areas following the Christchurch earthquake.  In these two examples, authorities 
    Environmental and human health risk management 209 
   
 
 
allowed for these activities to occur within a set of standards without fully recognising the 
increased risk and uncertainty posed by a post-disaster situation.  Following Hurricane 
Katrina, the permitting of open burning did not recognise the high volumes and risk of 
contaminated waste being burnt.  In Christchurch, the permitting of temporary storage 
facilities failed to fully assess and mitigate against the potential environmental and social risks 
associated with the operation of multiple facilities across the city, by contractors 
inexperienced in dealing with waste.   
 
As shown by these examples, accepting the uncertainty and mitigating against the potential 
effects is a prudent approach. 
 
In the absence of data and a full understanding of the risk, accept a higher level of uncertainty 
and mitigate against the potential effects as far as possible. 
 
Accept resource limitations 
By definition, resources (human and equipment) following a disaster are overwhelmed.  As 
discussed in Section 1.1, disasters generate many times the annual waste volume a 
community ordinarily deals with.  Both regulatory and operational resources will be 
stretched.  Risk management strategies need to acknowledge and account for this.  Risk 
management strategies that are too cumbersome are likely to either 1) slow down the 
recovery by creating a bottleneck or diverting resources away from other recovery activities; 
or 2) be ineffectual at managing the risks because they are impractical to implement.   
 
Regulatory resource limitations can be mitigated by either: 
1. Exempting permitting requirements for specific activities; or 
2. Expediting the peace-time risk assessment process. 
 
The first strategy, exempting permitting requirements, can have very mixed results.  For 
example, the approval for demolition of certain buildings without the removal of asbestos 
pre-demolition following Hurricane Katrina was successful.  The risks were well considered 
and mitigation strategies were established.  Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
staff were able to divert their limited resources to other recovery tasks.  The exemption from 
permitting requirements for temporary storage sites for waste after the Christchurch 
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earthquake, however, was not well considered.  Basic standards for operation of temporary 
storage facilities were established which site operators theoretically have to meet.  However, 
some sites were set up without the knowledge of authorities and thus authorities lost 
visibility of the activities that were taking place.  Several sites were not meeting the 
requirements set out by the authorities.  Managing these ‘illegal’ sites subsequently consumed 
valuable regulatory resources which negated one of the purposes of the permitting 
exemption: to reduce demands on regulatory authorities.  Meadows (2009) described this 
system trap as ‘rule beating’.  
 
One challenge and potential drawback of establishing permit exemptions is whether to take a 
risk-averse or risk-taking approach.  If a risk-averse approach is adopted, operational costs 
may be higher than necessary.  However, cost and time savings will be made by reducing the 
level and degree of management and monitoring required.  If a risk taking approach is 
adopted there may be adverse effects in the future which require costly remediation / 
treatment.  The net effect of this will vary depending on the context. 
 
When considering permitting exemptions in a post-disaster situation, cost implications and 
opportunities for misuse need to be considered. 
 
A major negative related to a permitting exemption is the loss of oversight and control over 
the process.  Once an activity has been approved, if no reporting or notification process is in 
place, authorities will be ‘blind’ to that activity and any potentially adverse effects.  For 
example, in Christchurch, due to a law change in late 2010, there is no legal requirement to 
notify authorities if demolition is taking place and how waste will be managed.  As a result, it 
has been difficult for authorities to identify, monitor and mitigate potential effects resulting 
from demolition works.  Therefore, if permit exemption is adopted, including a requirement 
for basic reporting or notification is useful for planning and monitoring purposes.  In some 
cases (specifically for environmental risks) this would enable retrospective analysis of an 
action to be carried out and future remediation completed if necessary.  Note that this is only 
feasible if the risks being accepted are reversible. 
 
Basic notification or reporting should be required for any risky activity to assist authorities in 
planning and monitoring.   
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The second strategy, expediting peace-time risk assessment processes, has some benefits 
compared to permit exemptions.  It allows for a site by site assessment to be carried out 
which is highly beneficial where risks vary significantly between sites.  For example, 
following the Christchurch earthquake, each building had to be individually assessed for 
safety to determine whether or not an internal building strip-out was possible.  A risk-averse, 
permit exemption approach might have dictated that no buildings could be stripped.  This 
would have had significant cost implications and would likely have been rejected by 
contractors and building owners.  Instead, a site by site assessment and approval process was 
carried out. 
 
If an expedited assessment approach is adopted, authorities must, however, recognise that 
the level of uncertainty has increased (due to the reduced time for assessment) and, 
therefore, mitigation measures must be increased accordingly (as discussed above).  
 
As for permitting exemptions above, monitoring is also important. 
 
An expedited assessment approach is more suitable where risks vary significantly between 
sites. 
 
Centralised management also offers a conduit to more efficiently manage environmental and 
human health risks and reduce the burden on regulatory authorities.  Centralised 
management will likely minimise the amount of monitoring required by regulatory authorities 
– as they only need to focus on the management systems of one organisation not numerous 
independent contractors – and subsequently improve quality control.  Central management 
systems themselves will generally establish and monitor operating procedures.  This was 
illustrated in the Victorian Bushfires case where the managing contractor was delegated 
authority to manage the environmental compliance of their transport fleet, subject to 
occasional audits.   
 
Central management can reduce the demands on resource constrained regulatory authorities. 
 
When there are operational resource shortages, risk managers have options to increase the 
availability of resources.  Simply these can be categorised as: 
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1. Decrease the demands on operators; or 
2. Increase the number of resources available (where there are regulatory constraints). 
 
The first method involves reducing the operational requirements for managing risks.  For 
example, following Hurricane Katrina, authorities elected to reduce asbestos handling 
requirements; following the Bushfires authorities elected to eliminate the need to separate 
hazardous waste from the Bushfire waste.  Both these decisions reduced operational 
demands and, therefore, labour and equipment requirements.  This strategy also allowed for 
a consistent and streamlined approach across all worksites.  In the case of Hurricane Katrina, 
this allowed demolition times for houses to reduce from an estimated four days to just one 
day per house (GAO, 2008).  The provisions also allowed the US Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality to carry out more 
programme oversight work.  However, the success of this approval depends on whether a 
risk taking or risk-averse stance is taken (as discussed above).   
 
The second method, to increase operational capacity, is to increase the available resources.  
In some situations certification of workers is required to carry out certain works: for 
example, in Italy contractors must be certified as Environmental Managers; in the US, 
Australia and New Zealand contractors must be specially certified to handle friable asbestos.  
In the case studies here, a reduction in contractor certification requirements for handling 
asbestos was made for Hurricane Katrina.  In Victoria, the Bushfire single waste 
classification essentially increased the number of resources available by assuming that only 
Class B (non-friable) asbestos was present which contractors do not need certification to deal 
with.  The author considers that quality control of the operations (particularly where limited 
regulatory monitoring is being practiced – see above) may be compromised by increasing the 
workforce.  Contractors who are already, and intend to continue to be, involved in 
demolition and waste management are likely to have more experience, knowledge and care to 
preserve their work quality as part of a long term commitment to the industry.  Contractors 
gaining certification for the purposes of the recovery may not be as aware or concerned 
about long term implications of their behaviour on themselves or others.  Experienced 
contractors also have the skill to assess the risks on a site by site basis and adapt the risk 
management strategy as necessary (particularly important where a permit exemption risk 
management strategy has been adopted).   
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A reduction in certification requirements, however, does increase the possibility of local 
labourers participating in the recovery which is important from a psychosocial point of view 
(see Section 8.3.5). 
 
One question from the survey discussed in Appendix C, specifically addressed the issue of 
operational capacity.  The question addressed capacity limitations when dealing with asbestos 
and asked whether it was more effective to reduce existing risk management processes (to 
reduce the time taken) or to reduce contractor certification requirements (to increase the 
workforce).  The response was split between the two options, indicating that there are 
perceived risks in both the strategies.   
 
It is preferable to maintain a skilled workforce for high risk work, particularly if a reduction 
in peace-time management procedures has been made. 
 
Public perception 
The case studies show examples of how poorly considered, or poorly communicated, risk 
management decisions can lead to public opposition and consequently can affect the 
recovery.    
 
The public opposition to the opening of Gentilly and Chef Menteur landfills following 
Hurricane Katrina is a clear example of where authorities did not adequately and 
transparently include the host community in their risk management decision-making.  
Decision-makers saw the close proximity of the landfills to the affected community as a 
positive (as it reduced transportation times).  However, the community saw it as risk-loading 
an already affected community.  Decision-makers should have communicated their 
justification for the decision more clearly, in particular the wider community benefits of the 
approach and the alternatives considered.  In addition, if the community had been involved 
during the decision-making process such that they understood both the local risks and the 
community wide benefits – the lengthy lawsuit and delays in operation may have been 
avoided.  Despite the legitimacy of utilising legal waivers and alter risk management 
approaches to aid recovery, the social impact cannot be easily predicted.  Risk 
communication strategies must be employed to mitigate negative community reaction.   
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One major challenge in a post-disaster situation is how to achieve community consultation 
and communication in a time limited situation.  The desire to establish waste handling 
facilities quickly was a major factor in the decision to conduct minimal consultation after the 
Christchurch earthquake before permitting the Lyttelton Port land reclamation, Burwood 
Resource Recovery Park and the temporary storage facilities.  As a result of the limited 
consultation, there was some community discontentment over the proposed facilities; 
however community action was minimal and there was no disruption to the operation of the 
facilities or the recovery.  Given that all these facility permits are now valid for five years (as 
per the CER Act), some better form of consultation should perhaps have been carried out.  
Consultation would have likely generated greater community support for the operations and 
would reduce the potential for future disruption to operations.  Consultation also presents 
opportunities for the public to identify potential risks that authorities may have overlooked.  
The importance of communicating risk was noted by Esworthy et al. (2006) following 
Hurricane Katrina also.  
 
Involve community in risk management decisions as far as practical and in particular for 
activities that will be operational medium to long term. 
 
Maintaining a consistent approach to risk management across the recovery, as discussed in 
Section 10.3.2, is also very beneficial to public perception of risks and how effectively they 
are being managed.  Instances of illegal dumping of waste and asbestos following the 
Christchurch earthquake, for example, undermined the good risk mitigation measures being 
practiced by most contractors, and thus, evoked public concerns.  By contrast the single 
waste classification and single organisation managing the waste following the Victorian 
Bushfire ensured all waste was handled in exactly the same way.  This gave the impression 
that the risks were being managed appropriately and effectively and the authors are unaware 
of any public concerns of the management approach.     
 
To improve public perception and trust in a risk management approach, consistent standards 
across the recovery effort are important. 
 
Further research would be beneficial into how public risk perception changes post-disaster 
and whether, and in what circumstances, reductions in standards are deemed acceptable to 
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aid planning both pre- and post-disaster.  During the author’s interviews with community 
members following the Victorian Bushfires, for example, community members consistently 
ranked health and safety as a higher priority than environmental protection, thus a reduction 
in environmental standards in favour of protecting human health and safety would be 
acceptable.   
 
In the survey discussed in Appendix C, one question directly related to post-disaster risk 
acceptance.  The question asked whether an impact on fisheries was acceptable for post-
disaster land reclamation.  44% of respondents indicated they would accept an impact lasting 
up to 5 years.  While no peace-time risk acceptance levels were gauged, it is hypothesised that 
this acceptance level would be far less for a peace-time activity. 
 
Further research would also be beneficial to determine whether a post-disaster change in 
standards has any impact on risk management approaches long term.  That is, if standards 
are reduced to meet disaster needs, will standards return to ‘normal’ and if so how long will 
this take?  Due to the time limitations in this study no longitudinal data have been gathered 
to assess this impact. 
 
10.3.2 Operational management implications 
As discussed in Section 8.3.2, post-disaster, risk ownership needs to be considered in the 
short and long term.  The new landfill cell constructed during the Bushfire recovery in 
Victoria, for example, was constructed and operated by managing contractor for the 
demolitions.  Immediately after the clean-up operation the landfill cell was handed to the 
local authority that owned the land (and was therefore responsible for long term 
environmental effects).  Thus the contractor did not necessarily have any incentive to ensure 
that long term risks were minimised.  It is understood that there were no contractual 
arrangements regarding liability resulting from any future adverse effects.  Ideally risks 
should be managed by those with long term vested interested in good risk management.   
 
Section 11.3.4 examines liability concerns for existing ‘long term’ waste management facilities 
that alter operations in light of post-disaster legislative changes. 
 
Short and long term risk ownership should rest with the same entity, where possible.  
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10.3.3 Funding mechanisms 
Funding mechanisms often have policies that require certain regulatory and legislative 
provisions to be met.  As described in Section 7.3.3 in some instances, the legislative/risk 
management changes that were made to enable the recovery actually threatened funding 
eligibility.  Thus the impact of changing risk management strategies through legislative means 
needs to be considered.   
 
10.3.4 Legislative and regulatory implications 
It is interesting to note that in a review of emergency exemptions from environmental laws 
Gerrard (2006) surmises that legislative changes come in four different categories:  
 exemptions from permitting requirements 
 relaxation of substantive standards 
 exemptions from, or acceleration of, certain processes 
 releases from liability 
 
Gerrard’s summary more or less aligns with the discussion in this chapter regarding different 
risk management techniques with the addition of liability considerations.  The legislative 
issues regarding environmental and human health risk management (including liability) 
strategies are discussed in the following chapter.   
 
10.4 Summary 
The challenge of post-disaster risk management is to balance risks against recovery objectives 
in a time limited situation.  It is essential that risks are identified and mitigated where 
possible.  Risk management strategies need to be practical and able to be implemented with 
limited regulatory and operational resources.   
 
 
    Legislation and regulation 217 
   
 
 
 
11. Legislation and regulation 
11.1 Introduction 
Emergency laws often form part of national, regional and local legal frameworks to enable 
communities to respond efficiently (in a timely manner) and effectively (with quality 
outcomes) to emergency situations.  Emergency legislation is utilised to alter existing 
regulatory processes and roles and responsibilities to save lives, protect property and the 
environment by facilitating a quick and coordinated response to an emergency situation.   
 
The mobilisation of emergency laws in emergency response situations where there is an 
immediate threat to lives, property or the environment is unquestionable.  In terms of waste, 
emergency laws can generally enable immediate threats from acutely hazardous waste, unsafe 
structures, blocked access ways and putrescible wastes.  However, the majority of disaster 
waste management is carried out during the recovery phase.  The role of emergency 
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provisions during recovery operations from large scale disasters, after the immediate hazards 
have been dealt with and waste poses a chronic (rather than an acute) threat to community 
recovery, is less clear.  In some contexts, such as in the response to the Christchurch 
earthquake, authorities have been moved to develop completely new legislation to enable 
recovery operations.  In the Christchurch case, it became apparent that neither the 
emergency legislation nor the peace-time legislation in New Zealand was sufficient to enable 
an efficient and effective recovery.  It is interesting to note that researchers had identified 
this deficiency in New Zealand legislation prior to the earthquakes (Rotimi et al., 2009; 
Brown et al., 2010a). 
 
Whether or not existing legislation (emergency and peace-time) can be applied to a disaster 
waste management programme in the recovery phase and how effective it would be is a 
question worth considering before a potential event.  Therefore, this chapter outlines the 
legal challenges faced in the five case studies.  First, the legal challenges are synthesised into 
the major components of legislative and regulatory requirements necessary to effectively 
manage disaster waste (divided into the five system elements in the analysis framework of 
this thesis).  Second, there is a discussion of the desirable approach to preparing disaster 
waste legislation. 
 
Due to the wide range of legislative frameworks in the case studies, and to ensure the 
observations and recommendations can be transferred between contexts, the analysis and 
discussion deliberately do not include a great number of legislative details but instead discuss 
the broader concepts of the various legal and regulatory approaches.  The full case studies, in 
the Appendices, include more specific legislative detail.  In addition a detailed analysis of the 
legislative situation in New Zealand for managing disaster waste (written prior to the 2011 
Christchurch earthquake) can be found in the following paper (also included in Appendix 
O):  
Brown, C., Milke, M. & Seville, E., 2010. Legislative Implications of Managing 
Disaster Waste in New Zealand. New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law, 14, 261-
308. 
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11.2 Case studies 
11.2.1 2009 Victorian Bushfires 
The main parties involved in establishing the legal standards and processes for management 
of disaster waste were the Victorian Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of 
Human Services / Worksafe (demolition, waste handling and disposal); Victoria Roads and 
Victoria Police (transportation).  Legal decisions were made at state and national level; local 
authorities had little or no input.  The legal decisions during the waste management process 
were reportedly carried out collaboratively.   
 
There were two main pieces of emergency legislation necessary to facilitate the bushfire 
waste management.  The first was Section 30A of the Victorian Environmental Protection 
Act 1970 which is administered by the Victorian Environmental Protection Authority.  
Section 30A allows for (temporary) storage, treatment, handling or disposal of waste in an 
emergency, to relieve public nuisance or hardship.  Management of Bushfire waste was 
deemed to be covered by this definition. 
 
The second piece of legislation related to health and safety.  An Order under Section 55 of 
the Dangerous Goods Act, 1985, was initiated to regulate the removal of asbestos from 
bushfire affected properties.  The Order reduced the storage, handling and disposal 
standards and stated that this was (Victorian Government Gazette, 2009): 
 
“to assist with this emergency and the rebuilding of those towns and premises burnt 
by the 2009 bushfires, it is in the interest of public safety to make an Order that 
enables the expeditious removal of any asbestos from premises damaged or 
destroyed by those fires while maintaining appropriate standards of safety”  
 
These two provisions were used to classify all the bushfire waste as a single classification, 
called “Bushfire Waste”.  The authorities were able to establish minimum standards for 
handling, transportation and disposal for the entire waste matrix.  That, in turn, allowed the 
debris management processes to be stream-lined and this facilitated the recovery18.  The 
                                                 
18 It should be noted the single waste classification was possible due to the nature of bushfire waste (low in 
volume, difficult to segregate for recycling and asbestos that has been subjected to extreme heat).  This specific 
approach may not be suitable to other disasters but the principle of legal flexibility remains the same.   
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decision-making process behind these legislative changes, however, was unclear and it is 
uncertain how these decisions would be viewed in a court of law.  Neither of the laws 
appeared to have prosecution and/or liability exclusion clauses. 
 
Prior to demolition and debris clearance from properties, the contractor was required to 
make property access and waste ownership agreements with the property owners.  Unless 
otherwise agreed with the owner, all waste (including recyclables) was assigned to the 
Contractor19.   
 
The construction of the new landfill cell approved through official peace-time legal 
processes.  However, the process was expedited significantly and the normal environmental 
impact assessment processes were not carried out (as described in the previous Chapter).   
 
Instead of the standard liability period for the landfill cell (30 years) being held by the 
contractor who operated the site, the landfill was handed back to the local authority (who 
was also the land owner) for maintenance and monitoring as part of their on-going landfill 
operations.  This may create questions regarding liability in the vent of future negative 
environmental effects.    
 
There was no legal or regulatory or contractual requirement for the contractors to recycle the 
debris. 
 
11.2.2 2009 Samoan Tsunami 
The Disaster & Emergency Management Act 2006 does not explicitly include waste 
management as a response function, therefore it is questionable whether the emergency 
powers within the Act could be used to manage waste even when there is an emergency 
declared. 
 
In terms of the recovery phase, peace-time legislation and regulation primarily applied.  The 
Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment’s Planning and Urban Management 
Authority (PUMA) have legislative authority (under the Planning and Urban Management 
                                                 
19 In this case the contractor elected to reinvest the recycling proceeds into the community. 
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Act) to enter property and remove or mitigate the effects of any nuisance (PUMA, obtained 
2010).  However, the author was advised that these regulations are rarely enforced in peace-
time let alone post-disaster.  In addition, it should also be noted that the majority of the 
affected area was on customary land which PUMA does not have authority to enter20.  
Approval to enter, in this case, must be sought through the customary governance structure 
(Punlenu’u).  The Planning and Urban Management Act exempts PUMA employees from 
liability while acting under the Act (Government of Samoa, 2004). 
 
There were some issues around ownership of the tsunami generated waste but no contractual 
or regulatory measures appeared to be in place.   
 
11.2.3 2009 L’Aquila Earthquake 
In Italy, European Union (EU) and Italian waste laws have to be adhered to.  Under EU 
laws, all waste has to be assigned an EU Waste Code (EWC).  In addition, all wastes must 
have a designated waste ‘producer’ (under Section 183, Italian Decree Law 152/2006) and 
this determines who has responsibility for the waste.  However, neither the EWC system, nor 
the Italian waste producer law, had a category suitable for the earthquake waste.  It was 
unclear initially whether the Department of Civil Protection (who was paying for the waste 
removal) or the municipality (who has peace-time responsibility for municipal waste) was 
responsible for the waste.  Eventually it was decided that the waste should be coded as 20 03 
99 (municipal waste) under the EWC system and so that the Comune would be responsible 
for (or is the designated owner of) the waste.  Strictly speaking, the debris (including 
hazardous materials) did not fall under this EWC code but it made sense from an operational 
point of view that the municipality was the ‘producer’ of the waste.  If the waste had been 
categorised with a 17 prefix (construction and demolition waste) the contractors for each 
demolition site would been the owners of the waste and operation of post-disaster waste 
separation sites (operated by the municipality) would have required special permission. 
 
                                                 
20 Customary lands are those shared among an aiga or extended family.  Each aiga is headed by a matai or leader 
who is responsible for land and titles.  Each community has a fono or council of matai that make decisions on 
village development and land-use.  Customary land is generally awarded through historical claims and or family 
genealogy.  
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Unfortunately this meant that most contractors were not authorised to transport the 
municipal categorised waste until an emergency order in March 2010 authorised suitably 
qualified contractors to transport the earthquake waste.  Before then the army and fire 
service had to be the primary transporters.  An emergency Decree Law was also required to 
allow for private property access to remove debris.   
 
All demolition contractors and waste haulers had to be certified as Environmental Managers.  
No specific data were collected regarding this; however, it is understood that the certification 
process is lengthy and no alternative certification procedures were established. 
 
To increase the number of disposal sites, as mentioned in the previous Chapter, waste 
handling facility approval regulations were authorised in March 2010.  The responsibility for 
siting new facilities was given to the Deputy Recovery Commissioner in June 2009 (OPCM 
3797) after no action was taken by the municipality.  No additional sites had been established 
at the time of the author’s reconnaissance (September 2010). 
 
11.2.4 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
The law played a critical role in the waste management process following Hurricane Katrina.  
Hurricane Katrina gives examples where legal waivers were used effectively, used 
controversially and where emergency waivers were not available when needed.   
 
Emergency management in the US is governed by the Stafford Act and corresponding 
National Response Plan (NRP).  The NRP outlines the roles and responsibilities with respect 
to management of disaster waste.  The NRP is divided into 14 Emergency Support 
Functions (ESFs) – three of which relate to disaster waste management.  Due to the scale of 
the event, US Environment Protection Agency (USEPA) was given authority to waive any 
law under its jurisdiction.  The USEPA elected to work inside Federal law by changing 
regulatory procedures and protocols and advocating state or local law changes where 
necessary.   
 
To enable recovery, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) issued a 
Declaration of Emergency and Administrative Order (DEAO) and a Disaster Debris 
Management Plan.  Both documents (and subsequent revisions) outlined measures to be 
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taken in order to prevent irreparable damage to the environment and serious threats to life or 
safety resulting from waste management.  The measures included: relaxation in permitting 
and quality assurance requirements, authority to make disaster damage repairs on solid waste 
management facilities without prior permitting and general waste management strategies 
(including siting waste disposal, and waste acceptance criteria, waste separation, burning 
restrictions, carcass disposal, hazardous waste storage).  In total there were 15 DEAOs 
issued over three years.   
 
The State of Louisiana’s decision to expand the acceptance criteria for Construction and 
Demolition (C&D) landfills was legislated under the second amended DEAO (LDEQ, 
2005b) and was sustained through subsequent revisions.  Despite the legal authority to make 
these changes, the Louisiana Environmental Action Network (LEAN) filed two lawsuits to 
close down two C&D landfills operating under these revised conditions.  The first landfill 
(Gentilly landfill) had been permitted as a C&D landfill prior to the Hurricane but did not 
begin accepting waste until after the storm.  The lawsuit resulted in an out of court 
settlement which limited the C&D shipments to the landfill to 19,000 cubic yards per day.  
The other site, Chef Menteur Landfill, was commissioned following Hurricane Katrina 
through an emergency authority by New Orleans’ Major Ray Nagin.  The lawsuit resulted in 
the site being voluntarily closed by Nagin one month later (Luther, 2008).   
 
As discussed in Section 10.3.1, this example shows that despite their availability, legal waivers 
are not always straight forward to utilise in a disaster recovery situation.  Whether the 
environmental risk was real or perceived, community acceptance of a legal waiver or an 
environmental or human health risk management approach can be crucial to its effectiveness. 
 
According to a Report to Congress on the debris removal process (Luther, 2008), existing 
legislation prevented FEMA and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) from 
expeditiously mandating house demolition and/or debris removal on abandoned properties.  
Neither organisation had the authority to demolish homes or remove debris from private 
property without following a multi-step process involving the home-owner and including 
decommissioning and condemnation.  In the US, state and local governments are responsible 
for right of entry permits for private property; however, with the absence of many home-
owners, this process was challenging and it restricted the speed of demolition and debris 
removal works.   
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The demolition process (and associated debris removal works) was a balance between 
eliminating immediate public health and safety risks and respecting property owner’s rights in 
their absence.  Mandating demolition of private property without consent, for reasons other 
than an acute risk to public health and safety, was not considered due to the likely significant 
social and political opposition.  It was believed that many absent residents may opt to repair 
rather than replace their homes even if there was significant damage (Luther, 2008). 
 
The USEPA identified standard asbestos handling and disposal procedures as a contributing 
factor to the slow debris removal process.  In response to this, the USEPA moved to reduce 
the handling requirements: “[US]EPA…is providing debris management guidance to ensure 
minimization of exposures while expediting cleanup.” (Luther, 2008).  In Louisiana, the 
USEPA granted ‘No Action Assurance’ letters (LDEQ, 2006a) which allowed a relaxation in 
some standard (National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants regulations) 
asbestos demolition and disposal procedures(LDEQ, 2007).  LDEQ were also granted 
delegated authority to use their own Louisiana Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants in place of the national standards.   
 
Waste separation (e.g. metals, concrete, vegetative debris) was required by local authorities to 
divert waste from landfill and to comply with existing federal and state laws21.  However, as 
discussed in Chapter 9, extensive recycling was not practiced.  The author has insufficient 
data to comment on the legal details of this. 
 
11.2.5 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
New Zealand’s Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Act provides the 
legislative framework for managing emergency responses.  It also outlines the organisational 
structures and planning requirements for Civil Defence personnel.  The Act is 
comprehensive for enabling emergency responses; however, it is weak in terms of enabling 
recovery.  As a result, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act was passed two months after 
the February earthquake.  The Act gives authority to Ministers to amend almost any piece of 
legislation (through an Order in Council) to facilitate earthquake recovery. 
                                                 
21 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires States to regulate solid and hazardous waste 
in accordance with the provisions in the Act. 
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As well as the authority to change existing laws, the CER Act established quite specific 
provisions controlling demolition of damaged structures.  Most importantly the Act gave 
CERA the authority to require buildings to be demolished or made safe and to intervene if 
works were too slow.  In addition, the Act gave CERA authority to seek compensation for 
works carried out on behalf of building owners.  During the works, CERA also established 
contractual arrangements around waste ownership, private property entry and cost recovery. 
 
Prior to the CER Act, some demolition works were carried out as part of the emergency 
works (rescuing persons, body recovery, clearing streets, making safe).  While the CDEM Act 
gives authority to carry out the works, there is no provision in the Act to recover costs for 
the works.  No waste ownership agreements / procedures were in place either.  As a 
temporary measure, contractor salvage rights were frozen to mitigate loss of personal 
property.   
 
As discussed in Section 8.3.4, several disaster waste management contracts were let without 
full peace-time procurement procedures being followed.  These contracts were let during the 
emergency phase but were extended into the recovery phase.  The CDEM Act has 
allowances for expedited procurement procedures; however the CER Act does not. 
 
The primary environmental regulation in New Zealand, the Resource Management Act, is a 
consultative, effects-based piece of legislation.  It is process not outcome orientated and 
there are few prescriptive environmental standards within the Act.  The governing authorities 
also have discretionary powers as to whether they will enforce certain provisions within the 
Act.  The degree to which these discretionary powers were utilised during the earthquake 
response phase varied.  Neither the regional nor national environmental regulatory 
authorities gave clear direction on how these powers would be used.  It appears that new 
facilities were expected to go through the peace-time process or apply for a facility specific 
Order in Council.  On the other hand, discretionary powers were used with respect to 
existing facilities. 
 
Several Orders in Council were passed under the CER Act relating to waste management 
activities.  The orders related to: 
 Approval of reclamation activities at Lyttelton Port. 
 Establishment of Burwood Resource Recovery Park. 
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 Permitting of the permanent waste disposal facility at Burwood. 
 Permitting of temporary waste storage facilities. 
 Allowance for overloading trucks. 
 Allowance for changes in operating conditions at the regional landfill. 
 Stream-lining of archaeological site management requirements. 
 Stream-lining of resource consent requirements for Historic Building demolition. 
 
Health and safety regulations remained largely unchanged.  The Department of Labour 
provided some earthquake specific guidance and flexibility in regulation interpretation for 
asbestos management; however, the law (or regulations) was not changed. 
 
One concern held by the earthquake waste managers in Christchurch was that there was no 
regulatory and legislative mechanism to gather data from demolition sites where buildings are 
three storeys or less (due to a recent Building Act change).  This meant that monitoring 
operations and anticipating waste management demands was difficult.  Some have attributed 
this lack of monitoring and authority visibility to the increase in illegal dumping post-
earthquake.  The CER Act had provisions for some data to be collected but only for 
buildings deemed unsafe under the Act.  Many residential properties and small commercial 
properties are being demolished for economic reasons rather than as an imminent threat and 
therefore are not included in the CER Act ‘dangerous building’ definition.  
 
The CER Act also provides liability protection for actions taken under the Act. 
 
11.3 Discussion 
11.3.1 Strategic management 
Legal frameworks for strategic management of waste should be incorporated into disaster 
recovery legislation.  Emergency legislation can, and should, include definitions of roles and 
responsibilities.  Emergency legislation should, importantly, provide authorities with a 
mandate to take any means necessary to meet recovery goals.   
 
The emergency support functions (ESF) defined in the US emergency regulations (The 
Stafford Act/National Response Plan) are a good example of how legislation and regulation 
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can be used to develop organisational structures.  The US regulations outline the relevant 
stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities during response and recovery works.  The 
regulations also stipulate who is responsible for obtaining legal waivers where necessary (in 
this case, local and state governments).  
 
The clarity around roles and responsibilities was less clear for the other case studies.  In 
L’Aquila, the Department of Civil Protection initially set-up the waste management system; 
the system was altered when the municipality took over.  In Victoria, there was no pre-
determined organisational structure for recovery; VBBRA was established and a contractor 
was appointed for the operational works.  No strategic planning appeared to be carried out.  
In Christchurch, CERA, under the CER Act, was given overall authority to manage the 
recovery but waste management was delegated to the local municipal authority.  The CER 
Act included provisions to intervene when individuals were not acting in the interest of the 
community.  Legislative decisions regarding waste were made at both local, regional 
(enforcement decisions) and national / Ministerial level (Orders in Council).  Clarity around 
decision-making authority and responsibility was lacking.   
 
Overall authority and clear responsibility for management of disaster waste should be 
incorporated into legal frameworks for recovery. 
 
If suitable strategic management structures and roles and responsibilities are defined pre-
disaster, the number of legislative changes made following many of these case studies (as 
discussed later in Section 11.3.5) could be reduced.  Better coordination structures are likely 
to improve the quality and completeness of decisions, such that the need for numerous 
future changes (amendments or additions) to legislation and regulation would be reduced.  If 
there is inadequate strategic coordination, there is a possibility that unnecessary legislative 
changes could be made or, conversely, necessary legislative changes may not be made.  In 
L’Aquila, necessary legislative changes to enable the establishment of waste handling facilities 
were not forthcoming as ‘ownership’ of the waste management activities was divided 
between various authorities and working groups.  This had a significant impact on the speed 
of demolitions.    
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Strategic managers should aim to anticipate necessary legislative changes to: minimise the 
number of legislative changes and avoid unnecessary legislative changes. 
 
It is beneficial for the authority responsible for strategic management of the waste to have 
legislative authority to make waste management decisions.  Following the 4 September 2010 
earthquake, an independent group called the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission 
(CERC) was established (under the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 
2010) to oversee the recovery and to consult with Ministers regarding any potential legislative 
changes.  The group had no decision-making authority and was considered by many to be 
largely ineffective.  Major delays were observed in the recovery, in particular, the slow 
demolition of buildings posing a public health and safety hazard and in some cases blocking 
roads and preventing others from accessing their buildings.  Many found this arrangement 
inefficient and unsatisfactory.  Some decisions took months.  The CER Act (enacted 
following the February earthquake) and the new, temporary, government department, 
CERA, were born out of the negative experiences of September.  Unlike the CERC, CERA 
has decision-making authority and some operational (primarily demolition) responsibilities. 
 
If strategic management authorities are established without decision-making authority this 
can sometimes have a detrimental effect on the recovery.  In Victoria, some individuals 
interviewed identified that the Victorian Bushfire Recovery and Reconstruction Authority 
lacked decision-making authority and had insufficient powers to enable the recovery.  In 
their view, this added another layer of bureaucracy and slowed the recovery.   
 
Strategic management authorities should have legislated mandate to enable decision-making. 
 
If a regional approach to strategic waste management is taken, consideration must be made 
to allow for intra-regional differences in regulation and legislation.  For example, different 
Parishes within New Orleans, operated independently and had “complex and constraining” 
rules around operating with each other (Roper, 2008).  This made developing and 
implementing consistent waste management approaches across the affected regions, difficult. 
 
If regional or national strategic waste planning is desired, approaches adopted must account for 
local legislation. 
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Legislated or regulated consultation requirements may need to be changed post-disaster to 
facilitate timely decision-making.  Consultation may be particularly challenging where 
communities have been heavily affected and where a) decisions need to be made quickly and 
b) the peace-time levels and methods of consultation may not be practical or feasible.  
Following Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, LDEQ revised its consultation requirements for 
permitting actions in acknowledgement of the displaced population.  LDEQ established 
three community impact categories (determined by factors such as newspaper circulation 
rates, school rolls, operational services, road conditions etc.).  Consultation requirements for 
hardest hit areas were dramatically decreased to “address these [permitting] issues in a 
manner that offers the opportunity for meaningful public participation and that meets the 
requirement and the intent of the state and federal permitting statutes and regulations” 
(LDEQ, 2006c).   
 
Consultation requirements may need to be adapted to the disaster situation, to facilitate timely 
decision-making. 
 
As discussed in Section 6.3.3, monitoring is an important part of strategic management and 
managing the environmental and public health risks.  Regulatory requirements should be in 
place pre-disaster to ensure monitoring systems are in place. 
 
Where possible, regulations should ensure that basic data are collected to aid risk monitoring 
and strategic planning. 
 
11.3.2 Funding mechanisms 
Disaster waste programmes, and recovery programmes in general, are highly dependent on 
funding availability.  The case studies have demonstrated several instances where 1) legal 
provisions have been needed to allow privately funded works to be managed collectively and 
2) where legal changes have affected funding eligibility.  These are discussed below. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, sometimes it is beneficial to manage privately funded works 
collectively to enable an efficient recovery.  For example, in Christchurch, the provisions in 
the CER Act allow for CERA to coordinate, and where necessary manage, building 
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demolitions and carry out ‘make safe’ works.  In particular, the Act allows intervention where 
the works, being carried out by individuals, are progressing too slowly.  Without this Act, the 
recovery timeline would be completely dictated by private entity actions.  Central 
management, by CERA, facilitated recovery objectives being met. 
 
Where funding mechanisms are private, legislative powers will be required to ensure funds can 
be directed strategically toward the recovery objectives. 
 
As part of the CER Act, provisions were included to ensure that, where CERA was forced to 
take actions on behalf of the owner, CERA would be able to recover their costs.  There was 
no such mechanism in the Civil Defence and Emergency Act and some funds, for works 
carried out during the emergency response, were subsequently not recoverable.  In the US, 
where property owners have insurance and receive money or in kind assistance through 
FEMA (such as kerbside collection and demolition services), they are legally required, under 
federal law, to reimburse FEMA for insurable works carried out (FEMA, 2006; 2007).  
However, it is unclear what, if any, mechanism is in place to manage this and how much 
money, if any, has been recovered in the past. 
 
Where central management is desired in a privately funded environment, legislative provisions 
need to include for cost recovery. 
 
As discussed in Section 7.3.3, funding policies can include conditions which require that 
waste only be managed under certain legislative conditions.  For example, FEMA requires all 
waste management activities meet Federal laws.  If Federal laws are not met, authorities will 
not be eligible for reimbursement for the works.  The provision following Hurricane Katrina, 
that allowed the US Environmental Protection Agency to change any law under its 
jurisdiction to enable recovery, as a result, was largely ineffective.  Local authorities did not 
want to jeopardise their funding eligibility.  Subsequently, necessary legislative changes may 
not have been made where they were needed. 
 
Review the impact of any proposed legislative changes on funding eligibility. 
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11.3.3 Operational management 
Waste classification 
Following both the Bushfires and the L’Aquila earthquake, the disaster waste was classified 
as a ‘single’ waste type.  In the Bushfire case, this decision was to enable stream-lining of 
waste management procedures, in particular, regulations around handling the potentially 
hazardous components of the waste.   
In the L’Aquila case, waste coding was necessary to adhere to European and Italian waste 
laws, as well as being necessary for funding eligibility (see Section 11.3.2).  As there was not 
an existing European Waste Code (EWC) that matched the earthquake waste (that is: 
collapsed building stock, including building materials, household furniture, appliances, 
personal items, potentially hazardous materials), an existing EWC was selected based on how 
authorities wanted to manage the waste (i.e. who would have responsibility for the waste 
under Italian Decree Law 152/2006).  As discussed in Section 11.2.3 an EWC code with 
prefix 20 meant that the municipality could assume responsibility for the waste and collect 
and transport and separate it as necessary – which was the desired approach.  This 
classification meant, however, that demolition contractors were not authorised to handle the 
waste.  A special Prime Ministerial Decree (OPCM) was required to authorise environmental 
managers to handle the waste.   
 
If a waste classification system exists, a disaster waste category is necessary which reflects the 
nature of the waste and ownership of the waste.   
 
Classifying the mixed disaster waste as a single waste product may simplify regulatory or legal 
requirements. 
 
Property entry and remediation 
Property entry and remediation is likely to be required in the short term if a hazard is posed 
to public health and safety or the environment: for example, corpses, rotting food, 
flammable or toxic substances.  In the longer term, if residents are slow to return or to 
facilitate clean-up of their own property, property entry and remediation may be desired by 
authorities to repair or demolish structures and remove debris to contribute to the wider 
social / community recovery.  When residents are present and willing, authority to access 
property is reasonably straightforward to obtain.  Prior to debris removal by contractors 
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following the Victorian Bushfires, every property owner was required to authorise property 
access to the contractor prior to demolition and debris removal commencing.  When 
residents are absent or uncooperative, gaining private property access is more challenging.  
The process necessary to condemn houses following Hurricane Katrina was involved and 
time consuming, and was a bottleneck in the disaster waste management process.  Only 1000 
properties were demolished in the first 15 months of the condemnation process; a further 
15,000 properties were demolished in the following three months (GAO, 2008).  This 
indicates the lengthy process required to gain legal right to access properties.  In L’Aquila, a 
special law was passed post-earthquake to enable private property access for debris removal 
(Decree Law n. 195).  In Christchurch, the CER Act enabled CERA to carry out works when 
necessary for recovery. 
 
Thus, provisions are needed to allow private property entry in a disaster recovery situation 
where the threat posed by the building is not immediate (as generally allowed for in peace-
time regulations) but the intervention is necessary to assist community recovery.  This is 
particularly important when residents are absent or are unwilling to act in a timely manner.  
There are two possible approaches which could be taken – usurp property rights and act 
without due process (similar to emergency legislation) or to stream-line process to facilitate a 
faster approval.  
 
Legislative provisions are needed to allow private property entry in a disaster recovery situation 
where the threat is not just immediate but may affect the community recovery. 
 
Property debris /waste ownership 
In cases where demolition and debris management is carried out on behalf of building 
owners, legal arrangements around ownership of recovered waste materials needs to be 
established.  This can be done through legislation or contractually. 
 
During the emergency phase in Christchurch, the legal implications of waste ownership were 
not well understood.  As a precautionary measure, under Civil Defence directive (which is 
legally binding under a State of Emergency), all salvage rights for contractors were frozen.  
This was a very important and publicly well received initiative but was not always effective.  
Some contractors were accused of taking and selling private property without building owner 
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consent (NZPA, 2011a; b).  Damaged buildings contain personal items, intellectual policy, 
confidential information etc. which has to be carefully managed, and where possible returned 
to the owners.  There are also insurance implications (where applicable), such as, where 
contents can be salvaged (even if they are not salvaged) they will generally be removed from 
the insurance pay-out.   
 
Waste ownership agreements may be difficult to gain where the population is absent, such as 
following Hurricane Katrina.  As discussed earlier, many houses there had to be condemned 
by the local authority.  The condemnation process gave authorities authority to gain entry 
and ownership of waste materials.   
 
Laws need to clearly assign waste ownership and liability for loss of valuables. 
 
One important step in managing waste ownership issues is dividing the waste into two 
categories: personal property and building materials. 
 
As the Civil Defence and then the CERA demolition process matured, waste ownership 
issues were written into the demolition contracts.  The two different contract types being 
used (cost reimbursement and lump sum) required different approaches to waste ownership.  
As outlined in Section 8.3.4, for cost reimbursement contracts the waste was essentially 
owned by the Principal (CERA).  All proceeds from the sale of recyclables and the cost of 
disposal would be charged back to the Principal (and subsequently, the owner).  Under the 
lump sum contracts, the contractor assumed ownership of the waste.  Despite noting in the 
contract that personal property must be returned to the building owners and tenants, there 
was much less control on management of any personal items that were found during the 
demolition process for lump sum contracts.  Regardless of contract type, contracts need to 
clearly distinguish between personal property and building material ownership. 
 
Demolition and debris management contracts need to include waste ownership clauses.  Waste 
must be delineated into personal property and building materials. 
 
Where disasters involve the movement of property between boundaries, waste ownership 
issues become even more complicated.  The debris resulting from the 2011 Japanese tsunami 
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floating across the Pacific (NOAA, 2011) is an extreme example of waste movement where 
waste is being carried across international boundaries.  Further consideration and research 
would be valid here. 
 
Waste ownership laws need to be considered where there is movement of waste during the 
hazard event (particularly across jurisdictional boundaries). 
 
Operational management strategies 
Legislative structures need to be written to allow for the desired operational management 
strategies to be applied.  The CER Act, for example, gave enough authority for CERA to 
partially (but not fully) establish a centralised management process.  However, approximately 
two thirds of commercial property owners elected to manage their own demolitions.  If a 
fully centralised management programme had been desired, then a more directive legislative 
mandate would have been required.  It is understood that the legislation was not necessarily 
intentionally written to allow for centralised management because there was no mandatory 
requirement for property owners to allow CERA to manage their demolitions.  The 
legislative framework should allow for implementation of the desired operational structure 
(refer Chapter 8).   
 
Legislative structures need to allow for the desired operational systems to be implemented. 
 
Programming Flexibility 
The long regulatory lead-in times sometimes required are generally not practical in a disaster 
recovery environment.  For example, the 10 day notification period for works involving 
asbestos in Louisiana was considered too cumbersome following Hurricane Katrina.  It was 
reduced to just 24 hours to reflect the uncertainties in the programming of works post-
hurricane.  Where possible, regulatory time frames should be designed to account for the 
uncertainty around post-disaster operations. 
 
Flexibility around notification periods are useful to allow for necessary programme flexibility.  
Short notification periods are desirable. 
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Worker certification 
As discussed in Section 10.3.1, resources are likely to be stretched post-disaster and there 
may be a desire to increase the available workforce.  As a result, legislation or regulatory 
processes around worker certification may need to be altered.  For example, in Louisiana 
asbestos worker certification requirements were expedited through a regulatory change.   
 
Legislation or regulations may need to be altered to increase the available labour resources. 
 
Liability 
Many people may volunteer their services following a disaster event.  However, there are 
liability issues for authorities to consider where unskilled (and potentially unpaid) persons are 
involved in demolition and debris management.  Many people who participated in the World 
Trade Centre collapse clean-up have since reported significant health impacts (Landrigan et 
al., 2004).  Many States in the US have Good Samaritan laws to protect people who 
volunteer their services to help others (Phillips, 2009). 
 
Liability implications of volunteer or community participation need to be considered. 
 
Procurement 
Many emergency laws include allowances for expedited procurement processes during the 
response phase.  Use of expedited procurement approaches in the recovery phase has been 
less considered.  In many cases demolition waste contracts will commence in the emergency 
period (potentially being granted under expedited processes) and then endure through the 
longer recovery phase.  For example, in Christchurch, the CDEM Act allows certain 
delegated persons to enter into contracts for the purposes of the Act without regard to the 
Public Contracts Act 1959.  The project manager for the CERA managed demolition works, 
for example, was appointed during the civil defence emergency period.  The role, for 
continuity, was continued through into the recovery phase.  The initial appointment and on-
going involvement was publicly criticised (Williams, 2011a).  The possibility of contracts 
starting under the emergency phase and continuing through the recovery phase is highly 
likely for waste management works.  Procurement approaches, particularly for activities that 
transition between the response and the recovery phases need to be considered and included 
in recovery legislation. 
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Legislative provisions need to consider procurement requirements for contracts which commence 
in the emergency period and endure through the recovery phase. 
 
The uncertainty of work scope during the recovery period sometimes makes peace-time 
procurement requirements difficult to meet.  For example, dedicated debris management 
sites were identified for disposal of debris streams from the CERA managed demolition 
works in Christchurch.  No competitive tender was possible because of the inability to 
accurately define the scope of the contract.  The default alternative was that no tender was 
carried out.  Thus, potential cost savings were lost and the approach was perceived as being 
anti-competitive.  A process for managing procurement when the scope is uncertain needs to 
be included in regulations. 
 
Procurement regulations during the recovery phase need to account for the uncertainty likely in 
the recovery works. 
 
Recycling 
In many countries a waste disposal levy exists to encourage recycling.  Following several 
disasters, including the Christchurch earthquakes, the waste levy has been removed to reduce 
the economic burden on the community.  While that goal is achieved, the removal of the 
waste levy, in turn, reduces the economic feasibility of recycling.  Thus, where communities 
are short of landfill space or alternative waste management options this change can cause the 
selection of suboptimal waste management options. 
 
Other peace-time laws can stipulate recycling requirement which are unfeasible in a post-
disaster situation.  For example, the State of California has a mandate that requires all 
Counties to achieve a 50% recycling rate (with no disaster exemptions).  The penalty for not 
achieving this is (in 2003) was a $10,000 / day fine (County of San Diego, 2005).  Authorities 
in San Diego after the Cedar and Paradise firestorm had to balance the effect of this fine 
against the knowledge that they would not receive reimbursement from FEMA (because of 
monitoring systems which did not meet FEMA funding eligibility criteria).  In this case 
recycling was deemed to be essential (due to limited landfill space) and the county accepted 
that they would not receive FEMA reimbursement.  In other cases where recycling is 
unfeasible (as discussed in Section 9.3.1), laws such as this may unjustly penalise a 
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community that is having to balance environmental objectives to meet economic, social and 
recovery objectives.  Recycling mandates must be considered in light of a disaster event and 
if necessary a disaster exclusion clause should potentially be added. 
 
Peace-time recycling mandates should have disaster clauses. 
 
Transportation 
Transportation of waste will be a critical link in the waste management chain following a 
disaster.  All waste (hazardous, non-hazardous, mixed, separated, processed, unprocessed) 
must be moved from the disaster site to the waste processing, treatment and disposal sites.  
Flexibility needs to be built into legislation to allow for post-disaster responses.  For 
example, in Victoria the requirement to double-wrap in plastic any asbestos contaminated 
material was waived to speed-up the clean-up process, reduce health and safety risks 
(brought about when lining trucks in plastic) and to increase the number of trucks suitable 
for waste transportation.  In Christchurch, restrictions on truck movements (hours, weight, 
frequency and travel rates) were altered to facilitate debris removal.  Licencing and 
operational regulations may also need to be changed to respond to resource (truck and 
driver) shortages.  
 
Legislative allowances may be necessary to facilitate higher volumes of truck movements (truck 
weight, operation hours, location etc.) and increase the available truck fleet. 
 
11.3.4 Environmental and human health risk 
Emergency repair to waste handling facilities 
Waste handling facilities may need emergency repairs following a disaster event to mitigate 
any negative environmental effects and to ensure the facility is operational for disaster 
generated waste.  Legislative provisions need to allow for this.  Following Hurricane Katrina, 
the first Declaration of Emergency and Administrative Order made an allowance for all 
existing waste handling facilities to make emergency repairs to their facilities where necessary.  
In New Zealand, the author is advocating for solid waste management to become a Lifeline 
to allow facilities to take advantage of emergency works provisions in the CDEM Act for 
utilities (Brown et al., 2010b)(and included in Appendix P) which allow emergency repairs to 
be made to existing Lifeline infrastructure. 
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Emergency legislation should allow for waste facilities to action immediate repair following a 
disaster. 
 
Health and safety 
Disaster waste invariably contains hazardous material in varying forms and quantities.  
Health and safety protection for the workers and public is critical.  In general, in the case 
studies in this thesis, health and safety standards have not been altered.  Regulations, 
however, have been streamlined to expedite management of some materials: in particular 
asbestos following the Bushfires (Dangerous Goods Order / single waste classification) and 
Hurricane Katrina (NAA letters).  Legislative means to do this are important. 
 
Legislative provisions to expedite hazardous waste handling procedures may be necessary.   
 
As noted in Section 8.3.4, contractors have a tendency to cut health and safety corners to 
return a profit.  Regulatory controls are necessary to prevent this.  Following the 
Christchurch earthquakes a number of contractors entered buildings that were deemed 
unsafe to salvage materials and stripped internal building components.  Stronger regulatory 
control over this may have reduced the risk to workers.  As discussed in Section 8.3.4, in lieu 
of regulatory controls, contractual measures can generally be established.   
 
It is interesting to note that, in Christchurch, there was some negative reaction to the 
recovery authority, CERA, directing people as to what was safe and unsafe.  For example, 
directing contractors as to which buildings they could carry out an internal strip (as above), 
or ordering residents to vacate their houses in areas where there was a potential rockfall 
hazard.  Some people did not feel it is the government’s role to determine safety and risk 
thresholds for individuals. 
 
Legislative authority to prevent contractors (and public) engaging in risky behaviour (such as 
entering unsafe buildings) may be necessary. 
 
Waste handling facilities 
Legislative flexibility may be required to ensure existing facilities have adequate capacity and 
new facilities can be established to manage the disaster generated waste.  Facilities will likely 
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include: new temporary waste storage, staging, recycling and disposal sites, and permanent 
disposal sites (landfill, land reclamation).   
 
Environmental legislative flexibility is required to enable existing and new facilities to cope 
with the disaster waste. 
 
It is useful to have legislation and regulation prepared for potential waste management 
options, even if they are not used in peace-time.  In previous disasters, for example, 
incineration has been used as a waste volume reduction method to save landfill / disposal 
site space where previously it was not an accepted waste management option.  It would be 
useful to have regulations prepared for all options that may be used post-disaster. 
 
Regulations should be prepared for all possible disaster waste management options. 
 
Liability 
Liability for adverse consequences associated with environmental or human health legislation 
relaxation needs to be addressed.  As discussed in Section 10.3.1, the high uncertainty 
involved in managing disaster waste can potentially lead to higher risk taking, intentionally 
and unintentionally.  Where adverse effects eventuate, it may be difficult to determine 
whether site operators are responsible for adverse environmental effects or it is directly as a 
result of the relaxed environmental standards adopted.  This is particularly important to 
consider where standards are reduced at facilities which exist in peace-time.   
 
Liability for adverse effects from relaxation of environmental and public health standards 
needs to be addressed.  
 
11.3.5 Legislative considerations 
Emergency versus recovery legislation 
Recovery appears to be in a grey area of the law.  Many emergency provisions focus on the 
removal of immediate threats to people, property and the environment.  The question raised 
here is whether emergency laws are still applicable in a recovery situation - where there is a 
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chronic threat such as due to the presence of disaster waste.  Should there be a specific tier 
of laws applicable to disaster recovery as well as emergencies? 
 
From the case studies there are examples of how some emergency provisions have been 
effectively adapted for recovery efforts.  The use of Section 30A for example following the 
Bushfires is one example.  While the decision-makers felt it was possible to use this 
legislation (intended for emergencies with acute environmental threats) for recovery 
purposes, others may not.  The use of an ‘emergency’ mentality in a recovery situation is not 
always suitable either.  Ardani et al. (2009) note that there was an unnecessarily extended ‘ 
crisis’ mentality following Hurricane Katrina and that this inhibited long term planning for 
recovery works. 
 
In the author’s opinion, there is a need to distinguish between emergency action and action 
taken to enable recovery.   
 
Emergency laws are not always applicable to recovery.  Recovery specific legislation is 
recommended for large scale events. 
 
In many cases, notable difficulty lies in how to manage the transition between the emergency 
response and the recovery phase.  Disaster waste management activities often commence in 
the emergency period but are required to continue for significantly longer than the 
emergency phase.  A clear distinction needs to be made between those that extend into the 
recovery period and those that do not.  Those that are likely to extend need to be treated 
accordingly.  In Christchurch, the issue around letting contracts, under expedited emergency 
procurement procedures, that continued into the recovery phase is an example of this 
transitional challenge.  It is likely that a transitional period within legislation would be 
necessary to account for response and recovery activities that start and end at different times. 
 
A clear distinction between emergency and recovery activities needs to be made and allowance 
needs to be made for activities which transition between the two phases (and legislative 
frameworks). 
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Appropriate legal authority 
There are primarily two approaches to legislative authority for recovery works – either 
individual agencies are given authority to alter their respective legislation; or there is a 
recovery authority and they are given legislative authority over peace-time authorities.  
Whichever approach is taken, collaboration between key authorities is essential. 
 
In the author’s opinion the latter option (recovery authority having legal authority) is 
preferable.  As discussed in Chapter 6, this approach ensures that all decisions are made with 
the recovery objectives in mind, rather than individual agencies making decisions without 
understanding the necessity of the change or the impacts on other recovery activities.  This 
approach also reduces the impact of organisations acting with peace-time ‘bounded 
rationality’.  As is demonstrated throughout this thesis, disaster waste management activities 
have a wider impact on recovery and many different authorities are likely to interface in the 
management of waste.  Decision-making should be collaborative (with all relevant authorities 
such as environmental and public health officials) but the overall design of the recovery 
should lie with the recovery authority.   
 
Legislative authority needs to reside with recovery authorities in collaboration with other 
relevant authorities. 
 
For clarity, and to prevent the blurring of legislative authority, it is also preferable that 
recovery legislative and regulatory changes are set apart from peace-time regulation.  The 
CER Act Orders in Council, the LDEQ Declarations of Emergency and Administrative 
Orders and the L’Aquila Decree Laws and Prime Ministerial Decrees (OPCMs) were all 
documents which clearly delineated recovery decisions from peace-time regulations.  This 
created a clear distinction for contractors and the public.  However, in Christchurch the 
additional use of discretionary powers by some under the Resource Management Act to 
‘enable recovery’ led to some confusion amongst contractors.  While the intent was to aid the 
recovery, there was little or no collaboration with CERA officials and, in the author’s 
opinion, the regulatory relaxations were not necessarily required.  The perverse effect was 
increased environmentally risky behaviour by some contractors, on the assumption that 
regulatory agencies would be lenient towards violators.   
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Recovery legislation and regulation changes need to be clearly delineated from peace-time laws. 
 
Empowering the decision-maker 
Disaster waste management is one of the first steps in a disaster recovery process, so the 
ability to make good decisions quickly is essential.   
 
The provision of well-considered legal structures in a disaster response situation is critical to 
support, protect and empower decision-makers to facilitate an effective and timely recovery 
process.  If legal structures are too rigid, this could lead to a slow clean-up process 
(Basnayake et al., 2005; Luther, 2008).  If legal structures are too flexible, potential for 
inappropriate decision-making (intentional and unintentional) is increased.   
 
Due to the variability of the nature and impact of disasters and emergencies, current 
emergency legislative provisions are understandably broad.  This flexibility, however, is not 
necessarily appropriate for a recovery situation.  As discussed in Section 10.3.1, affected 
communities do not always accept regulatory or legislative changes after (or sometimes even 
during) the emergency phase.  If decision-makers fear public disaffection or even 
prosecution then decision-making could be significantly impaired.  Decisions would likely be 
slowed and a more risk-averse stance might be taken.  
 
New Zealand’s legislative framework for managing disaster recovery was significantly lacking 
prior to the September 2010 earthquake (Rotimi et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2010a).  This 
prompted the development of the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 
(CERRA) 2010.  The broad scope and powers within the Act elicited concern from the New 
Zealand legal community.  The primary concerns were (as quoted in an open letter) (Geddis, 
2010): 
 Individual government ministers, through “Orders in Council”, may change virtually 
every part of NZ's statute book in order to achieve very broadly defined ends, 
thereby effectively handing to the executive branch Parliament's power to make law; 
 The legislation forbids courts from examining the reasons a minister has for thinking 
an Order in Council is needed, as well as the process followed in reaching that 
decision; 
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 Orders in Council are deemed to have full legislative force, such that they prevail 
over any inconsistent parliamentary enactment; 
 Persons acting under the authority of an Order in Council have protection from legal 
liability, with no right to compensation should their actions cause harm to another 
person.  
 
Following the 2011 February earthquake, the CER Act was drafted which usurped the earlier 
CERR Act.  While some concerns have been raised about the revised Act, there appears to 
be less resistance to the CER Act.  It is unclear whether this is due to the greater perceived 
need for legislative flexibility (due to the large scale event) or whether lessons from the 
drafting of the CERRA legislation were incorporated successfully into the CER Act.  Similar 
concerns were raised by the American Bar Association’s Section of Environmental, Energy 
and Resources following decisions to allow the USEPA to waive any legislation following 
Hurricane Katrina.  The group submitted detailed comments to USEPA outlining concerns 
about the expanded environmental law exemptions stating that broad exemptions carry great 
‘risks and costs’ and that individual effects should be considered (Gerrard, 2006).   
 
It is important to note that there is the potential for officials to take advantage of the broad 
powers in emergency legislation.  Allegations of corruption have been made against the 
Berlosconi government during the response to the L’Aquila earthquake.  Legislation must 
include sufficient checks to mitigate the potential negative effects. 
 
If legal provisions are to empower decision-makers and protect the community and their 
environment, there needs to be a balance between flexible provisions and certainty of 
outcome if waivers are used.  Figure 11-1 by Myburgh et al. (2008) shows the balance 
between flexibility and regulation needed to be effective and efficient in an emergency 
recovery  
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Figure 11-1 The legislative and regulatory system for achieving resilience outcomes (Myburgh et 
al., 2008) 
 
The author suggests two possible approaches to balancing flexibility and quality of outcome: 
1) developing minimum acceptable standards and 2) creating legislation/regulation to guide 
decision-making rather than to prescribe outcomes.  In the first instance, minimum standards 
could be developed for such activities as: land reclamation, incineration, landfilling etc.  In 
the second case, clear risk assessment processes (similar to those discussed in Chapter 5) 
could be integrated into the legal process.  A greater understanding and certainty about the 
potential social, economic and environmental risks, identified through a clear risk assessment 
process, will empower decision-makers to move forward and act quickly to make well 
informed decisions.  Focussing on prescribed outcomes might limit the decision-maker, lead 
to inappropriate decision-making or generate perverse outcomes.  For example, as discussed 
in Section 11.3.3, following the 2003 Cedar and Paradise Fires authorities were required to 
meet a certain recycling target by law.  Authorities could not meet this target due to time 
constraints and funding policy regulations.  A more appropriate approach may have been to 
require ‘recycling to be maximised while minimising economic, environmental and social 
impacts’ and providing some guidance on measurement of these effects. 
 
Establishing a recovery legislative and regulatory framework before an event will greatly 
assist the efficiency and effectiveness of recovery works.  For example, the haste with which 
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the CER Act was written and accepted has introduced problems in implementation.  Poorly 
written parts of the legislation have at times made it difficult to carry out CERA’s duties, 
particularly in respect to demolitions.  An example is the requirement that all parties with 
financial interest in a property are contacted prior to demolition.  In New Zealand, where 
these records are not routinely kept, this requirement is particularly cumbersome and 
resource intensive.   
 
The quality of post-disaster legislation will also have an impact on the effectiveness of the 
recovery.  Following the L’Aquila earthquake it took four months for the vague call for 
‘expedited processes’ for waste facility identification and approval to be explicitly described.  
Without clear guidance on what constitutes ‘expedited processes’ and with the understanding 
that peace-time environmental standards had to be met, decision-makers may have felt they 
were not able to make these decisions quickly.  In L’Aquila there are likely to be deeper 
issues however, as despite the later definition of ‘expedited processes’, these powers were not 
fully utilised.   
 
If legislation is prepared in advance there is more time for analysis and consideration.  
Recommendations in this Chapter, for example could be incorporated.  One of the tangential 
benefits of pre-established legislation (particularly in terms of defining organisational roles 
and responsibilities) is the development of relationships between stakeholders pre-event.  
Existing relationships were noted to be extremely valuable during the author’s involvement 
in the response works following the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake.   
 
Clear disaster waste management decision-making processes need to be officially established, 
such as establishment of minimum acceptable standards, or transparent risk / decision 
assessment processes. 
 
Where possible, a legislative framework for recovery should be prepared pre-disaster. 
 
It is vital that the right people are empowered to make operational decisions, as also 
identified in the State of California Integrated Disaster Waste Management Guidelines (State 
of California, 1997).  Having the flexibility to make independent decisions quickly can 
expedite the disaster response and the recovery operations.  Delegation of authority within 
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organisations is also an important consideration to enable effective response and recovery in 
the event that key personnel are adversely affected by the disaster.  This is a critical aspect of 
an emergency plan.   
 
Recovery legislative provision must include appropriate delegation authority to empower 
operational personnel to make operational decisions. 
 
It is interesting to note that Italy and Louisiana (the only State in the US to do so) operate 
under a Civil Law system, whereas the other case studies were in countries with Common 
Law systems.  The reliance on prescribed rules (Civil Law) in a variable and unpredictable 
post-disaster environment may be more limiting than more flexible principle based systems, 
particularly if situations have not been predicted or accounted for in the legislation.  The 
difficulty encountered in L’Aquila around coding the waste is a strong example of this.  
Disaster waste managers could not manage the waste until the law had been written to allow 
them to act.  This situation could make be very disempowering for decision-makers and 
operational personnel.  Conversely, in a principle based system (Common Law), there may 
be too much flexibility and decision-makers may not feel supported in their decision-making.  
If there have been no previous experiences in a post-disaster situation and therefore no 
judicial precedent, decision-makers may be uncertain as to how to implement the law.  Again 
this could be disabling for the decision-maker.  A balance between the approaches is needed.  
This would be a research area worthy of further investigation. 
 
Liability protection 
Another tool to empower decision-makers is liability protection.  While liability or 
prosecution protection often forms part of provisions in emergency regulations, there is not 
always protection for activities carried out during the recovery period (that is, where peace-
time laws are adapted for recovery purposes).   
 
Liability was a concern, in some cases, when managing asbestos related issues.  Exposure to 
asbestos can cause mesothelioma - a rare and aggressive form of cancer.  The disease can 
take up to thirty years to develop.  After the legal actions that followed the World Trade 
Centre collapse (Phillips, 2010; 9-11 Research, accessed 2011a), USEPA were cautious about 
liability issues.  Prior to Hurricane Katrina a federal bill was proposed to establish a national 
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fund to compensate persons for exposure to asbestos, and thereby limit the liability of 
asbestos manufacturers.  The bill, called the “Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution (FAIR) 
Act of 2005”, was not passed.   
 
To date, the author is not aware of any significant legal action regarding worker or public 
health and safety following the clean-up efforts following Hurricane Katrina.  However, in 
2007 Louisiana considered implementing a Bill similar to the 2005 FAIR Act limiting liability 
of asbestos-related industries for adverse health effects resulting from asbestos exposure.  
The Bill was spurred by a recent lawsuit against a contractor who had supplied asbestos 
contaminated soil to a customer.  To the authors’ knowledge this Bill was never passed.    
 
If liability is not protected, decision-makers will likely be reluctant to make decisions that, 
while beneficial to recovery, may have personal risks for themselves.  The author believes 
that protection from liability shifts the emphasis from legal obligation to duty of care; or in 
other words, from a feeling of accountability to responsibility.  The CER Act in Christchurch 
recognises this and includes a clause for protection from liability for those acting under the 
Act.  In the author’s opinion, several decisions, such as the authorisation of the land 
reclamation activities at Lyttelton Port, would have been unlikely to go ahead without this 
clause. 
 
Liability protection within recovery legislation may empower decision-makers to make timely 
decisions. 
 
Liability protection, or lack of it, is another reason why the interpretation of peace-time 
legislation should not be changed post disaster (as discussed earlier).  Changing regulatory 
interpretation of peace-time laws to aid disaster recovery may be a difficult decision to 
defend should adverse effects materialise. 
 
If alteration of peace-time standards is practiced, liability implications should be considered. 
 
Liability concerns become more complicated when existing facilities (with existing licencing 
arrangements and approvals) are authorised to alter their peace-time operating parameters.  It 
may be difficult to determine if future adverse effects at the site are as a result of poor site 
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operation or as a result of the reduced legislation.  USEPA investigated the possibility of 
liability over operation of the Gentilly landfill post-Hurricane Katrina and discovered it was 
impossible to discount FEMA from future Superfund22 liability (Luther, 2008).  One landfill 
operator in Victoria advised that they would only consider constructing a landfill cell at their 
facility [post-disaster to assist recovery] if they were assured total indemnity from liability.   
 
The impact on liability needs to be considered for legislative or regulatory changes to existing 
facilities with existing approvals and licences. 
 
Consistency 
The large number of Declaration of Emergency and Administrative Order (DEAO) 
amendments and legislative changes following Hurricane Katrina was not ideal.  While it is 
important and credible that authorities were prepared to remove legal or regulatory hurdles 
to facilitate a recovery (and to restore peace-time standards as appropriate), the constant flux 
of requirements (DEAOs were typically valid for 30-60 days and there were 15 issued over 
four years) may have affected the efficiency of the waste management process and certainly 
made planning more difficult.  Uncertainty in legal requirements can have a number of 
impacts: 
- Community mistrust in the authority arising from constant changes in acceptable 
environmental and human health standards. 
- Unwillingness of local authorities and contractors to formulate a long-term plan for 
waste removal if there is a fear that laws may change. 
- Inability of facilities to forecast operations, costs, time, personnel requirements, 
which may have cost implications, especially for recyclers. 
 
As noted after the Cedar and Paradise firestorm in 2003, it also took time to get staff up to 
speed on current regulations (County of San Diego, 2005) so limiting changes to regulations 
will help in operational efficiency also. 
                                                 
22 Release of hazardous substances is governed by the Superfund law (officially, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, or CERCLA).  The Act provides the President and 
USEPA (or delegated officials) broad authority and flexibility to respond whenever there is a release or 
threatened release of a hazardous substance, or a pollutant or contaminant that may present an imminent and 
substantial danger. 
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Recovery legislation, where possible, should be enduring.  Best endeavours should be made 
to anticipate the likely measures required and the duration so that legislative changes can be 
minimised.  Using recommendations, in reviews such as this, to anticipate potential 
legislative requirement is essential.  Strategic and legislative planning must, therefore, be 
carried out in tandem. 
 
The number of changes to legislation or regulation should be minimised and a realistic 
duration should be assigned.  
 
Legal complexity 
As global awareness for environmental sustainability grows, societies are developing more 
and more complex environmental standards and operations.  This can make responding to a 
disaster situation increasingly difficult. 
 
Following the Kobe earthquake, Kobayashi (1995) noted that as waste management systems 
become more complex (recycling and advanced waste treatment methods), society’s ability to 
cope with disaster waste decreases.  In particular, Kobayashi was referring to the Japanese 
waste management system which primarily relies on incineration and disposal of residues to 
limited landfills.  The landfills did not have capacity to accept large influxes of non-processed 
disaster materials and the processing facilities did not have enough capacity for timely 
processing of the waste materials.  Many incinerators were in fact either damaged by the 
earthquake or were affected post-earthquake by power cuts.  Complex treatment and 
disposal processes with strict environmental standards are not designed for large acute 
influxes of materials.  Disaster specific facilities and associated environmental waivers in this 
environment are inevitable.   
 
In New Zealand there are seventeen pieces of legislation and ten to twelve regulatory bodies 
which could potentially influence disaster waste management.  Not only does the amount of 
legislation affect our ability to efficiently respond in a disaster but the complexity and 
prescriptive nature of laws can inhibit creative problem solving following a disaster.  Some 
environmental laws impose cumbersome regulatory requirements and some exclude waste 
management techniques which may become necessary in a disaster situation (for example, 
incineration or land reclamation).  Breadth and flexibility of waste management options are 
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imperative following a disaster.  Consequently provisions for disaster waste management 
need to be considered when establishing peace-time waste management laws and systems. 
 
Clear legislative authority and strategic management will help to cut through this complexity.  
In some cases clauses may be necessary within peace-time waste management regulations for 
emergency and response. 
 
Consider disaster waste management requirements when developing peace-time waste strategies 
and regulations. 
 
Consideration of other laws 
No matter what legislative or regulatory changes are made or what waste management 
strategies are adopted, a considered review of the impacts of those decisions on other 
legislation needs to be made.  For example, in Christchurch the temporary storage Order in 
Council conflicted with two local bylaws and another Act.  It was unclear what the regulatory 
hierarchy was.  In Louisiana, following Hurricane Katrina, the discrepancies between the 
Civil Law system in Louisiana and the Common Law system in the rest of the US was at 
times challenging to manage.  Approaches taken in the other hurricane affected areas of 
Mississippi and Alabama, consequently, could not necessarily be implemented in Louisiana. 
 
When preparing recovery legislation legal implications on peace-time legislation and regulation 
needs to be considered. 
11.4 Summary 
In general, disaster waste management laws need to: allow for flexibility for adaptation to any 
situation; be bounded enough to provide support and confidence in outcomes for decision-
makers; allow for timely decision-making and action; be collaborative; and focus on 
responsibility, not accountability.  
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12. Conclusions 
12.1 Introduction 
So, where to from here?  How can the findings in this thesis be used to better plan for and 
respond to disaster waste events? 
 
During the case study interviews for the disaster events analysed in this thesis, there were 
mixed responses as to whether future planning for disaster waste was valuable or not.  There 
are several possible reasons for this viewpoint: 
- The perceived difficulty in planning for the unknown. 
- The low frequency of such large scale disasters. 
- The perceived success of particular past (un-planned for) debris management 
programmes. 
 
By definition disasters are rare events.  Every disaster will have different effects and will 
require a different type of response and recovery effort.  The aim of planning is to try and 
predict the likely range of these disaster events and to put systems and institutional 
frameworks in place that can facilitate specific disaster event responses.  The challenge is to 
try to prepare plans and institutional frameworks that are flexible enough to be adapted to 
every possible disaster scenarios. 
 
This research provides a robust framework and a systems understanding with which to 
prepare future disaster waste management plans.  The findings in this thesis are by no means 
complete.  However, with the foundations provided here, it is believed that base plans can be 
developed for future improvement as our understanding of disaster waste management 
advances.  Section 12.2, summarises the basic principles and approaches for disaster waste 
management, based on findings in this thesis.  Note that Appendix Q includes a summary of 
all the Principles developed in this thesis (the italicised summaries from Chapters 6 to 11).  
Sections 12.3 and 12.4 provide a critique of the research and highlight the key research 
developments, respectively.  This leads into Section 12.5, which outlines some of the areas of 
disaster waste management that require additional research. 
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12.2 Application of the research 
12.2.1 General 
As demonstrated during this thesis, the nature of a disaster and its resultant impacts can 
dramatically influence a disaster waste management response.  In some cases existing plans 
and processes were found to be inadequate to cope with the scale or nature of the given 
event and ad-hoc, post-event changes had to be made.  As was demonstrated following 
Hurricane Katrina, some of the rules and regulations failed to facilitate the desired outcome.  
The comprehensive and well utilised US disaster debris management plans and structures 
had to be altered in the wake of such an unprecedented disaster event.  Some of the 
challenges faced have led to permanent changes to disaster response in Louisiana and the 
US.   
 
In an emergency, the objectives are generally quite clear: to ensure life safety, to ensure the 
community has access to basic life services, and to prevent further loss or damages to 
property.  In terms of waste management this involves search and rescue activities, road 
clearance and making safe structures.  A prescriptive plan, during this phase, is useful.  
However, during the recovery phase, the objectives are not so clear cut.  The objectives will 
likely change depending on the disaster impacts and corresponding recovery objectives.  
Disaster waste will inevitably be managed during both the emergency response and recovery 
phases and a single management approach may not be suitable.  Generally, decision-makers 
need to move away from the ‘crisis’ mentality of emergency response when dealing with 
waste during the recovery phase.    
 
As outlined in the research scope (Section 1.12) this research focusses on disaster waste 
management issues during the recovery phase.  Recovery, in general, is poorly planned for 
internationally.  Emergency plans are generally well developed, but most recovery plans and 
institutional structures (laws and organisations) are formed in an ad-hoc, after-the-event 
fashion.  It was not until 2011, that a National Disaster Recovery Framework was ratified in 
the US (the country which, arguably, has the best developed emergency response and 
recovery frameworks) to improve recovery preparedness (FEMA, 2011).  Previously 
‘recovery’ had been the last of the 14 Emergency Support Functions under the National 
Response Plan.  Interestingly it appears that debris management has not been explicitly 
included in the Recovery Plan and it remains as a function under the Disaster Response Plan.  
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The author believes that the key to make disaster waste management plans, focussed on the 
recovery phase, applicable to the growing number and complexity of disaster impacts is to 
focus on guiding decision-makers to a desired outcome, rather than following a prescriptive 
process.   
 
The approach developed by the author for planning disaster waste management systems is to 
1) identify institutional structures that need to be in place pre-disaster to enable effective 
disaster waste management; and 2) to provide decision-making guidance based on the 
disaster impacts; the desired environmental, economic, social and recovery outcomes; and 
the system principles outlined in this thesis and as discussed below.   
 
The author has developed a disaster waste management guidance document for New 
Zealand based on the findings of this thesis.  This is included in Appendix N.  The guide 
aims to balance the prescriptive needs of the response phase and the greater flexibility 
required during the recovery phase.  The document is written so that it can be used in the 
preparation of a context specific plan, or for use in a post-disaster situation, recognising the 
fact that many communities in New Zealand lack the resources for planning for rare events.  
The guide has been discussed with a number of emergency management and waste 
management personnel in New Zealand; some with experience managing waste from small 
and large scale disaster events in New Zealand.  The document is currently in draft form and 
will undergo further reviews. 
 
12.2.2 Institutional structures 
The institutional frameworks that should be in place pre-disaster are: 
 Strategic and operational management organisational structures 
 Funding mechanisms, and 
 Legislative and regulatory frameworks.   
 
The institutional frameworks need to be integrated into overarching response and recovery 
structures in the given context.  Flexibility and adaptability are critical.   
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Strategic and operational management organisational structures 
Hurricane Katrina was the only case study where roles and responsibility for post-disaster 
waste management were adequately defined in pre-disaster planning documents.  Not even 
the international UN Cluster system adequately defines who is responsible for management 
of disaster waste.  Determining roles and responsibilities pre-disaster will aid in a more 
effective recovery.  Preferably, these plans should be by position not by person, in the event 
of specific persons being unavailable.  To enable the organisational structures to be adapted 
to a variety of different scale and type events, it is often recommended that the organisational 
structures are modular (Auf der Heide, 1989).  
 
Relationship and trust building is important pre-event to reduce delays and increase 
efficiencies.  In New Zealand, the author has been canvassing support for waste 
management to be included as a lifeline (critical infrastructure service) in New Zealand.  This 
arrangement is advantageous from a legislative perspective (lifeline utilities have an obligation 
to, and are given special privileges in a disaster to enable them, to restore and continue their 
service provision); but more importantly from and organisational perspective.  Lifeline 
utilities in New Zealand engage in regular planning and networking which is beneficial in a 
post-disaster situation (Brown et al., 2010b). 
 
Other strategic and operational structures that may be useful pre-disaster include establishing 
Memorandums of Understandings to facilitate post-disaster mutual aid (cost and resource 
sharing) for activities ranging from temporary waste handling facilities (or sites) to personnel 
and equipment.   
 
Funding mechanisms 
Work can also be done to ensure the appropriate funding mechanisms are in place to enable 
effective disaster waste management.  Following the Bushfires, the government was quick to 
announce that funding would be provided for demolition and debris management.  It is 
unknown if this had been planned for or it was a reactive initiative.  Either way, the 
government recognised that insurance would not be an effective mechanism for this 
response.  Even the established FEMA system was adapted after the catastrophic impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina, and federal funding was increased to expedite the recovery.  Establishing 
funding responsibilities and funding coverage is essential in achieving recovery objectives 
and mitigating negative environmental, economic and social impacts.   
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While there is a need for funding mechanisms to be prescriptive (to prevent misuse as well as 
to provide clarity and certainty for disaster responders) it is difficult to anticipate all 
situations to which the funds may have to apply.  The author proposes the need to 
investigate tiered funding mechanisms that can be adjusted to the disaster impacts as well as 
an outcome rather than a prescribed process approach.  In lieu of that, organisational and 
operational systems need to be established to allow for the chosen funding mechanism to be 
adapted to enable the most effective response to the given disaster event. 
 
In terms of changing future behaviour and disaster resilience, private funding schemes are 
potentially more effective than public schemes.  Private disaster funding schemes such as 
insurance can potentially mitigate risk-taking behaviour (such as building in high risk areas, 
building substandard buildings etc.) through increased premiums (The World Bank and The 
United Nations, 2010).  If individuals are responsible for their post-disaster recovery funds 
then more ownership may be achieved of the pre-disaster risk.  If public funding is provided 
in place of insurance then less ownership of the risk is taken and mitigation measures (such 
as relocation) are unlikely to occur.  In that case there is greater need for government 
regulation of hazard prone areas both to prevent exposure to hazards and to lessen the need 
for costly demolition and waste management.   
 
In Victoria, Louisiana and Christchurch, funds and assistance were provided that were not 
originally planned for or expected.  While external aid can help to stimulate the economy 
(The World Bank and The United Nations, 2010), some argue that this may set a ‘funding 
precedent’.  In other words this may cause an increased dependence on aid and reduce future 
individual preparedness and capacity to help themselves during the response and recovery.  
The World Bank and United Nations (2010) refer to this as the Samaritan’s Dilemma.  In the 
survey of disaster affected communities in Victoria following the Bushfires, most noted that 
they expected to receive the same assistance in a similar or bigger size disaster.  
Commonwealth, state and local government in Australia, now need to consider the 
precedent that has been set by providing the demolition and debris removal assistance and 
consider how they want their communities to prepare for future disaster events.  At least one 
author noted that there was a certain expectation of assistance following the 2011 
Queensland floods in Australia (Ralph, 2011). 
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The provision of government funding (instead of relying on insurance) after the Victorian 
Bushfires, while appreciated by all those interviewed, was not without criticism.  Some 
community members surveyed thought that only insured persons should receive assistance, 
even though they acknowledged the community wide benefits of the government initiative.  
Some who were insured felt that they were due compensation from the insurance companies 
in addition to the services provided by the government.  In some cases insurance companies 
did compensate for this but it depended on the policy type, wording and insurance company.   
 
Before designing a funding strategy, authorities need to consider what message of 
preparedness it would like to send to its people: does it intend to always provide assistance?  
If so, how much?  Or is it preferred that communities are empowered to facilitate their own 
demolition and debris management works?  The author believes that if communities 
understand the scope of the assistance and the expected extent of their role in the recovery, 
from the beginning, this sort of dependence could be avoided.  Whatever approach is 
desired, the message needs to be consistent, well publicised and in-line with insurance 
company policies.  Subsequently, disaster waste management plans need to be designed with 
the given funding mechanisms in mind. 
 
Legislative and regulatory frameworks 
As observed in Christchurch, establishment of legislation post-disaster can be problematic 
and, if poorly written, has the potential to inhibit the recovery works.  Written well, 
legislative and regulatory frameworks can empower and guide the decision-makers and 
enable an efficient and effective recovery.  The specific legislative measures that are required 
to manage disaster waste are as discussed in Chapter 11. 
 
12.2.3 Decision-making guidance 
It is envisaged that the analysis framework established in this thesis could be adapted as a 
planning tool. 
 
The disaster impact indicators and waste descriptors established in Chapter 4 could be used 
pre-disaster to predict the likely waste scenarios following a disaster event.  Post-disaster the 
indicators can be used to rapidly assess a disaster situation. 
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Using the indicators and the principles developed in this thesis, decision-makers could 
prepare the framework for managing the waste.  In a post-disaster situation the process is 
likely to follow the decision-path below: 
 
1. Is the existing funding mechanism (private / public; lump sum / reimbursement / 
direct facilitation) suitable for managing this particular event?  For all waste sources?  
If not, what should it be changed to? 
 
2. Given the funding mechanism, what operational organisational approach should be 
used for each waste source (individual / central)? 
 
3. If a centralised approach is desired what contractual arrangements should be used 
(cost reimbursement / lump sum)?   
 
4. Should recycling be included?  If so how should it be included (onsite or offsite 
separation)? 
 
5. Are there any legislative or regulatory provisions or processes that might 
unreasonably limit the effectiveness of the disaster waste management progress?  If 
so, is it reasonable (and justifiable) to change these?  How should those risks and the 
corresponding legislative changes be managed? 
 
In order to answer these questions, disaster waste management (and recovery) objectives 
need to be set.  Chapter 5 presented typical environmental, economic, social and recovery 
objectives that may be targeted.  To ensure that appropriate and justifiable decisions have 
been made to reach the desired objectives, it would be useful to use the system effectiveness 
criteria described in Section 5.2.  The criteria would be particularly useful to assess and justify 
decisions where there are departures from established waste management (and related) 
standards. 
 
12.3 Methodology critique 
A cross-case analysis approach was a necessary approach given the lack of research in this 
subject area.  The literature review demonstrated that no author has developed a 
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comprehensive understanding of disaster waste management, in particular the influence of 
institutional frameworks.  Thus, a high-level study was required to enable the key elements, 
and respective links, of disaster waste management systems to be identified.  As described in 
Chapter 2, the best way to gather this information was by a case study approach across a 
wide range of disaster events and contexts.  The selected case studies included a wide range 
of disaster events allowing for good cross-case analysis.  The author did note, however, that 
the Samoan Tsunami case study, the only set in a developing country context, was less easily 
compared to the other case studies.  In particular, the risk management techniques, legislative 
frameworks and funding mechanisms were limited, and thus, offered little for cross-case 
comparisons. 
 
The most effective way of gathering the data was through interviews.  Because of the range, 
depth and unknown scope of potential issues involved in this exploratory study, it would 
have been difficult to use questionnaire or survey as a data collection method.  Carrying out 
these interviews in the affected areas is highly valuable.  The interviewees generally appreciate 
the interest that the research is showing in the disaster recovery (and the effort to come to 
the affected area).  In addition the researcher is in a better position to sympathise and 
identify with the issues involved.  If the author had not been fortunate enough to find 
funding to visit the case study locations, a survey may have had to be employed.  However, it 
was noted that on the occasions that interview questions were sent to and completed by 
interviewees (which was sometimes carried out on request of the interviewee) the level of 
detail in the written response was far less in the face-to-face interviews.  Now that a research 
framework has been established (Section 12.5), more directed lines of inquiry will be possible 
in future research.  Thus, surveys or questionnaires may become more useful.  In addition, 
quantitative as well as qualitative data could potentially be gathered, which will allow a deeper 
understanding of the issues identified in this research.  For example, researchers could put 
measures in places to monitor recycling and labour markets following a disaster to quantify 
the qualitative assessments made in this thesis.  
 
One particular weakness of the research methodology was that the data gathering was at a 
single point in time, or, it was a snapshot.  If time and resources had allowed, the author 
would have considered gathering data over a longer period of time which would have 
allowed for longitudinal case studies.  This approach would have been particularly useful as 
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much of the analysis was based on environmental, economic and social impacts which will 
take time to materialise.   
 
The author felt that the participatory research approach taken for the Christchurch 
Earthquake case study was both invaluable and challenging.  In terms of developing a full 
understanding of the issues involved in disaster waste management, there would have been 
no better approach.  The author was exposed to real-time decision-making.  Unlike the other 
case studies, which relied on a (often reflective) snapshot summary of the events, the data 
was raw and uncensored.  While this enabled the author to more fully understand the 
nuances of disaster waste management decision-making, managing this rich data has proved 
challenging during the compilation of the case study and thesis.  First, the author has felt that 
she has not been able to fully analyse her experiences due to confidentiality and sensitivity 
issues around the, still, very active disaster waste management programme.  It has been 
testing to separate the information that is publicly available and that which is private and this 
has created challenges when obtaining ethical approval from the various persons and 
agencies involved.  As a result, the author has found that, whenever there was a question 
about the sensitivity of the data, she has self-censored it.  Second, the richness of the data for 
the Christchurch case has affected the balance between the case studies in the thesis.  The 
majority of the examples given in the cross-case analysis chapters stem from the 
Christchurch case study.  There is a potential that the author has generalised some of the 
experiences from Christchurch where there is perhaps insufficient evidence gathered from 
the other case studies to verify the validity of the generalisation. 
 
Despite these challenges, the participatory approach was extremely beneficial to the research.  
In particular, it facilitated the development of practical disaster waste management guidance.  
Having been directly involved, the author now better understands what information, 
assistance and institutional frameworks would be useful (both pre- and post-disaster) to 
manage disaster waste.  While involvement in disaster response events, by their nature, can 
never be planned, the author recommends that disaster researchers embrace this opportunity 
where it presents itself.  Some researchers may shy from a participatory approach due to its 
lack of formal design and loss of researcher objectivity.  However, the value of the 
experience and real-time observations is immeasurable; particularly where the research aim is 
to produce a practice-oriented output.    
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The nature of disasters often means that a researcher’s ability to gather complete and 
representative data is limited.  Designing and executing a complete study is difficult when 
dealing with a (by definition) resource depleted and psychologically affected community.  
Flexibility in research design is important.   
 
12.4 Key research developments 
Disaster indicators 
The disaster & disaster waste impact indicators presented in this thesis (Chapter 4) are, in the 
author’s opinion, one of the most important and potentially powerful developments in this 
research.  The indicators demonstrate a method by which disaster managers, planners and 
researchers can simplify the very large spectra of possible disaster impacts, into some key 
impacts or variables which will likely influence the management requirements.  While there 
may be a tendency to develop hazard-centric descriptors, the author believes that the general 
impact-oriented descriptors, such as those presented here, offer several benefits.  First, the 
non-hazard-centric indicators are in keeping with the multi-hazard approach to disaster 
management, internationally.  Second, the general impact indicators will allow transferable 
lessons to be distilled from every disaster event, regardless of context and hazard type.  For 
example, as demonstrated in this thesis, there are many challenges in recycling following a 
disaster event.  It would be disadvantageous not to heed the lessons learnt following 
Hurricane Katrina or the Victorian Bushfires and apply them to the situation we are facing in 
Christchurch just because the waste was generated by a different hazard.  The more disaster 
events we can gather information from, the more rapidly our body of knowledge will grow 
and our disaster preparedness will improve.  
 
It is likely that different sectors within disaster management (for example, disaster funders, 
organisational managers, welfare providers, public information managers) would need to 
develop different indicators.  However, eventually it may be possible to develop a condensed 
list of key disaster impacts which would help disaster management planners from all 
disciplines.  One possible addition (or additions) to the indicators is resource availability 
(human, plant, equipment and financial).  Resource availability has not been included in the 
list of indicators but, as shown in this thesis, the availability or not of resources is a key 
decision-driver for managing disaster waste, and likely other aspects of disaster management.  
In terms of disaster waste, resource availability influences, at the very least, the choice of 
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procurement approach, price escalation, recycling and environmental and human health risk 
management strategies.   
 
Because the indicators are relatively abstract, further consideration is needed into how these 
indicators can be included (or not) into operational guidelines.  In the meantime, the 
immediate application of the indicators is, as discussed above, for transferring lessons 
between disaster events.  In addition, the indicators could be used by planners and policy 
makers to develop a range of diverse scenarios to test plans and policies.   
 
Risk management 
It would be relatively straight forward to facilitate the removal and disposal of waste after a 
disaster.  However, simply removing the waste without considering the environmental, 
economic, and social effects as well as the effects on the overall disaster recovery objectives 
would be irresponsible.  Because of this, many of the discussions in this thesis are based 
around risk management.  It is the disaster waste manager’s responsibility to identify and 
mitigate the many risks involved in disaster waste management (for example, environmental 
and human health risks, risk of cost overruns, risks to the recovery timeline).  How these 
risks are managed will determine how effective a disaster waste system is.   
 
Therefore, it is important that disaster waste management plans, policies and decisions are 
formulated with a focus on the risks involved.  In general, the recommendations in this 
thesis suggest that: the greater the risks involved, the greater the level of control (on quality) 
is needed.   
 
12.5 Future research 
12.5.1 Establishing a research agenda 
This research has been intentionally broad in its scope.  With limited structured research in 
the area of disaster waste management to date, a structured exploratory research project was 
required.  It is hoped that the holistic, systems-based research framework presented here will 
set the stage for future research.  A common framework will allow for more disaster waste 
management systems to be studied and compared across a wide range of contexts and 
disasters so that a richer, fuller, and more robust understanding of disaster waste 
management can be established.  
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In addition to establishing a framework for future research, a number of specific research 
needs have been identified.  Some are directly related to the findings of this research, while 
others are items that are more tangential to the research questions but were noted by the 
author during the research (in particular during the author’s experience working in the 
Christchurch earthquake response).   
 
By establishing a research agenda here, it is hoped that better quality and more focussed 
studies will be possible in the future.  The limited research that has been carried out in this 
area to date has been ad-hoc.  Much of the research (including this thesis) has been done 
based on past disasters using the limited information that is available.  Knowing the research 
needs at the time of an event will enable researchers to ensure that the appropriate data are 
collected.  It is also hoped that some of these outstanding issues can be addressed before the 
next major event, so that communities, in New Zealand and internationally, can be better 
prepared.   
 
The research areas identified are outlined below. 
 
12.5.2 Disaster impacts 
Develop waste quantity estimation techniques (pre- and post-disaster) 
A cross-context and multi-disaster assessment of waste composition and quantities would be 
a valuable addition to the literature to enable the development of better waste quantity 
estimation methodologies.  The development of a standard method of reporting disaster 
waste composition and quantities would be a worthwhile step toward enabling this.   
 
Develop comprehensive disaster waste classifications 
As noted, the waste classification approach and findings in Section 4.3.2 could be expanded 
to produce a comprehensive set of tables outlining the typical disaster waste characteristics 
for different hazard types and the different waste streams (by waste source) for each hazard 
type.  Developing a correlation between disaster impacts and disaster waste impacts may also 
be beneficial to planners. 
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Investigate the effect of disaster scale and other disaster impacts on disaster waste 
management approaches.   
As outlined earlier, this research has focussed on extreme events.  Further analysis would be 
useful to determine the effect of scale (and other disaster & disaster waste impacts) on the 
disaster waste management system design: Are different responses necessary for different 
scales of events?  Which disaster impacts are most indicative of the response type required?  
At what level(s) is a change in response (eg individual to centralised operational 
management) required?   
 
12.5.3 Effects 
Investigate the long term effects of disaster waste management systems 
As identified in Section 2.3, this research was limited in that it presented a ‘snap shot’ of the 
disaster waste management system and did not investigate the long term impacts of the 
approaches taken.  A longitudinal study of one or more of the case studies investigated here 
(or others) would be beneficial for validation of the analysis and the proposed system 
effectiveness measures. 
 
Determine the indirect effects of disaster waste management approaches 
While a qualitative understanding of the indirect effects relating to disaster waste 
management were presented in this thesis, more comprehensive assessment of these effects 
would be useful.  Indirect effects include: the effect that efficient or inefficient debris 
management have on the economic recovery; and the psychosocial and community recovery 
implications of the speed of debris removal process. 
 
12.5.4 Strategic management 
Investigate context specific strategic management design 
Context specific research is necessary to determine how recommendations in this thesis 
could be integrated into existing organisational structures, that is, disaster response and 
recovery management structures in different contexts.   
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Determine community engagement protocols 
While acknowledging the importance of community engagement in post-disaster decision-
making, this thesis has not fully investigated how peace-time approaches to community 
engagement may change post-disaster (for example, changes in risk tolerance and 
expectations).  The drivers for, limits to, and possible mechanisms to enable community 
engagement should be investigated.   
 
12.5.5 Funding mechanisms 
Develop flexible funding mechanisms 
As described in this thesis, flexible funding mechanisms greatly enhance a community’s 
ability to effectively respond to disaster waste.  A recommendation in this thesis is that tiered 
funding mechanisms could be useful where different levels and types of funding are applied 
for different disaster impacts.  This should be investigated further.   
 
Investigation into how funding mechanisms might be able to change from the current 
‘lowest cost’ approach to ‘best cost’ options would also be beneficial.  This would ensure 
recovery funds and activities are always directed towards the overall recovery goals.  One 
approach worth investigating is implementing ‘outcome targets’ rather than ‘process 
constraints’. 
 
Investigate the economics of price escalation 
As discussed, price escalation post-disaster is acknowledged but not well understood.  
However, it must be accounted for if communities are to ensure they have adequate financial 
resources to recover from disaster events.  Research into the factors that contribute to the 
price escalation; the estimated magnitude of the price escalation; and possible management 
techniques to prevent, or account for the likely price escalation, would be beneficial.   
 
Research demolition cost estimation 
Context-specific research on estimating demolition and debris management costs would be 
beneficial.  Costs could be based on hazard maps, building material, building capital value, 
etc.  This would enable better financial planning both pre and post-disaster.  Cost estimation 
should account for price escalation (see above). 
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12.5.6 Operational management 
Quantify the cost effectiveness of different contract types 
While a qualitative analysis of different contract types has been included in this thesis, it 
would be beneficial to carry out a quantitative study to verify the qualitative assessment.  For 
example, compare the cost effectiveness (considering direct and indirect costs) of the cost 
reimbursement and lump sum contracts following the Christchurch earthquake.  
 
Investigate the psychosocial effects of participating in recovery activities 
Some participants in this research advised that participating in the demolition and debris 
management programme had psychological benefits.  Further investigation into this and the 
limits to public participation, would be useful so that disaster waste managers can effectively 
plan their disaster waste management systems. 
 
12.5.7 Recycling 
Determine likely post-disaster recycling market responses 
As discussed in Section 9.3.1, recycling and reuse markets are likely to behave differently 
post-disaster, as materials flood the market.  Where most markets experience resource 
deficits post-disaster (for example, large demands for building materials and equipment), 
recycling and reuse markets are completely the opposite.  A quantitative exploration of the 
likely market response in a post-disaster situation would be beneficial.  The research would 
identify key factors that may dictate the feasibility of post-disaster recycling.   
 
Analyse the economics of post-disaster recycling  
As well as a focussed economic analysis of the recycling markets, the economics of recycling 
(from ‘cradle to grave’, onsite and offsite) needs to be better understood.  In particular the 
sensitivity to certain variables (for example: the value of labour; the value of recyclables; the 
volume of waste; the available demolition resources; space constraints and logistics) should 
be tested and general principles of post-disaster recycling could be derived.  A robust model 
could also be used post-event to help communities to determine the most appropriate level 
of recycling.  
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As discussed in Section 12.5.3, a better understanding of the indirect costs (particularly with 
respect to time delays in the debris and demolition works) would be beneficial to determine 
whether on- or off-site separation is preferable.   
 
12.5.8 Environmental and human health risk management 
Investigate post-disaster risk perception 
The survey in Appendix C indicated that in a post-disaster situation many people’s 
environmental and human health risk tolerance increases.  A more in-depth study to verify 
these findings would be useful.  In particular, investigating risk tolerance changes depending 
on community and personal impact.  In addition, investigating how risk tolerance changes 
over time (i.e. with time elapsed from the disaster event) would be worthwhile. 
 
Research into post-disaster waste handling facility design and operation 
Research and development of disaster specific guidance for the effective design and use of 
temporary storage / staging facilities and low-engineered disposal sites is needed.  Factors 
requiring consideration include space requirements, environmental factors, human health 
risks, noise and dust, pre-disaster site identification, land-use planning issues and cost.   
 
One waste stream in particular that has drawn special attention following the Christchurch 
earthquake is the potential management of treated timber.  Further research into various 
management options (disposal, waste-to-energy etc.) is required.  
 
Research into likely human health hazards post-disaster 
A detailed assessment of human health risks associated with various disaster events would be 
beneficial.  A comparison between the perceived and the actual human health threat (and 
reasons for any disparity) would be useful.  The assessment should consider the public health 
hazards from: the waste matrix, waste management options and handling the waste.  
Management of fine particulate matter, in particular, has been identified by some as a priority 
(GAO, 2008).  The effects of open burning post-disaster too (particularly where 
contamination of the waste is likely) would be worth investigating. 
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12.5.9 Legislation and regulation 
Perform context specific legislative and regulatory reviews 
As noted in Chapter 11, legislation and regulation is highly context specific.  The 
recommendations in this thesis need to be manipulated and applied to context specific legal 
frameworks. 
 
Review issues around waste ownership 
One aspect of the legal review in this thesis that required additional attention is the potential 
issue around disaster waste ownership.  In particular, a legal review around trans-boundary 
(domestic, local, regional, national and international) movement of waste would be valuable. 
 
Compare civil and common law systems 
An interesting area of further research would be the comparison on the effectiveness of civil 
and common law legal systems on post-disaster management.  This study would be valuable 
at a broader recovery level, to see what aspects of each legal system are most effective at 
enabling recovery. 
 
12.6 Summary 
It is hoped that the concepts in this thesis, in particular, the development of a disaster waste 
management planning approach based around key decisions, will empower decision-makers 
to successfully manage disaster waste in the future.  Understanding the key decisions that 
need to be made, the main decision-drivers, and their relationships will give decision-makers 
greater confidence to make timely and effective decisions in a range of disaster scenarios. 
 
It is hoped that the reservations felt towards planning by some of the research participants, 
will be allayed by the findings in this thesis, and that communities can prepare for and 
respond to disaster events more effectively in the future.   
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